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Summary 
In 2010, at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 16 in Cancun, Parties decided to consider the 
establishment of market-based mechanisms at COP 17 in Durban 2011. These should be based 
ensure environmental integrity and lead to a net decrease of GHG emissions. In addition, they 
shall be complementary to Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), supplemental 
to domestic efforts in industrialised countries and have a robust market design as well as sound 
regulative rules. The Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) had 
been requested to draft a decision for COP 17. 
At the beginning of the research project, market-based mechanisms were still fundamentally 
opposed by Bolivia and Venezuela. Malaysia raised the issue that low cost abatement options in 
developing countries had been addressed through industrialised countries via market mecha-
nisms, leaving only expensive abatement options for domestic action through the host country. 
Bangladesh and Tuvalu, amongst others, underlined that new mechanisms require a sound 
design avoiding market failure. 
Broad support for market mechanisms came from the European Union (EU), the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS), Australia, Colombia, Ecuador, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, South Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey and Russia. Even Saudi Arabia, 
which has so far not shown constructive behaviour in the debate about market-based mecha-
nisms, has submitted a rather progressive position. China generally saw the establishment of 
new mechanisms as feasible, under the condition that the US commits to firm reductions. 
Against this background we examined several issues relevant to a sound design of such a sec-
toral mechanism. The results of these analyses are briefly summarized in the following sections. 
Incentives for mitigation investments 
Compared to a project-based approach, sectoral mechanisms would result in a different role of 
emitters, investors and government. Under project-based mechanisms the host country gov-
ernment mainly has a supervising role while the economic responsibility remains with the pro-
ject developer or project owner. Under a sectoral mechanism, the implementing country gov-
ernment would have a more active role and would have to ensure that the emission reductions 
are actually achieved because otherwise no revenues to cover additional costs for greenhouse 
gas mitigation measures would be achieved. Against this background we scrutinise whether the 
shift in responsibility from emitters or investors to implementing country government would 
-effective mitigation op-
tions and, if so, by which means such an outcome could be avoided or limited. We analyse the 
challenges which may be caused by the different responsibility structure, discuss the extent to 
which potential instruments and measures can provide the required incentive to look for cost-
effective greenhouse gas mitigation options and provide a summary of the views of selected 
actors as well as a synopsis of relevant experiences gained so far in this context. We find that 
sectoral mechanisms involve strong governance skills of government in implementing climate 
policy and identify a number of potential policy instruments which would provide the required 
mitigation incentives with different degrees of direct or indirect linking with the global carbon 
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market. As a conclusion we find that pilot implementations would help to establish confidence 
in the new mechanism and encourage its broader application. 
Challenges for monitoring, reporting and verification 
The new market-based mechanisms (NMM) will require a monitoring, reporting and verifica-
tion (MRV) system that enables transparent accounting of their contribution to greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reductions. This discussion paper analyses how such a MRV system for the new 
market-based mechanisms can be designed so that it complies with the criteria of environmen-
tal integrity, data availability, transparency, cost efficiency, a sound institutional framework 
and transferability. To do so, the general academic and political discussion on MRV is summa-
rised in a first step; then, lessons are drawn from existing MRV systems; finally, proposals are 
put forward for the MRV of new sectoral market-based mechanisms. 
In terms of designing a MRV system for NMM, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can 
firstly provide a good starting point with its established methodologies, rules and institutions. 
However, its framework has to be adapted when moving from the project to the sectoral level 
because, for example, the role of national MRV institutions will be more important. Secondly, 
ssions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) provides important lessons for the 
set-up of institutions and MRV of data at the sectoral level (flexibility needed, tiered approach 
of data accuracy, etc.). Thirdly, new data collection, reporting and verification systems for de-
veloping countries are being currently negotiated, including systems for internationally sup-
ported and non-supported NAMAs, and for biennial updates of national emission inventories. 
While all these systems have not yet been implemented, the MRV of NMM should be consistent 
with these systems to avoid double counting and overlaps. 
From the analysis of the EU ETS and CDM methodologies covering sectors (buildings, cement 
and power), we derive the following institutional and data requirements for a credible MRV 
system of new market-based mechanisms: 
 Regarding institutions, various national and international institutions will need to be cre-
ated. Particularly the national ones will be important, as it is in the EU ETS, as data from 
whole sectors has to be monitored and reported. We assume that at least a national coor-
dination entity and national regulations are required. 
 At the international level, we propose to establish an institutional architecture that is very 
similar to the one of the CDM: a governing body taking politically sensitive decisions, 
several technical groups as well as an administrative support unit assisting the governing 
body, and internationally accredited verifiers who are responsible for time-consuming 
tasks. However, the concrete role of bodies will very much depend on the post-2012 archi-
tecture of the climate regime. 
 The most important conclusion is that MRV of NMM will very much depend on the out-
come of the climate negotiations, mainly whether NMM are governed in an international-
ly coordinated way or not. An internationally coordinated MRV system would more easily 
ensure environmental integrity because of common rules and accounting. However, a ra-
ther uncoordinated system is not unlikely given the current negotiations. Therefore, more 
analysis has to be conducted on institutions and MRV guidelines required to ensure a 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
IX 
minimum of environmental integrity of NMM in the case of an internationally uncoordi-
nated regime. 
Setting baselines 
The establishment of a NMM for the climate change regime post-2012 was decided upon in 
December 2011 during COP 17 in Durban, with a view to defining its modalities and proce-
dures during 2012. One of the crucial design elements to consider when establishing market-
based mechanisms is the definition of a reference scenario or baseline for setting emission tar-
gets and calculating emission reductions. In this paper we consider approaches for setting base-
lines for a sectoral-level NMM (sectoral crediting or sectoral trading). We define the baseline as 
the expected development of GHG emissions under the assumption that no new mitigation 
measures would be taken, i.e. under a business-as-usual scenario. 
We first review the literature on the different design components of baselines: scope or level of 
aggregation, reference data, dynamics and updating, metrics, conservativeness and stringency 
level. Then we present a set of evaluation criteria for assessing the appropriateness of different 
baseline designs for a NMM: environmental integrity, transparency, flexibility and data re-
quirements. We present and discuss possible sectoral baseline designs for three economic sec-
tors: power, cement and buildings. The baselines are developed on the basis of aggregated his-
torical sector-level emission trends, data on sector composition (e.g. fuels and technologies 
used, products, geographic specificities) and future demand projections. The selection of sectors 
allows the complexities of setting baselines in sectors with large-scale installations (power and 
cement) and in those with dispersed installations (buildings) to be considered. It also allows 
assessment of different design possibilities for cases in which sectors comprise heterogeneous 
technologies and installation types. Both absolute and indexed baselines are considered, and 
they are compared to potential emission targets for the sector. We rely both on extrapolations 
of historical emissions paths and more complex projections of emissions on the basis of regres-
sions on important emission drivers to estimate baselines up to the year 2030. We also discuss 
more complex modelling tools that have been used, e.g. in the buildings sector. 
The results show that data quality and the transparency of assumptions are crucial for setting a 
realistic baseline that leads to an environmentally credible sectoral target or emissions thresh-
old. The coverage of the data (in terms of both scope and in time) is important, and the availa-
bility of disaggregated data not only on emission levels but also on emission drivers (types of 
technologies, plant vintages, fuels used, etc.) can improve the accuracy of the baseline, but 
needs to be weighed against costs, simplicity and transparency. Developers of sectoral baselines 
need to be transparent about data, methods and assumptions made in the projections, and 
should ideally show through sensitivity analyses that their projections are robust in terms of 
changes in some critical assumptions, and that they are realistic in terms of what a technology 
can (and should) achieve. At the level of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), a fundamental decision needs to be taken about how much flexibility 
should be granted to baseline developers versus how much needs to be defined ex-ante 
through guidelines and default parameters. 
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Institutional design 
A key issue in the design of the NMM is whether it would be coordinated internationally ex 
ante or whether Parties would establish their own market-based schemes and try then ex post 
to link these schemes in order to enhance the coverage of the carbon market and thus increase 
efficiency. Basically both approaches would be feasible. However, the first approach may post-
pone an agreement since negotiations may need longer discussions before an agreement 
among all Parties could be reached. The latter approach may seem to be quicker since Parties 
could build up their own market-based schemes right away. Nevertheless, linking with other 
market-based schemes may take even longer or may not be possible at all since their designs 
may be too different and diverse. 
Two further disadvantages of the uncoordinated approach are: i) If there is no common inter-
national standard on the environmental stringency and the level of ambition, each party which 
intends to link its market- -based approach has to 
s comparable in its design and does not under-
ir 
scheme, this may be straightforward. However, if a tenth country wants to link with nine oth-
ers, then its scheme would have to be scrutinised by nine other countries while the tenth coun-
try would have to scrutinise nine other market-based schemes  unless countries who have 
linked their scheme do not actually start to coordinate internationally. ii) If two countries are 
already linked and are approached by a third country and one country were to assess the third 
scheme as too weak and not linkable with its own scheme, this country would need to 
insist that the other country does not link with the third country either. Otherwise the rejection 
of the first country would be undermined by the acceptance of the second already linked party. 
Extending the coverage of linked countries would thus always require the agreement of already 
linked countries. Extending the coverage would need to follow accession rules as they are ap-
plied in the WTO or in the EU. Experience shows that this is a time-consuming process. 
In addition to these disadvantages it has to be taken into account that schemes which comply 
with significantly different standards in terms of environmental integrity need to be kept sepa-
rate and cannot be linked. Otherwise the scheme with the lowest standard would trigger a race 
to the bottom and thus finally establish the standard for the entire scheme. Keeping the mar-
ket-based scheme separate would, however, result in lower economic efficiency and would thus 
certainly not be an optimal solution. 
Draft modalities and procedures 
The purpose of this paper was to provide a straw man proposal that can act as a starting point 
for discussions at EU level on actual textual proposals to be put forward in the run-up to COP 
18 in November 2012 
2012 on the modalities and procedures for a new market mechanism under the Convention, on 
the modalities and procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism (3/CMP.1), the Cancun 
Agreements (1/CP.16), on the LWG-LCA outcome of Durban (2/CP.17) and on relevant research 
papers. The draft included sections on definitions, institutions, modalities and one section on 
procedures. In addition, several annexes were identified, which would need to be further elab-
orated once an agreement on the core modalities and procedures of a new market-based 
mechanism would have been reached. 
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This paper was not published but only submitted to the Directorate-General for Climate Action 
(DG CLIMA), which focused on a similar research and consultancy project on legal aspects of 
the design of a new market-based mechanism. These legal aspects were therefore not elaborat-
ed further in this paper. Together both documents were used as a basis for a submission of the 
European Union on draft modalities and procedures for the new market-based mechanism. 
Capacity building 
The NMM can take many forms; international negotiations on its design have just started. Look-
ing at the experiences with capacity building for the Kyoto Mechanisms, capacity building for 
the NMM should be designed in a way that aims at a) enabling an informed participation of 
policy makers in the negotiations about advantages/disadvantages of approaches as well as 
possible designs of the NMM, b) allowing the potential for use of the NMM in the implementing 
country to be effectively harnessed, i.e. capacity building on domestic implementation, c) en-
suring real ownership in the implementing country and d) efficient spending of support funds. 
Based on past experience we recommend establishing capacity building programmes as multi-
tier approach with a careful selection of the relevant target groups. In the initial phase of 
NMM, policymakers should be targeted as they negotiate internationally. It is important for 
them to understand the opportunities, challenges and barriers of a NMM for their country and 
to highlight the importance of domestic policy instruments which provide correct incentives 
for private sector mitigation investments. Once the design of NMM has been decided at UN 
level, it will be important to train both public institutions and the private sector in the host 
country about how to implement and engage in NMM. Phase I could be conducted in a style 
similar to the one successfully applied in the European Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI); i.e. 
through informal, facilitated discussions of policy makers that allow a comparatively open dia-
logue based on inputs through expert presentations. 
We therefore recommend that the German government tenders, for example, three pilot im-
plementations of the NMM in which Germany would buy the generated credits. Countries 
could, for instance, be defined as eligible for bidding if they have reached the third phase of 
PMR. In order to generate a credible incentive, the pilot phase should run for 4-5 years (e.g. 
from 2015 to 2020), and the credit volume should be significant, e.g. exceed 100 million tons 
CO2e. Other donors could contribute financially. Selection criteria could be appropriateness of 
o-
vide co-finance and the existence of a NMM strategy that involves all key stakeholder groups, 
thus showing ownership. Moreover, the incentives to actually trigger mitigation should be scru-
tinised regarding their potential effectiveness. 
Piloting implementation 
The UNFCCC aims to build the rules and procedures of a NMM in the coming years. NMM pilot 
activities are desirable to inform UNFCCC rulemaking as well as to convince implementing 
countries that the NMM is an attractive carbon market mechanism. Therefore it is recommend-
ed that the German government engages in NMM pilot activities with selected partner coun-
tries and possibly jointly with other industrialized countries. 
Based on a checklist exercise for gathering the required information in a formalised manner, it 
has been identified that it would be feasible to use the Peruvian residential sector as a pilot for 
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NMM implementation. Peru fulfils the generic participation requirements and has been actively 
engaged in pushing market instruments in the field of climate change, both on the national 
and international level. The institutional framework allows for a relatively professional han-
dling of an NMM activity. Currently no major national initiatives target the sector in the sense 
that the NMM activity would do. On the other hand there is strong political commitment to-
wards fighting climate change and also the residential sector has been identified as a potential 
contributor to reducing GHG emissions in Peru. MRV arrangements and baseline definition for 
the sector are in their infancy, and so is the projection for emission reductions. Robust calcula-
tions for baselines and projections, and robust design for the MRV system are to be developed. 
While it is apparent that the NMM activity would result in positive co-benefits, the country re-
quires support to implement it successfully. This comprises finance, technical aid and capacity 
building, of which all need to be defined further. 
The short assessment for Peru makes clear that the current provisions put forward in country 
submissions are relatively easy to meet if the implementing country is generally positive to-
wards market mechanisms. But the assessment also shows that to a certain degree international 
requirements for baselines and MRV will require host countries to provide data, run complex 
studies and set up robust schemes. This can become a major challenge for pilot implementa-
tions of the NMM. 
Conclusion 
In 2010 in Cancun, Parties agreed to consider the establishment of market-based mechanisms 
covering broad segments of the economy at the next COP in Durban. During the latter the new-
market-based mechanism (NMM) was actually defined. In addition Parties agreed in Durban to 
conduct a work programme in 2012 with a view to developing modalities and procedures for 
the implementation of the NMM. 
In the course of 2012 it was, however, not possible to develop a draft of the modalities and 
procedures for adoption at COP 18 in Doha. It became clear that the views of Parties are still far 
apart. Some developed countries, particularly the United States (USA), Japan and New Zealand, 
dislike any approval of NMM implementation at UNFCCC level and prefer a pure transparency 
approach (Framework for Various Approaches, FVA) without any third party review which 
might result in corrections. Some developing countries, particularly Brazil, China and India, 
highlight the current lack of demand for any market-based approach. Generally they would 
prefer the coordinated approach suggested by the EU but would put it into force only if the 
level of mitigation ambition of developed countries were increased significantly. Some other 
oposal but 
prefer to extend the NMM to sectors such as forestry which the EU cannot accept under the 
NMM, at least not at this point in time. 
Against this background it can be questioned whether the negotiations in the run-up to COP 21 
in Paris will ever be able to agree on a joint understanding of the NMM. Moreover, if the result 
of Durban is taken literally, i.e. if it is assumed that all parties will agree to commitments in 
2015 covering all sectors, then it can also be asked whether a sectoral approach, the concepts 
of which stem from the period before Copenhagen, is of any additional value for the future 
regime after 2020. 
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Instead of trying to find an agreement on market-based mechanisms covering broad segments 
of the economy, Parties should focus on the more general discussion under the Ad-hoc Work-
ing Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) and determine the extent to which flexibility in im-
plementing economy-wide targets under the ADP will be required and by what means such 
flexibility can be provided. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Jahr 2010 bei der Klimakonferenz in Cancun (COP 16) entschieden die Vertragsstaaten, die 
Etablierung neuer marktbasierter Mechanismen bei der COP 17 im Jahr 2011 in Durban zu 
erwägen. Diese sollten auf den Prinzipien freiwillige Teilnahme, Erfassung umfassender Seg-
mente der Gesamtwirtschaft (Sektoren), Sicherstellung der Umweltintegrität und Nettominde-
rung von Treibhausgasen (THG) basieren. Darüber hinaus sollen sie zusätzlich zu National an-
gepassten Minderungsaktivitäten (NAMAs) in Entwicklungsländern und zu Minderungsaktivitä-
ten in Industrieländern sein. Ferner soll das Marktdesign robust und der Regulierungsrahmen 
solide sein. Die Ad-hoc Arbeitsgruppe zu langfristigen gemeinsamen Aktivitäten (AWG-LCA) 
wurde beauftragt einen Entscheidungsentwurf für COP 17 zu entwerfen. 
Zu Beginn des Forschungsvorhabens wurden marktbasierte Mechanismen weiterhin von Bolivi-
en und Venezuela abgelehnt. Malaysia wies darauf hin, dass kostengünstige Minderungsoptio-
nen in Entwicklungsländern von den Industrieländern mittels Marktmechanismen bereits er-
schlossen wurden und nur noch kostspielige Minderungsoptionen für nationale Minderungs-
maßnahmen der Gastgeberländer übrig blieben. Bangladesch und Tuvalu haben, neben ande-
ren, betont, dass neue Mechanismen solide ausgestaltet werden müssen um ein Scheitern zu 
verhindern. 
Klare Unterstützung für Marktmechanismen kam von der Europäischen Union (EU), der Allianz 
der kleinen Inselstaaten (AOSIS), Australien, Kolumbien, Ekuador, Japan, Neuseeland, Norwe-
gen, Papua Neuguinea, Peru, Südkorea, Singapur, Schweiz, Türkei und Russland. Selbst Saudi 
Arabien, das bis dahin nicht durch konstruktives Verhalten in der Debatte über marktbasierte 
Mechanismen aufgefallen war, hat eine vergleichsweise fortschrittliche Position eingebracht. 
China hielt die Etablierung von neuen Marktmechanismen grundsätzlich für möglich, voraus-
gesetzt dass sich die USA zu verbindlichen Reduktionen verpflichtet. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund haben wir verschiedene Fragestellungen analysiert, die für eine solide 
Ausgestaltung sektoraler Mechanismen relevant sind. Die Ergebnisse dieser Analysen sind in 
den folgenden Abschnitten kurz zusammengefasst. 
Anreize für Minderungsinvestitionen 
Im Vergleich zu projekt-basierten Mechanismen führen sektorale Mechanismen zu einer Ver-
änderung der Rollen von Emittenten, Investoren und Regierungen. Bei einem projekt-basierten 
Ansatz hat die Regierung des Gastlandes im Wesentlichen eine überwachende Rolle, während 
die ökonomische Verantwortung beim Eigentümer des Projekts oder beim Projektentwickler 
verbleibt. Unter einem sektoralen Mechanismus würde die Regierung eine aktivere Rolle über-
nehmen und müsste sicherstellen, dass die Emissionsreduktionen tatsächlich auch erzielt wer-
den, da ansonsten die Erträge zur Finanzierung der Treibhausgasminderungsmaßnahmen nicht 
erbracht werden könnten. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersuchen wir, ob der Wechsel in der 
Verantwortung die Anreize für die Suche nach kostengünstigen Minderungsoptionen mindern 
oder beseitigen würde und, falls ja, durch welche Maßnahmen eine solche Wirkung verhindert 
oder begrenzt werden kann. Wir analysieren die Herausforderungen, die sich aus der verän-
derten Verantwortungsstruktur ergeben, diskutieren, inwieweit verschiedene Instrumente und 
Maßnahmen, die erforderlichen Anreize zur Suche nach kostengünstigen Treibhausgasminde-
rungsoptionen bieten können, und liefern eine Zusammenfassung der Standpunkte ausgewähl-
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ter Akteure sowie eine Übersicht über bisher in diesem Zusammenhang gemachte, relevante 
Erfahrungen. Wir stellen fest, dass sektorale Mechanismen eine solide Steuerungsfähigkeit der 
jeweiligen Regierung bei der Umsetzung von Klimapolitik erfordern und identifizieren mehre-
re potenzielle Instrumente, die die notwendigen Minderungsanreize mit unterschiedlichem 
Grad direkter oder indirekter Einbindung in den globalen Kohlenstoffmarkt bieten. Als Schluss-
folgerung stellen wir fest, dass Pilotumsetzungen dazu beitragen würden, das erforderliche 
Vertrauen für den neuen Mechanismus zu etablieren und eine breitere Anwendung fördern 
würden. 
Herausforderungen für Monitoring, Berichterstattung und Verifizierung 
Der neue Marktmechanismus (NMM) benötigen ein System zur Überwachung, Berichterstattung 
und Überprüfung (MRV), das eine transparente Anrechnung von Emissionsminderungen er-
möglicht. Dieses Diskussionspapier untersucht, wie ein solches MRV-System für den NMM aus-
gestaltet werden kann, damit die Kriterien ökologische Integrität, Datenverfügbarkeit, Transpa-
renz, Kosteneffizienz, solider institutioneller Rahmen und Übertragbarkeit erfüllt werden. In 
einem ersten Schritt wird die allgemeine wissenschaftliche und politische Diskussion über MRV 
zusammengefasst, dann Erkenntnisse aus bestehenden MRV-Systemen gezogen und schließlich 
weitere Vorschläge für das MRV des NMM aufgeführt. 
Zur Ausgestaltung eines MRV-Systems für NMM kann erstens der Clean Development Mecha-
nismus (CDM) mit den etablierten Methoden, Regeln und Institutionen eine gute Ausgangsbasis 
bieten. Allerdings müssen die Rahmenbedingungen für den Wechsel von der Projekt- zur Sek-
torebene angepasst werden, da zum Beispiel die Rolle der nationalen MRV-Institutionen wich-
tiger sein wird. Zweitens bietet das Emissionshandelssystem der Europäischen Union (EU ETS) 
auf sektoraler Ebene wichtige Erkenntnisse für den Aufbau von Institutionen und MRV-Daten 
(benötigte Flexibilität, mehrstufiger Ansatz der Datengenauigkeit, etc.). Drittens werden derzeit 
für Entwicklungsländer neue Systeme für Datenerhebung, Berichterstattung und Verifizierung 
einschließlich Systemen für international geförderte oder nicht geförderte NAMAs sowie die 
Aktualisierung der zweijährigen nationalen Emissionsinventare verhandelt. Obwohl diese Sys-
teme bisher noch nicht umgesetzt wurden, sollte MRV für NMM konsistent mit diesen Systemen 
sein, um Doppelzählungen und Überlappungen zu vermeiden. 
Aus der Analyse der im EU ETS und CDM erfassten Sektoren (Gebäude, Strom und Zement) lei-
ten wir folgende institutionelle Voraussetzungen und Datenanforderungen für ein glaubwürdi-
ges MRV-System der neuen Marktmechanismen ab: 
 In Bezug auf Institutionen müssen verschiedene nationale und internationale Institutio-
nen geschaffen werden. Insbesondere sind die nationalen Institutionen wichtig, sehr ähn-
lich wie beim EU ETS, da die Daten aus gesamten Sektoren überwacht und berichtet wer-
den müssen. Wir gehen davon aus, dass mindestens eine nationale Koordinationsstelle 
sowie nationale Vorschriften dafür erforderlich sind. 
 Wir schlagen vor, auf internationaler Ebene eine institutionelle Struktur aufzubauen, die 
dem CDM sehr ähnlich ist: eine Regulierungsinstitution, die politisch sensible Entschei-
dungen trifft, mehrere technische Arbeitsgruppen, eine administrative Einheit zur Unter-
stützung der Regulierungsinstitution sowie international akkreditierte Verifizierer, die die 
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zeitaufwendigen Aufgaben übernehmen. Allerdings wird die konkrete Rolle dieser Insti-
tutionen sehr stark von der post-2012-Architektur abhängen. 
 Das wichtigste Fazit: MRV für den NMM wird sehr stark vom Ergebnis der Klimaverhand-
lungen abhängen, vor allem ob der NMM international koordiniert wird oder nicht. Ein 
international koordiniertes MRV-System würde aufgrund der gemeinsamen Regeln und 
Bilanzierungen leichter die ökologische Integrität sicherstellen. Allerdings ist ein eher 
unkoordiniertes System angesichts der laufenden Verhandlungen nicht unwahrscheinlich. 
Im Fall einer international unkoordinierten Regelung müssen mehr Analysen von Institu-
tionen durchgeführt und MRV-Richtlinien geschaffen werden, um ein Minimum ökologi-
scher Integrität von NMM zu gewährleisten. 
Bestimmung von Baselines 
Die Einrichtung eines neuen Marktmechanismus zur Klimapolitik nach 2012 wurde im Dezem-
ber 2011 während der COP 17 in Durban beschlossen, mit der Absicht ihre Modalitäten und 
Verfahren noch im Jahr 2012 festzulegen. Einer der entscheidenden Gestaltungselemente, die 
zur Gründung marktbasierter Mechanismen dazugehört, ist die Festlegung eines Referenzsze-
narios oder einer Baseline für die Bestimmung von Emissionszielen und für die Berechnung 
von Emissionsreduktionen. In diesem Bericht betrachten wir Ansätze für die Festlegung dieser 
Baselines auf sektoraler NMM-Ebene (sektorale Kreditierung oder sektoraler Handel). Wir defi-
nieren die Baseline als eine erwartete Entwicklung der Treibhausgasemissionen unter der An-
nahme, dass keine neuen Verminderungsmaßnahmen gemacht werden, d.h. entsprechend ei-
nem Business-as-usual-Szenario. 
Wir haben zuerst die Literatur zu den verschiedenen Gestaltungselementen von Baselines ana-
lysiert: Umfang oder Höhe der Aggregation, Referenzdaten, Dynamik und Aktualisierung, Met-
riken, Konservativität und Stringenz. Dann präsentieren wir eine Reihe von Kriterien zur Be-
wertung der Eignung verschiedener möglicher Baselines für den NMM: ökologische Integrität, 
Transparenz, Flexibilität und Datenanforderungen. Wir präsentieren und diskutieren mögliche 
sektorale Baselines für drei Wirtschaftssektoren: Strom, Zement und Gebäude. Die Baselines 
werden auf der Grundlage von sektoral aggregierten historischen Emissionstrends, Daten zur 
Branchenstruktur (z. B. Kraftstoffe und Technologien betreffend, Produkte, geografische Beson-
derheiten) und Nachfrageprojektionen entwickelt. Die Auswahl der Sektoren ermöglicht eine 
komplexe Bestimmung von Baselines in Sektoren mit Großanlagen (Strom und Zement) und 
verteilten Anlagen (Gebäude) in Betracht zu ziehen. Sie ermöglicht auch eine Bewertung ver-
schiedener Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten im Falle von Sektoren mit heterogene Technologien 
und Anlagentypen. Es werden sowohl absolute als auch indizierte Baselines betrachtet und an-
hand potenzieller Emissionsziele für diese Sektoren verglichen. Wir nutzen sowohl Extrapolati-
onen historischer Emissionspfade, als auch Projektionen auf der Basis von komplexeren emissi-
onstreiberbasierten Regressionsmodellen, um Baselines bis 2030 abzuschätzen. Außerdem dis-
kutieren wir komplexere Modellierungsinstrumente, die z. B. im Gebäudebereich verwendet 
wurden. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Qualität der Daten und die Transparenz der Annahmen von 
entscheidender Bedeutung für die Bestimmung einer realistischen Baseline sind, die zu ökolo-
gisch glaubwürdigen sektoralen Emissionszielen oder Emissionsschwellwerten führen. Der Er-
fassungsgrad der Daten (sowohl in geographischer wie zeitlicher Hinsicht) spielt dabei eine 
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wichtige Rolle. Die Verfügbarkeit disaggregierter Daten, nicht nur in Bezug auf Emissionen, 
sondern auch auf die Emissionstreiber (Technologieart, Anlagenbaujahr, Brennstoff, etc.), kön-
nen die Genauigkeit der Baseline verbessern, was aber im Hinblick auf Kosten, Einfachheit und 
Transparenz abgewogen werden muss. Entwickler von sektoralen Baselines müssen transparent 
sein hinsichtlich ihrer Daten, Methoden und Projektionsannahmen. Sie sollten idealerweise 
durch Sensitivitätsanalysen zeigen, dass die Baselines im Hinblick auf kritische Annahmeverän-
derungen hinreichend robust sind und dass Annahmen, was eine Technologie erreichen kann 
(und soll), realistisch sind. Auf Ebene der Klimarahmenkonvention (UNFCCC) muss eine grund-
sätzliche Entscheidung darüber gefällt werden, wie viel Flexibilität Entwicklern von Baselines 
gewährt werden kann und wie viel vorab durch Richtlinien und Default-Parameter definiert 
werden sollte. 
Institutionelles Design 
Ein zentrales Thema bezüglich des NMM ist, ob seine Ausgestaltung vorab international koor-
diniert werden soll oder ob die Vertragsstaaten zunächst ihre eigenen marktbasierten Systeme 
etablieren um sie später mit anderen Systemen zu verknüpfen, um auf diese Weise eine Erwei-
terung des globalen Kohlenstoffmarktes und den damit verbundenen Effizienzsteigerungen zu 
erzielen. Grundsätzlich wären beide Ansätze machbar. Allerdings kann der erste Ansatz eine 
Vereinbarung hinauszögern, da längere Verhandlungen notwendig wären, um eine für alle 
Vertragsstaaten akzeptable Vereinbarung zu finden. Der zweite Ansatz scheint schneller zu 
funktionieren, da Vertragsstaaten ihre eigenen marktbasierten Systeme sofort aufbauen könn-
ten. Dennoch kann die Verknüpfung mit anderen marktbasierten Systemen länger dauern oder 
auch überhaupt nicht zustande kommen, da die Designs möglicherweise zu unterschiedlich 
und vielzählig sind. 
Zwei weitere Nachteile des unkoordinierten Ansatzes sind: i) Wenn es keinen gemeinsamen 
internationalen Standard für Umweltintegrität und Ambitionsniveau gibt und wenn jeder Ver-
tragsstaat, sein marktbasiertes System mit einem anderen marktorientierten Vertragsstaaten 
verknüpfen möchte, hinterfragen muss, ob die Regelung des anderen Vertragsstaats vergleich-
bar ist und ob das eigen System durch die Verknüpfung nicht unterminiert wird. Solange es 
nur wenige Staaten gibt, die eine Verknüpfung ihrer Regelungen anstreben, könnte dies un-
problematisch erfolgen. Wenn allerdings ein zehntes Land sich mit neun anderen verbinden 
möchte, dann muss einerseits dieses System des zehnten Landes von den neun anderen geprüft 
werden und andererseits die neun anderen marktbasierten Systeme vom zehnten Land geprüft 
werden  es sei denn, die Länder, die ihre Systeme verknüpft haben, sind an einer Koordination 
ihrer Systeme gar nicht interessiert. ii) Wenn zwei Länder bereits verknüpft sind und von ei-
nem Drittland angeworben werden und es würde sich herausstellen, dass das eine Land das 
Drittlandsystem als zu schwach bewertet und es somit mit dem eigenen System nicht verknüpf-
bar ist, dann müsste das erste Land darauf bestehen, dass das zweite Land sich nicht mit dem 
Drittland verbinden darf. Andernfalls würde die Ablehnung des ersten Landes die Annahme 
des zweiten Landes, welches bereits verlinkt ist, untergraben. Die Ausweitung der bereits ver-
bundenen Länder würde immer die Zustimmung der bereits verlinkten Länder benötigen. Die-
se Ausweitung erfordert Beitrittsregelungen, wie sie im Rahmen der WTO oder in der EU auf-
zufinden sind. Die bisherigen Erfahrungen zeigen, dass dies ein langwieriger Prozess ist. 
Neben diesen Nachteilen ist zu berücksichtigen, dass Systeme, die mit erheblichen unterschied-
lichen Standards in Bezug, auf die ökologische Integrität, getrennt zu halten sind und nicht 
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verknüpft werden können. Ansonsten würde das System mit dem niedrigsten Standard einen 
Wettlauf nach unten auslösen und damit schließlich den Standard des ganzen Systems beein-
flussen. Werden die marktbasierten Systeme jedoch separat gehalten, so würde dies zu einer 
geringeren Wirtschaftlichkeit führen und damit sicherlich nicht zu einer optimalen Lösung. 
Entwurf von Umsetzungsregeln 
Der Zweck dieses Papiers war es, einen Entwurf als Ausgangspunkt für die Diskussionen auf EU-
Ebene zu erarbeiten und Textvorschläge im Vorfeld der COP 18 im November in Doha, Katar 
zu unterbreiten. Der Entwurf wurde basierend auf der EU-Eingabe zu Modalitäten und Verfah-
ren (Modalities & Procedures) für einen neuen Marktmechanismus unter der Klimarahmenkon-
vention vom März 2012 erstellt. Ferner wurden auch die Modalitäten und Verfahren für einen 
Clean Development Mechanismus (3/CMP.1), die Vereinbarungen von Cancún (1/CP.16), das 
LWG-LCA Ergebnis von Durban (2/CP.17) sowie relevante Forschungsarbeiten herangezogen. 
Der Entwurf enthält Abschnitte über Definitionen, Institutionen, Modalitäten und Verfahren. 
Darüber hinaus wurden mehrere Anhänge identifiziert, die weiter ausgearbeitet werden müs-
sen, sobald eine Einigung über die Modalitäten und Verfahren des neuen marktbasierten Me-
chanismus erreicht wurde. 
Dieses Paper wurde nicht veröffentlicht, sondern lediglich der Generaldirektion für Klimapoli-
tik (DG CLIMA) übergeben, die sich in einem ähnlichen Forschungs- und Beratungsprojekt auf 
die rechtlichen Aspekte des Designs des NMM konzentrierten. Diese rechtlichen Aspekte wur-
den daher in diesem Papier nicht weiter ausgearbeitet. Gemeinsam wurden beide Dokumente 
als Basis für den Entwurf der EU zu Modalitäten und Verfahren für den NMM verwendet. 
Capacity Building 
Der NMM kann viele Formen annehmen. Internationale Verhandlungen über seine Ausgestal-
tung haben gerade erst begonnen. Mit Blick auf die Erfahrungen mit Capacity Building bei 
Kyoto-Mechanismen, sollte die Ausgestaltung des Capacity Building für den NMM folgende Zie-
le erfüllen: a) die Befähigung der politischen Entscheidungsträger zu einer informierten Teil-
nahme an den Verhandlungen über Vor- und Nachteile von Ansätzen sowie über eine mögli-
che Ausgestaltungen des NMM, b) eine effektive Nutzung des NMM-Potenzials im Umsetzungs-
land, d.h. Fortbildung bezüglich nationaler Umsetzung, c) echte Eigenverantwortung im Um-
setzungsland und d) effiziente Ausgaben der Unterstützungsgelder. 
Aufgrund bisheriger Erfahrungen empfehlen wir den Ausbau von Fortbildungsprogrammen als 
mehrstufigen Ansatz mit einer sorgfältigen Auswahl relevanter Zielgruppen. In der Anfangs-
phase des NMM sollten die politischen Entscheidungsträger adressiert werden, da sie internati-
onal verhandeln. Es ist wichtig, die Chancen, Herausforderungen und Hindernisse des NMM für 
ihr Land zu verstehen und die Bedeutung nationaler Instrumente, die Anreize für privatwirt-
schaftliche Investitionen im Klimaschutz liefern, hervorzuheben. Sobald die NMM-Gestaltung 
auf UN-Ebene beschlossen wurde, wird es wichtig sein, sowohl öffentliche Institutionen und als 
auch den privaten Sektor im Umsetzungsland fortzubilden, also wie man NMM implementiert 
und betreibt. Phase I könnte in einem ähnlichen Stil angewendet werden wie sie erfolgreich in 
der Europäischen Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI) durchgeführt wurde, d.h. durch informelle 
Diskussionen der politischen Entscheidungsträger, die einen vergleichsweise offenen Dialog 
ermöglichen und die auf Fachvorträgen basieren. 
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Wir empfehlen daher der Bundesregierung, z.B. drei Pilot-Umsetzungen des NMM auszuschrei-
ben, bei denen Deutschland die generierten Kredite kaufen würde. Länder könnten z.B. als för-
derungsfähig für das Bieten definiert werden, wenn sie die dritte Phase der PMR erreicht ha-
ben. Um einen glaubwürdigen Anreiz zu erzeugen, sollte die Pilotphase über 4-5 Jahre (z.B. 
2015-2020) laufen, und das Kreditvolumen sollte signifikant sein, also zum Beispiel 100 Millio-
nen Tonnen CO2e überschreiten. Andere Spender könnten finanziell dazu beitragen. Auswahl-
kriterien könnten die Angemessenheit des NMM-Konzeptes im Kontext des nationalen Minde-
rungspotentials sein, die Bereitschaft zur Mitfinanzierung sowie die Existenz einer NMM-
Strategie, die alle wichtigen Interessengruppen involviert und hierdurch Inhaberschaft illus-
triert. Darüber hinaus sollten die Minderungsanreize im Hinblick auf ihre potenzielle Wirk-
samkeit überprüft werden. 
Pilotumsetzung 
Die UNFCCC strebt an, in den kommenden Jahren Modalitäten und Verfahren für den NMM zu 
entwickeln. Pilotaktivitäten für den NMM sind wünschenswert, um über UNFCCC-Regeln zu 
informieren, sowie durchführende Länder davon zu überzeugen, dass der NMM ein attraktiver 
Kohlenstoffmarktmechanismus ist. Deshalb wird der deutschen Regierung empfohlen, sich an 
NMM-Pilotaktivitäten mit ausgewählten Partnerländern und eventuell gemeinsam mit anderen 
Industrieländern zu engagieren. 
Mittels einer Checkliste, mit der die notwendigen Informationen auf eine formalisierte Art und 
Weise gesammelt wurden, konnte festgestellt werden, dass eine NMM-Pilotaktivität im peruani-
schen Wohnsektor umsetzbar wäre. Peru erfüllt die allgemeinen Teilnahmevoraussetzungen 
und hat sich aktiv dafür eingesetzt, Marktinstrumente im Bereich des Klimawandels durchzu-
bringen, sowohl auf nationaler als auch internationaler Ebene. 
Der institutionelle Rahmen ermöglicht einen relativ professionellen Umgang mit einer NMM-
Pilotaktivität. Derzeit nehmen keine großen nationalen Initiativen diesen Sektor so ins Visier, 
wie das im Rahmen von NMM-Pilotaktivitäten erfolgen würde. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es ein 
starkes politisches Engagement zur Bekämpfung des Klimawandels und wie sich herausstellte, 
hat der Wohnsektor wesentlich zur Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen in Peru beigetra-
gen. MRV-Maßnahmen und Baseline-Definition sind allerdings für diesen Sektor ebenso wie die 
Projektion von Emissionsreduktionen unterentwickelt. Solide Berechnungen der Baseline und 
der Projektionen, sowie ein robustes MRV-System müssen entwickelt werden. Obwohl es offen-
sichtlich ist, dass NMM-Pilotaktivitäten zu positiven Nebeneffekten führen können, benötigt 
Peru für eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung Unterstützung. Diese umfasst die Finanzierung, techni-
sche Hilfe und Kapazitätsaufbau, welche noch genauer definiert werden müssen. 
Die Kurzbewertung von Peru macht offensichtlich, dass die derzeitigen Vorkehrungen zur Ein-
bringung des Landes relativ leicht erreicht werden können, falls das Umsetzungsland den 
Marktmechanismen positiv gegenüber steht. Die Analyse zeigt aber auch, dass ein gewisser 
Grad an internationalen Anforderungen an Baselines und MRV nötig sind, um Umsetzungslän-
dern Daten zu liefern, komplexe Studien zu betreiben und robuste Systeme einzurichten. Dies 
kann eine große Herausforderung für die NMM-Pilotumsetzung werden. 
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Fazit 
Im Jahr 2010 vereinbarten die Vertragsparteien in Cancun die Etablierung marktbasierter Me-
chanismen, die weite Teile der Wirtschaft umfassen, bis zur nächsten COP in Durban zu erwä-
gen. Dort wurde der NMM dann tatsächlich definiert. Außerdem vereinbaren die Vertragspar-
teien in Durban in 2012 ein Arbeitsprogramm durchzuführen, mit der Absicht Modalitäten und 
Verfahren für die Umsetzung des NMM zu entwickeln. 
Im Laufe des Jahres 2012 war es allerdings nicht möglich, einen Entwurf für Modalitäten und 
Verfahren zu entwickeln, der bei der COP 18 in Doha angenommen werden konnte. Es stellte 
sich heraus, dass die Ansichten der Vertragsstaaten noch weit auseinander liegen. Einige In-
dustrieländer, insbesondere die Vereinigten Staaten (USA), Japan und Neuseeland, lehnen die 
Ansätze der NMM-Umsetzung auf UNFCCC-Ebene ab und bevorzugen lieber einen reinen 
transparenzbasierten Ansatz (Rahmen für verschiedene Ansätze, FVA) ohne Prüfung durch Drit-
te, die zu Korrekturen führen könnte. Einige Entwicklungsländer, vor allem Brasilien, China 
und Indien, heben besonders den aktuellen Mangel an Nachfrage nach einem marktorientier-
ten Ansatz hervor. Allgemein bevorzugen sie den koordinierten Ansatz der EU, aber sie würden 
ihn nur in Kraft setzen wollen, wenn die Verpflichtung zur Emissionsminderungen der Indust-
rieländer erheblich erhöht wird. Einige andere Länder wie Papua-Neuguinea (PNG) stimmen 
weitgehend mit den EU-Vorschlag überein, bevorzugen aber den NMM auf Sektoren auszuwei-
ten, wie z.B. Wälder, welche die EU zumindest derzeit nicht im NMM akzeptieren würde. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund kann in Frage gestellt werden, ob bei den Verhandlungen im Vorfeld 
der COP 21 in Paris überhaupt eine Einigung über ein gemeinsames Verständnis des NMM er-
zielt werden kann. Wird das Ergebnis aus Durban wortwörtlich genommen, gemäß dem sich 
alle Vertragsparteien bis 2015 auf Verpflichtungen einigen sollen die alle Sektoren erfassen, 
dann kann auch in Frage gestellt werden, ob ein sektoraler Ansatz, dessen Konzepte aus der 
Zeit vor Kopenhagen stammen, für das künftige Regime nach 2020 einen zusätzlichen Wert 
bietet. 
Anstatt zu versuchen, eine Einigung über marktbasierte Mechanismen für breite Segmente der 
Wirtschaft zu erzielen, sollten sich die Vertragsstaaten auf die allgemeinere Diskussion der Ad-
hoc-Arbeitsgruppe der Durban Platform (ADP) konzentrieren und identifizieren, in welchem 
Umfang Flexibilität bei der Umsetzung wirtschaftsweiter Ziele im Rahmen der ADP notwendig 
ist und durch welche Maßnahmen diese Flexibilität erbracht werden kann. 
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1 Introduction 
Der Klimawandel und die damit einhergehenden Auswirkungen durch die globale Erwärmung 
wurden als eine der größten Bedrohungen für unseren Planeten erkannt. Der 4. IPCC Report 
sowie viele andere Studien haben anschaulich dargestellt, dass die anthropogenen Treibhaus-
gasemissionen drastisch gesenkt werden müssen, um eine hinsichtlich der Auswirkungen und 
möglichen Anpassungsmaßnahmen noch einigermaßen beherrschbare Entwicklung zu ermög-
lichen. Die notwendigen Minderungen liegen dabei in einer Größenordnung, die eine Einbin-
dung von Reduktionsmaßnahmen in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern erfordert (IPCC 2007, 
S. 775-777). Dies gilt auch vor dem Hintergrund der dramatischen Wachstumsraten von Emissi-
onen in diesen Ländern, welche jedoch die Chance auf einen nachhaltigen Entwicklungspfad 
hin zu einer kohlenstoffarmen Wirtschaft bieten. 
In diesem Kontext haben sektorale Ansätze bei den Verhandlungen unter der Klimarahmen-
konvention seit dem Bali Action Plan (1/CP.13) erheblich an Bedeutung gewonnen. Die Europä-
ische Union verfolgt mit diesen Ansätzen insbesondere folgende Zielsetzungen: 
 Beyond Offsetting: Sie haben das Potenzial, die globalen Anstrengungen zur Treibhaus-
gasminderung auszuweiten und den Beitrag von Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern 
sukzessive zu vergrößern. 
 Reduktion von Transaktionskosten: Sie sind effizienter als die projektbasierte Ansätze, da 
nicht einzelne Projekt sondern gesamte Sektoren oder Subsektoren registriert, imple-
mentiert und überwacht werden müssen. 
 Verringerung von Carbon Leakage: Sie werden darüber hinaus als Möglichkeit gesehen, 
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen und der Verlagerung von Emissionen in energieintensiven 
Sektoren, die in starkem internationalem Wettbewerb stehen, entgegenzuwirken. 
Der Begriff der sektoralen Ansätze war noch 2009 recht weit und umfasste viele verschieden 
Ansätze (NAMA Crediting, Policy CDM, etc.). Inzwischen hat sich die Diskussion weiterentwi-
ckelt. Nunmehr werden vor allem zwei Ansätze differenziert (Raab et al. 2009): 
 Sectoral Crediting: Grundlage ist die Vereinbarung von sogenannten no-lose-Zielen für 
bestimmte Sektoren oder Subsektoren einzelner Entwicklungsländer. Diese Emissionszie-
le sollen niedriger liegen als der Business as usual-Pfad, um einen eigenen Minderungs-
beitrag dieser Länder zu gewährleisten. Wird dieses Ziel unterschritten, so können ex-
post Minderungskredite ausgestellt werden, deren Erlöse auf dem globalen Kohlen-
stoffmarkt dann für die Refinanzierung der durchgeführten Minderungsmaßnahmen 
eingesetzt werden kann. Wird das vereinbarte Ziel nicht erreicht, so werden keine Min-
derungskredite ausgestellt (Schneider und Cames 2009). 
 Sectoral Trading: Hierfür werden ebenfalls ambitionierte Minderungsziele für ausge-
wählte Sektoren einzelner Entwicklungsländer vereinbart. Allerdings müssen diese Ziele 
verbindlich sein. Wenn absehbar ist, dass das Ziel nicht erreicht wird, muss die Zieler-
reichung durch den Erwerb von Emissionsrechten oder Minderungskrediten sicherge-
stellt werden. Vorteil dieses Ansatzes ist, dass die Emissionsrechte ex-ante zur Verfügung 
stehen und in den Entwicklungsländern direkt für die Integration nationaler Akteure in 
den globalen Kohlenstoffmarkt genutzt werden können. 
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Während Sectoral Crediting eher dem CDM gleicht, ist Sectoral Trading eher eine spezifische 
Form des internationalen Emissionshandels. Entscheidend für beide Ansätze ist, dass jeweils 
alle Anlagen oder Aktivitäten, die unter die Abgrenzung des jeweiligen Sektors fallen, erfasst 
werden und nicht nur einzelne Einheiten. 
Bei den Verhandlungsrunden der Klimarahmenkonvention wird die Debatte um sektorale An-
sätze inzwischen vor allem unter dem Tagesordnungspunk BAP 1b(v) Various approaches, 
including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost effectivness of, and to promote, 
mitigation action diskutiert. Diese Verhandlungen zu diesem Tagesordnungspunkt wurden in 
den Jahren 2011 und 2012 durch dieses F+E-Vorhaben wissenschaftlich vorbereitet, unterstützt 
und begleitet werden. Dabei wurden einerseits wesentliche Hintergrundinformationen zu den 
Ansätzen bereitgestellt, mögliche Ausgestaltungsoptionen für diese Ansätze entwickelt und 
konkrete Verhandlungspositionen für die Bundesregierung vorgeschlagen. 
In den folgenden Abschnitten werden die Arbeitsergebnisse des F+E-Vorhabens dokumentiert. 
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2 Development of sectoral mechanisms in the UNFCCC negotiations 
Work package 1, by Björn Dransfeld (perspectives), 13 May 2011 
In the context of the climate negotiations under the UNFCCC the concept of sectoral mecha-
nisms has gained momentum in recent years. These sector based market mechanisms are 
thought to address the abatement potential in sectors that so far has not been tapped. The 13th 
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali set the course for new market based mechanisms as po-
tential elements of an international post-2012 climate policy regime. The Bali Action Plan 
hes, including opportunities for using markets, 
to enhance the cost-effectiveness, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different 
 
A main supporter of the creation of new market based mechanisms is the EU that developed 
and introduced the concept of sectoral crediting and sectoral trading in the UNFCCC negotia-
tions in 2008. The omnipresent North-South split of the negotiations is also reflected with sec-
toral mechanisms: while in recent years sectoral mechanisms have received support from sev-
eral industrialized countries, developing countries are rather sceptic when it comes to introduc-
ing new market based mechanisms. 
Besides the EU, Parties such as Japan, Australia or New Zealand have backed the idea of sec-
toral abatement schemes. Also the US has been discussing the use of sectoral credits in the 
course of the congressional debate on the national climate and energy bill in 2009 and 2010. 
On the other hand, the BASIC countries and the G77 group generally argue that efforts at sec-
toral level could contribute to, but should not replace, legally-binding mitigation commitments 
by Annex I countries, which thus is regarded as conditional for the establishment of market 
mechanisms. They keep reiterating that in any case the majority of global mitigation action has 
to be borne through industrialised countries. Furthermore, the G77 stresses that domestic sec-
toral efforts for developing country Parties were just one option in the toolbox for national mit-
igation actions. But the main concern of developing countries with market based mechanisms 
is certainly the suspicion that their introduction leads to the imposition of firm mitigation tar-
gets. Nevertheless, several smaller countries such as Costa Rica, Colombia or Korea have been 
supportive for sectoral crediting. 
Developing countries moreover fear the introduction of trade barriers and thus oppose bench-
marks or standards for their domestic markets. The Latin American countries Bolivia and Vene-
zuela have established themselves as hardliner opposition of any market based attempts. Alt-
hough these countries are often referred to as ALBA group, they do not necessarily represent all 
Parties of the classical ALBA group (such as Ecuador, Nicaragua or Caribbean states). 
While COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 was not able to make a decisions on the intro-
duction of new market based mechanisms, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Coopera-
tive Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) 8 generated a draft on several items in Copenha-
gen, such as item 1b (v) of 
for using markets, to enhance the cost-
the draft of the AWG-LCA decision on item 1b (v), several Parties (i.a. EU, Umbrella Group, Ko-
rea, Columbia) proposed an option to the COP, in which they request the Subsidiary Body for 
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Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to compile definitions, modalities and procedures 
for new market based mechanisms. 
In the course of 2010 the climate talks held in April, June, August and October were thought to 
fine-tune the draft AWG LCA decision on mechanisms. Though, over the year strong particular 
interests led to a heavily riddled AWG LCA text with many options and brackets. Hence, the 
AWG KP did not refer to sectoral trading or crediting mechanisms in its text that evolved over 
the year. 
2.1 Current debate on sectoral mechanisms – party submissions 
The COP16 in Cancun nonetheless decided to consider the establishment of market based 
mechanisms at the next COP17 in Durban 2011. These shall base on the principles of voluntary 
n-
tegrity and lead to a net decrease of GHG emissions. In addition, they shall be complementary 
to NAMAs, supplemental to domestic efforts in industrialised countries and have a robust mar-
ket design as well as sound regulative rules. 
COP16 made clear that any new market mechanism shall co-exist with existing mechanisms 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The AWG LCA has been requested to draft a decision for COP17. In 
this regard, parties were invited to submit their views and position on the establishment of one 
or more market based mechanisms by the end of February 2011 in order to discuss them at the 
sessions in April and June. Besides this there were other calls for submissions, for instance on 
non-market based mechanisms and the evaluation of the existing mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
22 parties submitted inputs on market based mechanisms prior to the AWG LCA intersessional 
meeting in early April (FCCC 2011a). Parties now seem to sense the need to enter into detailed 
discussions and thus do propose a comprehensive scope of issues. The submissions serve as the 
basis for negotiations under the AWG LCA in April and June 2011. In general, the submissions 
are perceived as rather constructive. The inputs on market mechanisms comprise a broad 
range of topics from supportive to opposing, from continuation of existing mechanisms to re-
placement of existing through new mechanisms and from project based over policy or sectoral 
approaches to NAMA crediting. 
Interestingly, of the BASIC countries only China submitted input. However, since the BASIC 
group governments met in early March 2011 in Delhi, India to align their climate policy strate-
gies on the run up to Durban, it is understood that China´s submission in general represents 
the BASIC views. Also, South Africa, that has been supportive for installing a NAMA crediting 
mechanism in the past, may take a neutral approach this year as it hosts the upcoming COP17 
and is eager to facilitate the negotiations in an inclusive and constructive manner. Besides this 
it is noteworthy that the United States of America has not submitted any contributions to the 
debate. 
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Market based mechanisms are still opposed by Bolivia and Venezuela. Malaysia
2
 (host to several 
CDM projects) raises the issue that low cost abatement options in developing countries have 
been addressed through industrialised countries via market mechanisms, leaving only expen-
sive abatement options for domestic action through the host country. Bangladesh and Tuvalu, 
amongst others, underline that new mechanisms require a sound design avoiding market fail-
ure. Broad support for market mechanisms comes from the EU, AOSIS, Australia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Japan, NZ, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Turkey and Russia. Even Saudi Arabia, that so far has not shown a constructive behaviour in the 
debate on market based mechanisms, has submitted a rather progressive position. China gen-
erally sees the establishment of new mechanisms as feasible, under the condition that the US 
commits to firm reductions. In addition, several parties do implicitly support the creation of 
sectoral mechanisms, amongst which are the EU, Japan, Norway, Russia
3
, Switzerland, Colom-
bia and AOSIS (via Grenada). Sectoral mechanisms thus currently hold a prominent position for 
the upcoming negotiations under the AWG LCA, although they are one tool amongst several 
market mechanisms such as NAMA crediting or the CDM. 
Content wise the majority of the submissions focus on general aspects of new market mecha-
nisms and do not formulate specific design aspects for sectoral mechanisms. Thus the subse-
quent Table 1 in the first place displays issues true not only for sectoral mechanisms but for all 
market based mechanisms, followed by few sector specific aspects and miscellaneous topics. 
                                            
1
 
Mechanisms in the design of the post-2012 climate regime  
2
 Malaysia submitted its view within the submission on the evaluation of market mechanisms (FCCC 2011b). 
3
 Russia submitted its view within the submission on the evaluation of market mechanisms (FCCC 2011b). 
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Table 1: Submissions on new market mechanisms parties – summary by topic 
Issues related to new market based mechanisms 
General issues - All countries except Bolivia and Venezuela highlight that market mecha-
nisms should complement the existing Kyoto Mechanisms. 
- Japan and Australia request the consistency of co-existing frameworks and 
mechanisms - in this regard, the avoidance of double counting is stressed 
by several parties. 
- Papua New Guinea and Australia favour the adoption of an overarching 
framework, under which then countries can choose to apply specific 
measures and mechanisms according to the requirements of their domes-
 
- Parties consider any actions for developing countries as voluntary. How-
ever, AOSIS mentions that targets for developing countries can be bind-
ing. 
- New market mechanisms should contribute to global net reductions, 
which is highlighted by AOSIS, Colombia, EU, Norway and Switzerland. 
Governance - A centralized governance approach is proposed for instance by Australia, 
the EU, Saudi Arabia, AOSIS or Papua New Guinea. Under this scenario a 
global framework would be set up, under which then guiding principles 
or eligibility criteria are established (such as for JI Track 1).
4
 
- A decentralized governance system would establish action based assess-
ment of reductions such under the existing CDM and is supported by Ja-
pan and the EU, as well. 
- The majority of the submissions (including the EU) underscores that any 
mitigation action needs to be shaped according to the domestic environ-
ment based on principle of subsidiarity. 
- It is more or less common sense that an international actor should be in-
stalled, a role that many parties see with the UNFCCC. 
                                            
4
 AOSIS has already drafted potential criteria that could be applied, such as the installation of a target below busi-
ness as usual, the setup of a national GHG evaluation system, the existence of historic emission data of the re-
spective sector (gathered by using IPCC methodologies), an objective review of baselines and projections through 
sectoral experts, the frequent reporting of national and sectoral emissions, maintenance of issued units in a regis-
try or procedures to avoid double counting. Criteria for Annex 1 countries could be the same as already existing 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Scope of market 
mechanisms 
- While new market mechanisms in general follow the idea to broaden the 
scope of a project based system, China and Saudi Arabia propose to limit 
new mechanisms to a project based approach. 
- With respect to the potential boundary of a system subsectors, sectors or 
multisectors are suggested. 
- Japan and Papua New Guinea want all technologies to be eligible (i.e. in-
cluding CCS and nuclear power), while AOSIS wants to exclude industrial 
gases. Bolivia wants to ban CCS and industrial gases from any mechanism. 
- Saudi Arabia has proposed a positive list for international project types el-
igible under a mechanism. 
Supplementarity - Domestic reductions through Annex-1 countries are essential for almost 
all developing countries. China even sees binding targets of parties out-
side the Kyoto Protocol as a precondition for acceptance of market based 
mechanisms, a clear broadside against the USA. 
- Bangladesh wants to limit use of offsets to 20 %, while Saudi Arabia wants 
host countries to receive a share of the credits originated through domes-
tic action. 
Fungibility - Many countries highlight the importance of fungibility of credits. 




- Common rules for baselines and MRV are proposed for instance by Nor-
way, Japan and AOSIS. Russia suggests a harmonized approach for setting 
targets. 
- Parties are all highlighting the necessity of environmental integrity of fu-
ture schemes. The most important issues in this regard are avoiding dou-
ble counting and leakage, ensuring the additionality of credits, ensuring 
that offsets address mitigation actions with higher abatement costs 
 
- Norway in addition mentions establishing an international registry, while 
Korea proposes the use of indirect MRV through default values (such as 
the penetration of energy efficient appliances). 
- China underlines that offsets may not be regarded as financial contribu-
tions by industrialised countries. 
Capacity building - Almost all parties highlight the importance of capacity building in order 
to allow developing countries to set up the required infrastructure for a 
new mechanism. Thus, there are clear expectations that capacity building 
is borne and conducted by industrialised countries. 
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Issues directly related to sectoral mechanisms 
 - On the scope of sectoral mechanisms, AOSIS and Russia suggested the 
power, steel and iron and cement sector, AOSIS as well the transport for 
initial consideration. 
- On sectoral tra
n-
try pledges under the Convention (such as Annex B). Basically this trading 
sys
trade. 
- AOSIS furthermore calls for a technical paper to scope the potential in key 
sectors in developing countries. 
Miscellaneous 
 - m for Carbon-Efficient Economies 
-
sectoral scope. Discount factors range from 2  41%, depending on the 
countries share of global emissions. Further 2% are proposed for the ad-
aptation fund share of proceeds. 
- Papua New Guinea suggests establishing a Sustainable Market Mechanism 
Standard Board and a Carbon Reserve Bank. While the former is under-
stood as a regulator for a new market mechanism (such as the EB under 
the CDM), the latter is thought to work similar to the IMF  in case of cer-
tain sectors underperformance the Bank would step in providing credits 
in order to fill the gap of credits. However, this aid is suggested to be 
conditional to the adoption of certain rules through the host country. It is 
very unlikely that developing countries would agree to such an attempt 
that undermines their national sovereignty. 
- Ecuador has outlined its approach for the market based treatment of net 
avoided emissions in the Yasuni national park. Essentially the country 
wants to be rewarded for not exploiting the oil from the fields under the 
tropical rainforest reserve. 
- AOSIS highlights that mechanisms for aviation and shipping that poten-
tially evolve under the ICAO and IATA regime should be regarded and 
checked for potential linkage to the UNFCCC system.  
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3 Incentives for mitigation investments 
Work package 2, by Björn Dransfeld, Axel Michaelowa (perspectives), Martin Cames, Sean Healy 
(Öko-Institut), 29 June 2011 
The basic idea for sectoral mechanisms has been introduced mainly for two entirely different 
reasons: 
 On the one hand they should provide a bridge for the transition towards a global carbon 
market and for the transition from a non-Annex I to an Annex I country (Schmidt et al. 
2006). 
 On the other hand they should overcome the flaws of project-based mechanisms such as 
1) high transaction costs due to necessary registration, monitoring and verification pro-
cedures, 2) lack of environmental integrity due to a high risk of carbon leakage and/or in-
flated baselines and 3) limitations in the mitigation potentials which could be addressed 
by them (closure of activities without replacement at the same site; etc.). 
The transition from a non-Annex I to an Annex I country would require substantial changes 
within a country since the entire economy would be subject to an absolute greenhouse gas 
(GHG )emission cap. The sectoral mechanism has been suggested as an intermediate step to-
wards the integration of all countries into one global carbon market. Non-Annex I countries 
would have the opportunity to identify certain sectors of their economy which would already 
f-
finally include the entire economy into the global carbon market. 
At the same time, sectoral mechanism could address the flaws of the project-based mechanisms, 
since they would enable to streamline many procedural issues. The environmental integrity 
could at the same time be increased since, generally speaking, the risk of leakage is the smaller 
the larger the scope of a mechanism and if sectoral thresholds would be ambitiously below 
BAU to avoid inflated thresholds and reflect own contributions by developing countries. 
However, establishing of sectoral mechanisms would also change the role of emitters (e.g. pri-
vate entities) and of the government. Under project-based mechanisms the host government 
has mainly a supervising role and may encourage the establishment of projects though the 
economic responsibility remains with the project developer or project owner. Under a sectoral 
mechanism, the host country government would have a more active role and would have to 
ensure that the emission reductions are actually achieved because otherwise no revenues to 
cover additional cost for GHG mitigation measures would be achieved. Sectoral mechanisms 
currently are distinguished into sectoral trading and sectoral crediting. 
A sectoral trading mechanism implies an absolute commitment to reduce GHG emissions of a 
certain -compliance with the 
target sanctions will apply to the host country. An amount of allowances corresponding to the 
target will be allocated to the country ex-ante. Given the binding nature of this mechanism, the 
government will very likely pass the responsibility onto the sectoral emitters, either by setting 
up an emissions trading scheme or by imposing mandatory measures. 
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 the sectoral crediting mechanisms 
target as well, which rather corresponds with a business as usual scenario and has no binding 
character (no lose target). In case of compliance with the target, the emission reductions be-
yond the target will be credited ex-post. In case of non-compliance, no sanctions apply. Credits 
will be tradable on the international carbon market and hence provide international finance 
for mitigation. The idea is, that the host country initially contributes to mitigation through 
g-
ities that address reductions 
n-
tive for the government to meet or even over-achieve the target is clearly weaker as under a 
trading mechanism with a mandatory goal. 
On this background this paper scrutinises whether the shift in responsibility from emitters or 
n-
gage in seeking cost-effective mitigation options and if so, by which means such outcome could 
be avoided or limited to the extent possible. It shall be noted here, that emitters may be of dif-
ferent legal nature  public, public-private or solely private nature. It is though assumed that 
the strongest incentives in this respect are required for private entities, hence this paper con-
centrates on the private sector. 
In the next chapter we describe in detail the issue which may be caused by the different re-
sponsibility structure under a sectoral mechanism. Based on these deliberations we discuss to 
which extent potential instruments and measures can provide the required incentive to seek 
for cost effective greenhouse gas mitigation options (chapter 3.2). We complement these con-
siderations with a summary of views of selected actors on this issue (chapter 3.3) and with a 
synopsis of experiences gained so far (chapter 3.4). Finally we draw conclusions and derive im-
plications for the concept of sectoral mechanisms (chapter 3.5). 
3.1 Description of the issue 
3.1.1 Differences to project-based mechanisms 
Sectoral mechanisms are in many aspects fundamentally different to project-based mechanism. 
However, two aspects are centrals with regard to the incentive structure of those mechanisms: 
Sectoral mechanisms 
 cover all activities or installations within a certain sector boundary and 
 require governments to play a different role. 
Under a project-based mechanism, only selected activities or installations will be subject to mit-
igation measures. Under a sectoral mechanism, in contrast, all installations within an ex-ante 
determined sector boundary will be covered. This shift will increase the mitigation potential 
which can be addressed, enhance the portfolio of technical mitigations measures which can be 
taken, specifically if the sector boundary is wide and includes various activity types, increase 
environmental integrity by reducing the risk of leakage since output cannot be transferred to 
uncovered activities and reduce transaction costs because a number of requirements under a 
project-based approach such as registration and determination of a baseline only have to be 
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done once for the whole sector but not per project activity. Mitigation measures will most likely 
only be initiated at those activities with the worst emission performance even though all activi-
ties within the boundary will be covered by the mechanism. Sectoral mechanisms will also ena-
ble a transition to advanced or integrated mitigation technologies if the sector boundaries are 
defined adequately. 
In addition, the economic responsibility would be shifted from the project owner or project 
developer to the host country government. Currently, governments only need to approve dur-
ing the registration process that a planned mitigation project complies with their sustainability 
criteria but do not face any responsibility if the project does not generate the revenues which 
are required to recover the mitigation costs. The economic risk of a mitigation project is exclu-
sively borne by the project owner. 
Under a sectoral mechanism, private entities cannot take the responsibility for an entire sector 
which includes all activities. Therefore, the host country government needs to take that respon-
sibility and needs to ensure that the envisaged greenhouse gas mitigation is actually achieved. 
In this regard sectoral mechanisms are much closer to international emissions trading pursuant 
to Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol which entitles Parties to trade emission allowances among 
them. Governments are not required but may directly involve emitting entities in trading of 
internationally recognised emission allowances. 
The same would apply to sectoral mechanisms. Host country governments would, possibly after 
consultations with business representatives of the covered sectors, submit a proposal for the 
implementation of a sectoral mechanism. This proposal would include a clear definition of the 
sector(s), business as usual projections as sectoral threshold, a target (absolute or no lose) in-
cluding own contributions and a detailed descriptions how the target should be achieved. After 
approval of the proposal, the host country government needs to ensure that the projected 
greenhouse gas reductions are achieved. As with international emissions trading, the govern-
ment will trade excess allowances or generated reduction credits to cover the cost of incentives 
for the covered activities or installations in their country (chapter 3.2). 
3.1.2 Challenges for private investors under a sectoral mechanism 
While any sectoral mechanism aims to trigger investments into mitigation activities, a crucial 
question is how these investments are going to be incentivized. The willingness of investors to 
invest into certain activities depends on several parameters, such as the mechanism applied 
(trading or crediting), the detailed layout of the scheme or country and sector specific parame-
ters. 
According to the concept of sectoral mechanisms, the host country government agrees on a 
absolute or voluntary (aka no lose) target for a certain domestic sector. Based on the economic 
theory underlying these market based instruments, as well as the principle of subsidiary, the 
government is free to choose the most appropriate and economic means to keep the emissions 
below the targets. 
In order to do so, a domestic framework that urges the emitters of the respective sector to act 
in line with the governmental specifications has to be set up. Key parameters for successful 
implementing any sectoral mitigation attempt thus are (i) the design of the policy framework, 
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(ii) the ability of the government to implement or even enforce action under this framework 
and (iii) the sectoral emitters that have to reduce emissions. 
The design of the policy framework determines instruments and measures that can or must be 
applied to achieve respective reductions and specifies rules and procedures for the application 
of these measures, for instance on responsibilities of actors, MRV or a sanctioning regime. 
Those potential measures will differ depending on whether a sectoral trading or a sectoral 
crediting mechanism is installed and depending on the nature of the target (absolute/no lose). 
The ability of a government to implement sectoral mitigation action under the policy frame-
work is certainly dependent on many factors, such as the form of governance or the govern-
-facto dictatorship governments 
may find it easier to enforce action, while democracies strive to adopt rather balanced, consen-
sus orientated solutions. The latter for instance applies to the voluntary commitment of the 
German industry to reduce emissions, a political compromise that actually failed. 
Moreover, the success of any policy will be influenced by the legal character of emitters that 
can be state owned companies, public-private entities or private businesses (either purely do-
mestic or JVs with foreign shareholders). In the first place, the different forms of entities follow 
different intrinsic motivation to act and will do this in a more or less economic manner. While 
public actors tend to operate inefficiently, private companies are first of all profit maximizing 
entities and thus required to manage their resources efficiently. Second, governments may 
simply decide that public actors apply certain mitigation measures, whereas private emitters 
will usually require specific incentives to act in any way other than the most profitable one. 
Thus the question, whether a shift of responsibilities towards the governmental level would 
limit or eliminate incentives for investments, is most relevant for the specific scenario of a sec-
tor that is predominantly characterized by private entities and has been featured with a sec-
toral no lose crediting mechanism. Whether the following hypothetical challenges and their 
potential solutions actually apply or not will be discussed further below: 
 Principal-Agent dilemma: Emission reductions are caused by action at the sector level, 
thus under this set up any action to reduce emissions requires investments by private en-
tities. However, the overarching incentive to reduce emissions is provided by credits that 
will be issued by an international body, such as the UNFCCC, and be transferred ex-post to 
the host country government. Only if the government would directly forward the credits 
or an equivalent of the investment to the investor, this would ensure mitigation through 
the emitters. 
 Free Riding and sectoral underperformance: The entire sector (i.e. aggregated emis-
sions) has to comply with a no lose target. If the entire sector misses the no lose target, no 
sanctions will apply. If the entire sector meets or over-achieves the target, credits will be 
issued. For a single emitter the question arises, whether all of his competitors will reduce, 
do nothing or even increase their emissions. The character of the no lose target triggers 
no sanctions and uncertainty over the activities of competitors prevails. 
 Lacking Guarantees: Besides the costs of opportunity that come along this delayed pay-
back, investors face a lack of guarantees that they actually receive an equivalent to their 
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investment in case of underperformance. This is in particular true for foreign investors 
from Annex 1 countries. Unlike the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a new mech-
anism lacks experiences and credibility and investors thus will act rather cautiously. 
 Ex-ante investments/ex-post credits: Investments to bring down the sectors emissions 
are required prior to the start of a crediting period. But only once the sectoral abatement 
has been conducted, monitored at installation level and verified, credits can be issued. 
Figure 1: Implementation of sectoral measures under a sectoral crediting mechanism 
International Level
UNFCCC
















Similarly to other baseline and credit schemes such as the CDM, private entities initially 
lack incentives and guarantees to invest in emission reduction technology. In order to 
overcome these challenges, the government could either impose mandatory measures to 
stay at least within the business as usual scenario or could provide incentives and guaran-
tees for emitters to implement the respective mitigation actions. 
3.1.3 Role of actors 
As described above, sectoral mechanisms were, among other reasons, suggested to provide an 
intermediate step within the transition towards a global carbon market which would finally 
include all countries. Quite evidently, governments, in particular host country governments, 
need to take a different role with more responsibilities under such an approach. 
Different to project-based mechanisms, where project owners or project developers, i.e. private 
entities, develop and implement a project, under sectoral mechanisms the host country gov-
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ernment would have the leading role in establishing such sectoral mitigation effort in their 
country. They would develop a proposal for the implementation of a sectoral mitigation effort 
which would include 
 a clear definition of the sector boundary including an enumeration of activities which 
would be not covered, 
 a business as usual projection which will be used to determine the level of ambition, 
 an absolute or a no lose target over a clear time frame (5, 10, 15 years, etc.) which in-
cludes a certain degree of own contributions, 
 a detailed description of how the necessary mitigation measures are incentivised, 
 a projection of the impact of these incentives on the sectoral greenhouse gas emissions 
and 
 a reliable sectoral monitoring plan. 
After review by a supervising entity (e.g. UNFCCC), the proposal would be approved and could 
then be implemented by the government. 
In the case of an absolute target (sectoral trading), the host country government would receive 
allowances corresponding to their target. At the end of the timeframe or after ex-ante agreed 
periods, the host country government needs to submit a sectoral inventory and to surrender 
the corresponding amount of allowances. The excess allowances, whose amount can be esti-
mated from the difference between the threshold and the projected impact of sectoral incen-
tives, can be sold on the global carbon market to recover the financial resources which are 
needed to provide the sectoral mitigation incentives. However, the host country government 
would have to purchase additional allowances if it finally turns out that the actual emissions 
are higher than the remaining allowances. 
Provided that the units established under a sectoral mechanism are fully fungible with allow-
ances under international emissions trading, the host country government could trade these 
sectoral allowances with all Parties participating in international or sectoral emissions trading. 
In addition the host country government could also trade these allowances with private entities 
of those countries where the governments provide for such direct involvement of the private 
sector. 
With a no lose target (sectoral crediting), credits can only be issued if the promised reductions 
are actually achieved and verified. Formally the host country government can thus participate 
in trading efforts only after credits have been issued. However, host country governments could 
try to establish agreements similar to the so called emission reduction purchase agreements 
(ERPAs) under the CDM. Under such an agreement the host country government and countries 
or private entities which need to purchase credits would ex-ante agree to trade credits at a cer-
tain price once they are issued. These agreements often include upfront payments by the pur-
chasers which result in a respective rebate on the agreed credits price. That way, the host coun-
try government can also mobilise upfront financial resources to recover parts of the costs of 
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those incentives or measures which are planned to achieve the promised emission reduction in 
their countries sector. 
Private entities within the host country can either be involved directly, indirectly or not at all 
ide incentives to 
private entities (chapter 3.2). Whichever option is selected, important is that the planned emis-
sion reduction is finally achieved. Otherwise no credits can be issued whose revenues could be 
used to recover the cost of incentives or measures. And even worse, if the host country would 
have agreed to a sectoral ERPA, they might even be forced to pay for non-delivery of sectoral 
credits unless such non-delivery risks are not covered by respective insurances. 
Obviously, host country governments would have strong interests to ensure that the targets of a 
sectoral agreement are in fact achieved. Therefore they would need to establish effective regu-
lation which provides sufficient incentives to the private entities in their country to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and they would have to enforce that regulation adequately. 
In this regard, free riding would only occur if the host country government would also provide 
financial incentives to those activities or installations which do not reduce their emissions. 
However, this would be quite illogic and such provisions should already be identified and cor-
rected during the review process because it certainly would result in a failure of the proposed 
agreement. 
In contrast, host country governments need to guarantee the financial incentives for each 
tonne actually reduced also if the agreed sectoral target would not be met. Host country gov-
ernments will therefore propose sectoral agreements which certainly can be met because the 
economically attractive potential is larger. Private investors will scrutinise the publically availa-
ble proposal documents for sectoral agreements and will assess whether the targets of the sug-
gested agreement can realistically be achieved or not. If they basically agree with the proposal, 
they will check whether investing in greenhouse gas emission reductions will be economically 
attractive or not. 
a-
tion measures and the new government may withdraw the incentive. This would certainly re-
sult in distrust against the new government and the country in general and this distrust would 
most likely not be limited to mitigation investments but affect any foreign investment. Such 
regulatory risk can therefore not be entirely denied but seems to be small because it would 
cause consequences not just for mitigation investments but for the entire host country econo-
my. 
Emitters in the covered sectors would at least to that extent be involved that they need to de-
cide whether the provided incentive would make any mitigation measures economically viable. 
If that is the case they may implement such measures themselves or task project developers 
with the implementation of such measures. 
Greenfield projects such as renewable energy projects may be implemented by emitters or by 
project developers with specific experience in the respective field. The extent to which project 
developers will be involved may depend on how the incentives to reduce emissions are provid-
ed to the covered sectors. Direct involvement in the (global) carbon market may attract more 
project developers than emission performance standards (chapter 3.2). 
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3.2 Incentives: instruments and measures 
Incentives can be maintained for private companies through several options described below. 
The discussion assumes that the sectoral target can be allocated to emitting installations in 
form of an installation-
section of this chapter discusses incentives directly related to the emissions credits, the second 
part policy instruments that serve as an incentive to mitigate and thus indirectly create emis-
sions credits. 
3.2.1 Guaranteed sectoral credit revenues 
A host country government could guarantee each company that reduces emissions below the 
threshold level to receive internationally tradable credits as per the reductions achieved and 
monitored. This would expose the government to the risk to have to import Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) or Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) to cover the shortfall caused by compa-
nies emitting above the threshold level. The government could reduce the risk by introducing 
policy instruments that penalize emissions above the threshold level (see 3.2.7 and 3.2.8 below). 
3.2.2 Carbon funds with shared risks 
All private companies in the sector would be organized in form of a carbon fund that pays div-
idends to its shareholders pro rata to the achieved and monetized reduction credits. While this 
approach would reduce the government-related risk, it cannot address the free riding problem, 
unless the management of the carbon fund would be able to introduce policy instruments that 
penalize emissions above the threshold level. 
3.2.3 Revenue split 
A contract between the private companies and the government would specify a revenue split 
from the emission credit sales. The government could retain a portion (2-5%) to cover the costs 
for administration of the scheme, whereas the rest would be allocated proportionally to the 
reductions achieved. This approach would have the same free riding problems as the one de-
scribed in 3.2.2. 
3.2.4 Domestic mandatory emissions trading scheme 
Under a mandatory emissions trading scheme (ETS), there would be a clear incentive to reduce 
emissions as those companies with a lack of allowances would need to acquire allowances to 
cover their shortfall. The system could be designed as follows: The overall cap of the scheme 
could be set at the level of the threshold. This would ensure that the crediting threshold is ex-
actly met. The host country could then allow entities in the sector to exchange national emis-
sion allowances against futures of sectoral credits. The exchanged national emission allowances 
would need to be surrendered in a national cancellation account and could hence not be used 
on the national market anymore. This would ensure that each exchanged allowance results in 
an emission reduction below the crediting threshold (Schneider & Cames 2009). To prevent that 
the domestic carbon price exceeds the price of the global carbon market if it turns out that too 
many domestic allowances have been exchanged, the host country government should also 
accept internationally recognised units for compliance under the notional trading system. Cov-
ered entities would have an incentive to exchange domestic allowances against sectoral credits 
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as long as the price of credits is higher than the price of allowances. Such a mechanism would 
interlink the national GHG emissions trading schemes with the global carbon market. Host 
country governments may see this approach as the first step on the slippery slope towards le-
gally binding commitments and thus be reluctant to accept it. 
3.2.5 Tradable intensity standard 
As many developing countries fear an approach based on absolute emissions, Whitesell and 
Helme (2009) have proposed a tradable intensity standard. The host country government would 
set an intensity standard in from of a domestic benchmark which is equal to the threshold level 
for the sector.
5
 Installations which beat the benchmark, would receive an internationally rec-
ognised credit for each tonne below the benchmark from the host country government. Firms 
whose emissions exceed the benchmark would have to purchase internationally recognised 
credits from domestic installations which beat the benchmark or on the global carbon market. 
For each tonne below the threshold the host country government would receive an interna-
tionally recognised sectoral credit from the respective issuing body. In addition, the host coun-
try government would receive compliance credits from installations which exceed the bench-
mark. Both amounts together would be exactly equivalent to the amount which is required to 
reward the installations whose emissions are below the benchmark. 
3.2.6 Feed in tariffs and subsidies 
If a sectoral mechanism is introduced in the electricity sector, the government could introduce 
a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity. If the tariff is sufficiently high to make renewables 
commercially attractive, the increasing renewable electricity production will generate sectoral 
credits. These credits will accrue to the government and could cover part of the cost of the 
feed-in tariff. The disadvantage of this approach is that the incentive due to the feed-in tariff 
depends on the credibility of the government which has to sustain the tariff for a substantial 
time period. 
Subsidies could be granted for many sectors and technology types, especially when it comes to 
energy efficiency improvements (procurement programmes, scrapping schemes for old devices, 
i-
cient abatement options. 
3.2.7 Taxes and subsidy reductions 
There are different ways to use taxes as an incentive for sectoral crediting. A win-win approach 
for the national economy would be the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies accruing to the com-
panies covered by the sector. The reduction of the subsidies would trigger emission reductions 
and the accrual of sectoral credits to companies reducing emissions would at least partially 
offset the monetary losses of the companies. 
The simplest way of taxation would be to tax revenues from sales of sectoral credits that could 
be reinvested to buy international credits to cover emissions increases from some companies. 
                                            
5
 This may require some unit conversion if the baseline level is not defined in form of a benchmark. 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
19 
From an incentive point of view, such an approach would be highly problematic as it reduces 
the incentives for reduction and actually encourages free riding. 
A much more incentive-compatible way of taxation would be an emissions tax for emissions 
above the threshold. As a disadvantage, this approach would require determining baseline 
emissions at installation level which may result in high transaction costs and trigger lobbying 
activities. Proceeds from this tax could be used by the government to buy emissions credits to 
cover the shortfall due to the excess emissions; ideally the tax thus would be set at a level equal 
to the market price for international credits. Due to the variability of these prices, the tax level 
should probably be set higher to avoid frequent changes. 
The host country government could also tax fossil fuel use entirely to incentivise energy effi-
ciency and make renewable fuels commercially attractive. The tax level would have to be set at 
a level sufficiently high to lead to an emission reduction below the threshold. If the introduc-
tion of the tax increases the awareness of energy efficiency improvements, the tax level could 
remain quite low and still harness a significant amount of sectoral credits that should accrue to 
the companies directly. The government could then redistribute the revenue from the tax in a 
way that does not disincentivise further emission reductions. 
All tax-related options require good governance and a will provide mitigation incentives if the 
companies believe in the governments ability to implement and enforce such policies. 
3.2.8 Standards and regulation 
A mandatory requirement to install emissions mitigation equipment to reach the threshold 
could be coupled with a direct allocation of credits to the companies that reduce emissions be-
low the baseline. The host country government guarantees to buy international credits to cover 
emissions of companies with excess emissions. This approach requires willingness of developing 
countries to enforce the abatement mandates. Governments might slap penalties on installa-
tions that do not comply with the mandate and use the revenues to buy credits to cover the 
shortfall. 
3.2.9 Result 
In order to provide sufficient mitigation incentives for private investors, the host country gov-
ernment would have to introduce policy instruments such as a mandatory regulation sufficient 
to achieve the threshold or a tax for excess emissions or a combination of several instruments, 
target level. The credibility of such an approach rests on the trustworthiness of the government 
to enforce a regulation or to collect a surplus emissions tax. Such policy combinations would 
allow the government to directly collect the funding for acquisition of international credits to 
reach the sectoral target level. 
3.3 Views of selected actors 
Baron, Buchner & Ellis (2009, pp. 23-28) discuss how sectoral crediting can be implemented at 
the host country and how emitters and other actors can be incentivized to invest in mitigation 
a separation from the price signal (credit reve-
nues go to the government) to an attempt at a full link (with full liability assumed by the gov-
ernment in case of overselling) for 
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some of the implementation options , the government would also have more liability com-
pared to the CDM that the carbon market in-
centive to individual investors in mitigation may be less direct, and therefore weaker than that 
under a single project configuration like the CDM
the fact that the implementation of sectoral agreements requires a significant policy effort on 
the part of the host country government, they agree that incentives for private entities can ba-
sically be established. 
Whitesell and Helme (2009) analyse various approaches how the price signal of the global car-
bon market can be fully passed through to the entities covered by a sectoral agreements. They 
Sector Programs and Cap-and-Trade in Developing Countries  Sec-
tor Crediting Tradable Intensity Standards i-
gation incentives can be established which are more or less directly linked to the global carbon 
markets. Cap-and-trade and a tradable intensity standard (section 3.2.5) may however provide 
the most direct incentives since they would be based on internationally recognised units and 
do not require the establishment of national units. 
IETA (2010) also scrutinises how private sector entities could be incentivized to establish green-
house gas mitigation measures under sectoral mechanisms. They analyse n-
Installation-Level Mitigation and Crediting
would entail risks to 
investment that could severely curtail the ability of private finance to play a significant role,
but that various options also exist that could incentivize scale up, achieve mitigation objec-
tives, and still meet the needs of private investors  
For developed or developing country Parties incentives for the private sector do not seem to be 
an issue at all. Earlier this year, 22 Parties submitted their views on new marked-based mecha-
nism including sectoral mechanisms.
6
 Many highlighted that markets in general provide incen-
tives for the innovation and diffusion of low carbon technologies but only Papua New Guinea 
touches on the issue of incentives for the private sector. However, even Papua New Guinea does 
not put into questions that incentives for the private sector can be maintained but calls only for 
an implementation which provides incentives for the business sector at national and interna-
tional level. 
3.4 Selected experiences 
3.4.1 Guaranteeing the credibility of a mechanism - Lessons of the CDM 
The CDM was initially seen as the least attractive of the Kyoto Mechanisms due to the risk of 
investing in emissions mitigation in developing countries and the huge bureaucracy required 
to check whether projects were actually additional and whether emissions reductions were real. 
International emissions trading was seen as having much lower transaction costs and Joint Im-
plementation would benefit from the good investment climate in industrialized countries. 
                                            
6
 FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/MISC.2 and FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/MISC.2/Add.1 
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Nevertheless, the CDM became the most successful of the Kyoto Mechanisms. This was due to 
the fact that emissions credits are granted by an international institution without interference 
of the host country government. This enabled to avoid governmental corruption, especially due 
to the higher transparency of the CDM process in comparison to the Joint Implementation (JI) 
process. While the CDM project cycle is cumbersome, it has led to full fungibility of credits and 
their general acceptance as compliance tools. Only recently, media and NGO pressure has 
weakened the trust in CERs, leading to the EU decision to ban imports of certain credit types. 
Moreover, companies in developing countries, especially the BASIC countries, discovered that 
CERs are a valuable export commodity, leading to a race to unilaterally develop CDM projects. 
This had not been foreseen by anyone and is the key secret of CDM success. 
The high expectations for JI were shattered when host country governments bickered for years 
regarding rules how to allocate ERUs and were unclear about the approval rules. International 
emissions trading suffered from high profile corruption cases when government officials sold 
AAUs at prices well below market value. 
The lessons from the CDM are thus that the availability of a transparent incentive for private 
companies on the international level which cannot be taken away by governments of low cred-
ibility can mobilize significant mitigation action. This means that sectoral crediting mecha-
nisms should be designed in a way that minimizes involvement of host country government 
other than preventing free riding. 
3.4.2 Examples of successful policies in developing countries 
The transition from a project based to a sectoral mechanism will require an enhanced role for 
government actors. However, successful policies in developing countries have already been 
implemented in the past and provide important lessons for how private entities can be incen-
tivised to reduce their emissions under a sectoral approach in the future. The following three 
case studies from developing countries demonstrate how different combinations of incentive 
instruments and measures can be adopted in order to encourage emission reductions. 
The eleventh Five Year Plan in China 
Five Year Plan (2006-2010). A combination of financial incentives and mandatory regulations 
ensured that by 2010 the country achieved a 19.1% reduction in energy intensity (Hannon et al. 
2011). Although it was necessary for the government to intervene and close small inefficient 
plants in 2010 to meet the energy intensity target, which was both socially and economically 
disruptive, various policies incentivising emission reductions also made an important contribu-
tion. In particular, the Top 1000 Energy Consuming Enterprise Programme and the Ten Key 
Projects Energy Efficiency Programme delivered primary energy savings of 124 Mtce and 102 
Mtce respectively in 2006-2008 (Hannon et al. 2011). 
Energy Efficienc
largest state-owned enterprises. Every company participating in the programme was required 
to develop an energy efficiency action plan showing how the target would be achieved. It was 
expected that these action plans would include measures to improve the reporting of energy 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
22 
consumption, conduct energy audits and identify and invest in energy efficiency improve-
ments. In addition to setting the energy saving target, the Chinese government instructed local 
authorities to supervise and monitor the participating firms in the implementation of their en-
ergy efficiency action plan. In November 2009, NDRC announced that the Top 1000 pro-
gramme had reached its target energy savings of 100 Mtce (Price et al. 2010). 
Given that the programme was rapidly implemented, there was insufficient time for a detailed 
assessment to determine the energy saving target of each company. As a consequence, it may 
be argued that the energy saving target for the Top 1000 Energy Efficiency Programme (i.e. 
15% of the total energy savings required in the eleventh Five Year Plan) was not ambitious 
enough (Price et al. 2010). Therefore it is important to acknowledge that target setting needs to 
reflect abatement potential. In addition, many companies experienced difficulties in complet-
ing energy audits due to the lack of qualified auditing personnel. Capacity building in auditing 
and monitoring thus remains essential to the effectiveness of energy efficiency programmes. 
However, although lessons need to be learnt, the Top 1000 Energy Efficiency Programme is 
generally considered a success and demonstrates how private entities can be incentivised 
through the setting and monitoring of top-down targets by government actors. 
The aim of the Ten Key Projects Energy Efficiency Programme was to deliver an energy saving 
of 250 Mtce during the eleventh Five Year Period by allocating targeted funding (i.e. approxi-
mately 1 billion USD) to energy efficiency projects (WRI 2009). For example, one objective of 
the program was to increase the efficiency of coal burning boilers and kilns by five and two 
percentage points (Energy Bulletin 2011). The renovation of medium and small sized boilers 
with advanced techniques such as pulverised coal firing were incentivised by allowing compa-
and following accounting and management system checks, an eligible company would receive 
ost upfront, with the remaining 40% provided after the technology 
was installed and subject to an evaluation of the energy savings (WRI 2009). Such a payment 
the data for 2006-2008 it is expected that the programme achieved its target energy saving 
(Price et al. 2010). 
Ethanol Programme in Brazil 
In response to the oil crisis of 1973, the Brazilian government initiated a programme to incen-
tivise the production of large quantities of ethanol from sugarcane (PROALCOHOL) as a re-
placement fuel for gas
five million tonnes of raw sugar equivalent in 1975 and that the product was valued at a low 
price for a long period in the international market, the decision was made to divert some of 
the sugarcane to ethanol production (Goldemberg 2006). The PROALCOHOL programme in-
volved both compulsory and voluntary measures to stimulate demand for ethanol. Firstly, there 
was a compulsory requirement to use 10% anhydrous ethanol as an additive to gasoline, which 
did not require any changes to existing vehicles. Secondly, there was a voluntary requirement 
to use 100% hydrated ethanol in modified vehicles (Goldemberg 2006). 
The PROALCOHOL programme increased the production of ethanol and, by 1981, a quarter of 
the cars sold in Brazil were fuelled by alcohol (Trennepohl 2010). Essential to the success of the 
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programme was the agreement from the automobile manufacturers in the country to produce 
vehicles with converted motors. Such an agreement was only possible because the PROALCO-
HOL programme guaranteed the availability of ethanol in the fuel stations across the country 
(Goldemberg 2006). The Brazilian government primarily supported this programme through 
the provision of soft loans to the sugarcane farmers (i.e. to invest in ethanol distilleries) and to 
the consumer by subsidising the price of ethanol at the pump (Goldemberg 2006). According to 
Nunes (2007) the subsidy ensured that the ethanol price was set lower than the gas price (i.e. 
< 65%). Although sales in cars fuelled by alcohol subsequently decreased in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, coinciding with lower oil prices and the removal of subsidies, the PROALCOHOL 
programme demonstrates how private entities can be incentivised to change their business 
operations in response to the introduction of regulation and financial incentives. 
Energy Efficiency Programme in Thailand 
During the 1990s the electricity demand in Thailand was increasing rapidly, with lighting rep-
resenting 25% of national electricity use in the country (Birner 2000). As a consequence a com-
prehensive five year demand side management (DSM) programme was set up by the Thai na-
tional electric power utility (EGAT) in 1993. The new DSM office implemented several market 
interventions for energy efficiency, which did not rely upon the use of subsidies. Instead EGAT 
encouraged energy efficiency improvements through various collaborations with manufactur-
ers and public promotions (Birner & Martinot 2003). The switching from thick (T-12) to thin (T-
8) fluorescent tubes provides an example of how the DSM programme successfully intervened 
in the market. By financing an $8 million consumer information campaign highlighting that 
the T-8 tubes provided the same quality of lighting as the T-12 tubes whilst consuming less en-
ergy, the EGAT secured an agreement with the importers and manufactures of T-12 tubes to 
switch to T-8 tubes. As a consequence of this market intervention the market share of T-8 tubes 
increased from a 40% share in 1994 to a 100% market share by the end of 1995 (Birner & Mar-
tinot 2003). 
The introduction of energy efficiency labelling was another effective market intervention by 
EGAT in the manufacture of refrigerators. EGAT negotiated a voluntary labelling scheme for 
refrigerators based upon efficiency performance. This was again supported by an advertising 
campaign to promote the energy efficiency standard to consumers and EGAT ensured that 
there was sufficient capacity to audit refrigerator models by partnering with a technical stand-
ards institute to test the refrigerators. The scheme was subsequently made mandatory with an 
increase in the energy efficiency requirements for the labelling scheme. The impact of the pro-
gramme was impressive. In 1994, only one single door model and 2% of double door models 
qualified for the highest energy efficiency level. By 2000, all single door and 60% of double 
door models qualified for the highest efficiency level (Birner & Martinot 2003). The experience 
in Thailand demonstrates that voluntary agreements can be effective when industry have con-
fidence in government policies to transform the market. The empowerment of consumer 
choice, through the introduction of energy efficiency labelling and information, can also facili-
tate necessary market transformations. 
3.5 Implications for the concept of sectoral mechanisms 
Sectoral mechanisms strive to trigger investments into sectoral greenhouse gas mitigation ac-
tivities. In particular under the scenario of a sector with mainly private owned emitters that 
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faces a sectoral no lose target, incentives to invest into mitigation might be low if investors do 
not get guarantees to receive an equivalent for their investment, e.g. in form of credits. It is 
thus required to design the implementation of a sectoral mechanism in a way that prevents 
free riding and provides guarantees to investors. Otherwise private investments will be alienat-
ed by the lack of credibility. 
As the lessons of a decade of CDM show, the availability of a clear incentive was the key pillar 
of success. Thus, sectoral mechanisms will only be successful if private companies see such an 
incentive that has a fair chance of surviving in the long run. The discussion on the role of gov-
ernment has shown that the increased responsibility of the government under a sectoral mech-
anism requires strong governance of implementing domestic mitigation policies. Therefore, 
sectoral mechanisms may initially be implemented only in selected developing countries. How-
ever, examples of successful climate mitigation policies illustrate that several countries have a 
good track record in implementing such policies and that a number of developing countries 
would be eligible for establishing sectoral mechanisms. 
In terms of measures, host country governments should concentrate on providing policy in-
struments that prevent free riding. The fact that a sectoral crediting threshold is no lose for the 
country as a whole does not necessarily imply that the implementation of the mechanism with-
in the country needs to be no lose as well. 
Emissions above the threshold could be penalized by a mandatory regulation or an emissions 
tax, which would provide a clear message that emissions reductions achieved by one company 
are not diluted by the non-action of its competitor. Alternatively, subsidies such as feed in tar-
iffs could be used to provide a clear monetary incentive to the private sector. These incentives 
would however not be directly linked to the global carbon market. The credits would just serve 
to reduce the budgetary burden in the case of a subsidy or to increase revenues 
in the case of an emission tax. Last but not least sectoral mechanisms can domestically also be 
implemented as a mandatory emissions trading scheme. Such an approach would establish a 
direct link to the carbon market and provide strong mitigation incentives at activity level. 
However, each host country and each sector is different. Investors, in particular from industrial-
ised countries, will only invest if (i) they trust in the respective government and (ii) believe the 
implementation of the mechanism is credible enough. In order to build confidence in this re-
gard, pilot schemes should be set up rather sooner than later. Many concerns on lacking incen-
tive structures of sectoral mechanisms will disappear once the new market-based approach is 
established as long as CDM is currently established. 
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4 Solving the MRV challenge for new market-based mechanisms: 
What can past experience teach us? 
Work package 3, by Paula Castro, Daisuke Hayashi, Martin Stadelmann, Axel Michaelowa (IPZ), 
Martin Cames, Sean Healy (Öko-Institut), 23 November 2011 
The new market-based mechanisms (NMBM) being discussed in the climate change negotia-
tions will require a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system that enables a trans-
parent accounting of their contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. Two ex-
isting strands of MRV can provide lessons for designing this new system: MRV of project-based 
market mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Proto-
col and MRV of national climate change mitigation actions and greenhouse gas inventories. 
For project-based market mechanisms, such as the CDM, MRV is an essential element to ensure 
envi
are required to monitor greenhouse gas emission reductions, to compile monitoring reports 
and to submit these reports to external verification. However, MRV under the CDM cannot be 
simply transferred to those NMBM that will address national or sectoral actions,
7
 rather than 
project-based interventions as in the CDM. Therefore, the existing MRV of national mitigation 
actions and targets of industrialised countries  which are sometimes structured along specific 
sectors and industries  is a valuable experience that can inform the design of MRV for NMBM. 
For national mitigation actions, MRV elements have already been included under both the 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997.
8
 However, the wording of MRV was only introduced under the Bali Action Plan in 2007, 
when countries agreed to undertake measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NA
enabled by technology, financing and capaci
new market-based mechanism proposals in subsequent COP negotiations represents a challenge 
to policy makers on how best to design MRV systems that ensure environmental integrity, con-
sistency with the existing system, avoid overlap between MRV of NAMAs and of new market-
based mechanisms, and are accepted by the international community. 
This discussion paper analyses how a MRV system for the new market-based mechanisms can 
be designed so that it complies with the criteria of environmental integrity, data availability, 
transparency, cost-efficiency, a sound institutional framework and transferability. To do so, in a 
first step, the general academic and political discussion on MRV is summarized; then, lessons 
are drawn from existing MRV systems in the CDM, the EU ETS and a voluntary sectoral report-
ing initiative; and finally, proposals are put forward for the MRV of new sectoral market-based 
mechanisms. 
                                            
7
 While the negotiations regarding new market-based mechanisms are still open regarding the form that these 
new mechanisms will take, in this study we focus mostly on sectoral market mechanisms, particularly sectoral 
crediting and sectoral trading. 
8
 The reporting requirement under the Kyoto Protocol are very different: while developing countries are only re-
quested to report on programmes containing mitigation measures in their national communications (normally, 
every 5-15 years), industrialized countries have to submit more regular and detailed national communications, 
and every year an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC 2007). 
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4.1 Overview of the academic and political discussion 
In the following we provide an overview of the academic and political discussion on specific 
MRV requirements for sectoral mechanisms. We will firstly outline the objective of MRV before 
providing a more detailed description of the three components and desirable characteristics of 
MRV systems that may be suitable for sectoral mechanisms. 
According to Breidenich & Bodansky (2009), the role of MRV in any new agreement for a post-
2012 climate regime is multifaceted. The three components of an MRV system may facilitate 
progress towards a new climate agreement by: 
 Measuring the progress of countries towards the objective of an agreement, this may 
encourage international collaboration on the establishment of baselines and the identi-
fication of mitigation potentials; 
 Reporting the mitigation actions of a country to recognise their effort at an internation-
al level, which will allow for independent review of these mitigation actions with the 
possibility of learning from them and improving policy measures where necessary; 
 Verifying the outcome of the mitigation actions that are reported and measured by a 
country ensuring that there is mutual confidence 
climate regime itself. 
In essence, the fundamental objective of an MRV system is to provide credibility to a new 
agreement on the post-2012 climate regime; and such credibility is vitally important in order to 
maintain the mutual confidence of participating countries in the process. Given that the nature 
of any obligations (commitments, support, actions, etc.) and MRV systems is not explicitly de-
fined in the Bali Action Plan, both are subject to ongoing negotiations at the COP level (Fransen 
2009). 
Within these negotiations, the role of new market-based mechanisms and the conditions neces-
sary to enable emission reductions to be measured, reported and verified are being carefully 
considered. To a certain extent, the terms measurable, reportable and verifiable are all closely 
linked, however it is important to acknowledge that each component of MRV presents a dis-
tinct set of issues concerning the design of MRV systems for new market-based mechanisms. 
Breidenich & Bodansky (2009, p. 3) define the function of measurement e-
scribe a phenomenon in reasonably precise, objective terms  that is, in terms of an established 
 to both direct physical 
measurement as well as an estimation based on indicators, which can be quantitative or even 
qualitative. For example, national emission inventories are often based upon an estimation of 
GHG emissions that are derived from the product of activity data and GHG emission factors. 
, 
p. 2). 
Reporting involves the provision of information by all countries that have approved the terms 
of an international agreement. Breidenich & Bodansky (2009) suggest that the provision of in-
formation may include national conditions (GDP, climate, etc.), government policies and 
measures (tax policies, subsidies, etc.), environmental results (emission levels, etc.) and private 
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precision and reliability of the reported in y actors (i.e. states, business actors, non-
which information is presented in a transparent and standardised way that allows comparison 
between reports and verifica  5). 
Verification 
2009, p. 6). Verification is considered a technical non-judgemental function, which involves the 
factual accuracy of information. It is therefore a distinct term, which is not necessarily either 
political (i.e. a review) or legal (i.e. compliance) in nature (Breidenich & Bodansky 2009). The 
verification of the mitigation action of a country is dependent upon the extent to which data is 
capable of being verified (i.e. quantitative and qualitative data), the actors involved (other 
states, accredited private entities, NGOs, etc.) and the way in which the verification process is 
implemented (onsite inspections, onsite monitoring, remote monitoring, etc.). The way in 
which sectoral mitigation actions of countries can be monitored, reported and verified depends 
upon the sectoral approach implemented. 
The introduction of sectoral crediting (i.e. the issuance of credits for the difference between 
actual emissions in a sector and the crediting threshold) or sectoral trading (i.e. the definition 
of a sectoral cap and the issuance of tradable emission permits up to that cap) would require 
reliable, transparent and standardised data on sectoral emission reductions. The determination 
of emission reductions would require a measurement of actual emissions and the establishment 
of quantified baseline projections (Ellis & Moarif 2009), which would be particularly challeng-
such as economic growth, population growth, international fuel prices, technological innova-
complicated further if it refers to a sub-sector as the interaction of separate mitigation actions 
by a country within the same sector may impact baseline calculations (Jung et al. 2010). In ad-
dition, the reporting and verification of information would be more difficult to implement if 
activities are defined at the sub-sector level and differ from the sectoral disaggregation used in 
official statistics (Ellis & Moarif 2009). 
It is evident that the existing monitoring and reporting requirements under the Kyoto Protocol 
will have to be further developed to enable emission reductions from new market-based mech-
anisms to be measured, reported and verified. According to Fransen (2009), even the national 
communications and inventories for Annex I Parties are currently not adequate to contribute to 
MRV under a post-2012 agreement. Given the less stringent requirements for non-Annex I Par-
ties, they would even be less appropriate as a basis for future MRV. This may be particularly 
true for the MRV requirements of new market-based mechanisms because the required sectoral 
information may currently not (or not accurately) be reported in national communications. 
However, attempts should be made to build upon the existing monitoring and reporting pro-
cedures that have widespread support amongst the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
It is suggested that the post-2012 framework needs to extend monitoring requirements to de-
veloping countries. Given that new market-based mechanisms are designed to realise mitiga-
tion potentials in certain sectors of developing countries, it is essential that the inventories of 
the developing countries with significant emissions become more frequent and complete. 
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Many countries have advanced the concept of a registry to recognise the mitigation efforts of 
developing countries in the international framework and to prioritise the distribution of finan-
cial and technology support from developed countries. While the idea of a registry has wide-
spread support in principle, the way it would operate is still subject to ongoing negotiation 
with the MRV requirements potentially varying depending upon the type of NAMA (unilateral, 
supported or market-based), the market mechanism used (crediting or trading) and the nation-
al circumstances of the developing country (McMahon et al. 2009). However, if the outcome of 
the negotiations in terms of MRV stringency is weak, the credibility of the underlying agree-
ment would be reduced. 
In conclusion, the fundamental purpose of MRV is to communicate progress and provide credi-
bility for the mitigation actions of a country in a manner that is internationally comparable 
with the efforts of other parties to an environmental agreement. The emergence of new mar-
ket-based mechanisms in a post-2012 agreement presents various challenges to how infor-
mation is currently measured, reported and verified. From a technical perspective, it is evident 
that the measurement of data at a sectoral or even sub-sectoral level will require additional 
skills and capacities to define sectoral boundaries and baselines. Furthermore, reporting and 
verification processes will require data to be more disaggregated and standardised amongst all 
of the participating countries. From a political perspective, there needs to be an international 
agreement on a MRV system that would extend beyond the Kyoto Protocol Parties to include 
MRV procedures for non-Annex I countries. These technical and political challenges will need 
to be addressed to ensure mutual confidence amongst the Parties in order to provide the neces-
sary conditions for new market-based mechanisms in a post-2012 regime to succeed. 
4.2 Description of criteria for analysing existing MRV systems and designing new ones 
The main purpose of MRV systems is to safeguard environmental integrity. Therefore MRV sys-
tems need to comply, inter alia, with following principles (EU 2004, p. 4-5): 
 Completeness: All greenhouse gas emissions from all sources covered by the respective 
scheme need to be monitored and reported. 
 Accuracy: emission determination should be systematically resulting in data neither 
under nor over actual emissions; uncertainties should be reduced as far as practicable 
and quantified to the extent possible; metering and testing equipment used to monitor 
emissions should be calibrated and regularly maintained; data processing tools used in 
determining emissions should be free from errors. 
 Conservativeness: in the interest of environmental integrity, wherever uncertainties in 
determining emission levels are remaining, it is better to err on the lower bound (un-
derestimating the emission reductions). 
 Materiality: Only information whose omission or misstatement could influence the de-
cision of users should be taken into account; in that sense, materiality provides a cut-off 
threshold for the size potential of omissions or misstatements. 
 Consistency: Emission data should be comparable over time by using the same monitor-
ing methodologies; monitoring methodologies should only be changed if the new 
methodology ensures improved completeness or accuracy. 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
30 
 Cost effectiveness: the accuracy of monitoring methodologies should be balanced 
against the additional cost; those methodologies should be applied which provide the 
highest accuracy unless their application is technically unfeasible or would lead to un-
reasonable high cost. 
 Adjustability: monitoring methodologies should be improved if more accurate data or 
methodologies become available. 
 Transparency: all data required to determine emissions, including activity data, emis-
sion factors, assumptions, references, etc., should be analysed and recorded in such way 
that it can be reproduced by surveillance entities. 
Some of these criteria are conflicting so that a balance between them needs to be identified 
(e.g. consistency versus improvement). How that balance would look like cannot be determined 
in general but depends on the detailed circumstances of the respective subject that needs to be 
monitored, reported and verified. 
Based on these principles we derive the following criteria for the assessment of existing sectoral 
MRV systems: 
 
Criterion Key questions 
Environmental 
integrity 
Does the MRV system safeguard environmental integrity by ensuring high levels 
of completeness, accuracy and consistency? Is conservativeness guaranteed?  
Data availability Are all the data required to determine baseline and actual emissions available, 
including activity data, emissions or conversion factors, etc.? To which extent 
data needs to be gathered before the start of the system and which data may be 
considered sensitive since it would be considered as confidential business data? 
Transparency Are the emission data gathered made publically available for any interested per-
son or body? Are additional data made publically available and if yes, which 
additional data?  
Cost-efficiency Does the MRV system result in unreasonably high cost? How could the costs of 
MRV be reduced without undermining environmental integrity? 
Institutional 
feasibility 
Which bodies need to be established to apply the MRV system and to which ex-
tent already existing bodies can be mandated with the required tasks? 
Transferability In which context is the MRV system applied so far? Can it be transferred to de-
veloping countries and which criteria in terms of size, governance, institutional 
framework, etc. those countries need to comply with? 
 
The existing MRV systems will be analysed in a qualitative manner on the basis of these crite-
ria, taking into account the actual circumstances of the context where the system is applied up 
to now. 
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4.3 Analysis of existing MRV systems 
4.3.1 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) is based upon the guidance provided by the Commission Decision 2004/156/EC. 
The coverage of the EU ETS includes any combustion installation with a rated thermal input 
exceeding 20 MW and the operators of these installations are required to adhere to the moni-
toring and reporting guidelines expressed by the Commission in order to use emission permits 
(Directive 2003/87/EC). 
A monitoring methodology needs to be submitted by the operator of an installation to the 
competent authority, which describes the activities carried out by an installation to be moni-
e-
tween calculation and meas  
The monitoring and reporting guidelines provided in the Commission Decision 2004/156/EC 
establish a tier system for the calculation of greenhouse gas emissions defining a hierarchy of 
different accuracy levels for activity data, emission factors and oxidation or conversion factors. 
In principle the operator is obligated to apply the highest tier level (i.e. the highest level of ac-
curacy) unless this is technically or economically not feasible. 
The use of a measurement based methodology (i.e. metering devices) to monitor the green-
house gas emissions of an installation can only be implemented if the output is more accurate 
than the calculation based methodology. The accuracy of measurement is determined based on 
uncertainty connected to how the 
2004/156/EC). 
The operator of the installation is required to report the monitoring of greenhouse gas emis-
sions in accordance with the reporting format outlined in the Decision 2004/156/EC and to 
ensure that all monitoring methodologies are subject to independent verification. 
Environmental Integrity 
Completeness
emissions from all sources belonging to activities listed in Annex to 
(Decision 2004/156/EC). Despite this objective of being complete, two aspects need to be dis-
cussed here. Only installations above 20 MW of thermal input are part of the EU ETS system. 
While reducing costs of monitoring, this approach may lead to leakage to smaller installations. 
An additional aspect is how emissions from electricity are accounted for. Under the EU ETS, 
electricity emissions are accounted through the allocation of allowances to power generation 
companies, which are supposed to pass the higher cost of GHG emitting electricity to their con-
sumers. In order not to price electricity emissions doubly, they are thus not included in the ac-
counting for industrial installations. While this approach is appropriate for the EU ETS due to 
its broad coverage, it may not be appropriate for sectoral market mechanisms in developing 
countries, as in this case there is no certainty that emissions from electricity use or consump-
tion are accounted for. If they are not, and the benchmark or baseline for the sector only con-
siders direct emissions (e.g. from fuel combustion during the production process), this could 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
32 
create the perverse incentive to increase the use of electricity in order to substitute fuel com-
bustion. 
Accuracy: The accuracy of the monitoring and reporting is ensured within the MRV system by 
obligating the operators of installations to conform to the highest level of accuracy as defined 
by the tier approach (unless this is not technically or financially feasible) when using either the 
calculation or measurement based methodology. However, the European Environment Agency 
(EEA 2006) reports difficulties in the implementation of this tiered approach: during the ETS 
Phase I, in some countries the minimum tiers were not yet technically feasible by 2005. In 
about 20% of the installations above 500 kt annual emissions, either the activity data, the emis-
sion factor or the net calorific value could not be calculated according to the minimum tier 
requirements for at least one fuel. This shows that, even if the regulations try to ensure data 
quality, during implementation the strict requirements had to be adapted to the reality of the 
sectors, at least during an initial learning period. 
Conservativeness: To determine how many emission allowances should be allocated to new 
installations, a benchmark approach was introduced, and each member country established its 
own benchmark. Hermann (2010) discusses that the benchmarks in the cement sector were set 
in most countries on the basis of the best available technology (BAT), which should ensure ac-
curacy in determining desirable emission levels. However, a case study of the German cement 
benchmark shows that even when utilising BAT as the basis for the benchmark, this one was 
not stringent enough, because it did not take into account the high share in use of waste fuels 
for the clinkering process, because the load factor chosen was too high, and because there were 
different benchmarks for different technologies, failing to set an incentive to make broader 
technological improvements. 
Consistency: The emission data monitored is comparable over time, with the monitoring 
methodology only changed if the accuracy of the reported data is improved (Decision 
2004/156/EC). 
Data Availability 
Data available: In the context of the power sector, the calculation of greenhouse gas emissions 
from combustion is the product of fuel consumption, an emission factor and an oxidation fac-
tor (Decision 2004/156/EC) with the accuracy (i.e. certainty) of the data dependent upon the tier 
approach. For example, according to the Commission Decision 2004/156/EC the use of an emis-
i-
y by referring to country specific emis-
 
The flexibility provided by this tier approach in the MRV guidelines (Decision 2004/156/EC) 
ensures that data in most circumstances are available for installations to calculate their green-
house gas emissions whilst also documenting a transparent way to improve the quality of mon-
itoring over time. 
Data to be collected: If the measurement based approach is implemented by an operator of an 
installation to monitor greenhouse gas emissions, the measurement data will need to be fre-
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quently collected along with information on the uncertainty associated with the measurement. 
Otherwise, data on fuel consumption is used for the calculation based methodology. 
Transparency 
Public availability of emission data: In the EU ETS, the greenhouse gas emission data are 
made publically available on an annual basis to ensure complete transparency. The operators 
of the installations covered in the scheme are required to report emission data according to the 
format set out in the Commission Decision 2004/156/EC. 
Public availability of additional data: Information is also provided on the number of permits 
submitted, purchased/sold or banked at the end of the year for each installation. 
Cost-efficiency 
Cost of MRV system: The tier approach outlined in the MRV guidelines provides a balance be-
tween the accuracy of monitoring and the additional cost of the methodology. 
Reduction of MRV costs: Provisions are included within the Commission Decision 2004/156/EC 
to ensure that if the monitoring and reporting of information at a certain level of accuracy 
leads to unreasonably high costs for the operator of an installation, then information can be 
monitored and reported according to a lower tier of accuracy. However, the competent author-
ity must be satisfied that this is the case before allowing an installation to collect information at 
a lower level of accuracy. 
Institutional Framework 
Responsible authorities: The monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU 
ETS system required the establishment of registries to account for the greenhouse gas emissions 
of the participating installations. National authorities have been responsible for setting up reg-
istries to facilitate emissions trading. In addition to the registration of verified emissions, this 
involves accounting for the surrender of permits at the end of the year by installations along 
with additional information on the selling or purchase and banking of permits. According to 
EEA (2006), in most participating countries, more than one authority is involved in the national 
implementation of the EU ETS, and sometimes emissions monitoring and issuance of permits is 
carried out by local or regional authorities. To avoid inconsistencies in implementation at the 
national level, working groups with regular meetings, specific guidance notes and/or training 
courses for the authorities have been carried out. 
In addition, a network of independent accredited verification bodies has been established to 
ensure that the monitoring and reporting of emissions by the operators of the participating 
installations were implemented in accordance with the MRV guidelines. 
Transferability 
Applicability of MRV system in developing countries: Based upon the lessons learnt from the 
EU ETS, a similar scheme for developing countries may be feasible if technical support is pro-
vided. The implementation of NAMAs may act as a first step (akin to the EU ETS phase I) to-
wards improved MRV of greenhouse gas emissions to implement a similar scheme in the fu-
ture. One possible implementation would be to establish market-based pilot schemes in devel-
oping countries, which already receive emission units (credits or allowances) that are fully fun-
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gible with the international system. However, to ensure environmental integrity during this 
pilot, either the issuing body would issue less credits than those verified or the buying party 
would cancel part of the credits received.
9
 
4.3.2 Power under the CDM 
There are a number of CDM baseline and monitoring methodologies for projects in the power 
sector. As an example we analyse the consolidated baseline and monitoring methodology 
ACM0002.
10
 This methodology is applicable to CDM projects that either install, increase capaci-
ty, retrofit or replace grid-connected electricity generation from renewable sources (hydro, 
wind, geothermal, solar, wave or tidal power). 
Depending upon the CDM project type covered by this methodology, the identification of a 
baseline scenario will be slightly different. For example, the installation of a new grid-
connected renewable power plant/unit assumes that the electricity delivered to the grid by the 
project activity would have otherwise been generated by the existing electricity grid, which is 
associated with a specific emission factor. Alternatively a capacity addition to an existing grid 
connected renewable power plant/unit assumes in the baseline scenario that in the absence of 
the CDM project activity the existing facility would continue to supply electricity to the grid at 
historical levels. 
The identification of such baseline scenarios for CDM projects and the subsequent demonstra-
tion of additionality through tests such as the barrier analysis and investment analysis are es-
sential elements of the CDM project cycle. 
The issuance of CERs will depend upon the emission reductions that are estimated to occur 
from the displacement of electricity generation from fossil fuel power plants during the pro-
posed crediting period of the CDM project activity (i.e. installation, capacity addition, retrofit 
and replacement). Independent verification by Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) is re-
quired to ensure that all Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued for emission reductions to 
CDM project developers are real. 
Environmental Integrity 
Completeness: All of the main greenhouse gas emission sources for the baseline scenario (i.e. 
CO2) and the project activity (i.e. CO2, CH4) are accounted for in methodology ACM0002. 
Accuracy: As an offsetting mechanism, the CDM projects currently depend upon the concept of 
additionality to ensure their environmental integrity. A project is regarded as additional if it 
would not have been implemented without the incentive from the CDM. This is demonstrated 
in methodology ACM0002 through a barrier analysis and (in most cases) an investment analy-
sis. However the current approach has been criticised as being very subjective and difficult to 
validate in an objective manner. 
                                            
9
 It is not advisable to introduce different kinds of tradable units here (as in the case of afforestation/reforestation 
projects in the CDM), because this would lead to fragmentation of the market. 
10
 http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/DB/C505BVV9P8VSNNV3LTK1BP3OR24Y5L 
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The ability to accurately measure the GHG reductions that result from CDM projects covered by 
the methodology is also an essential requirement for maintaining environmental integrity. In 
order to achieve this accuracy within methodology ACM0002, the quantity of net electricity 
generation annually supplied to the grid by the plant or unit that has been added under the 
project activity is required to be measured using electricity meters. The use of such a measure-
ment device, which is used according to relevant industry standards, ensures a high level of 
accuracy on the amount of electricity generated. While this data on produced electricity is very 
accurate, the overall estimation of emission reductions in ACM0002 relies on less accurate data 
on emissions produced by existing power plants (Michaelowa 2011) and at least three chal-
lengeable assumptions: First, the methodology assumes that mainly power from coal, oil and 
gas power plants are replaced but no generation from renewable energy and nuclear (excep-
tion: largely hydro-based grids). Second, the methodology assumes 100% replacement of other 
electricity as consequence of renewable electricity production. Third, ACM0002 assumes that 
the replaced emissions can be accurately estimated by taking specific weights for emissions 
from all power plants on the grid and for emissions of the recently built power stations. There-
rather than an exact value (which can never be attained). 
The monitoring of emissions associated with the production of electricity from geothermal and 
solar thermal projects requires a calculation of the annual fuel consumption based upon emis-
sion factors approved by the CDM Executive Board. 
Consistency: The requirement for the continuous measurement of the net electricity genera-
tion annually supplied to the grid by the plant or unit that has been added under the project 
activity should ensure that the data will be comparable over time. The CDM Executive Board 
will only approve changes to methodology ACM0002 if the accuracy or completeness of the 
data can be improved. 
Data Availability 
Data available: Methodology ACM0002 refers to the use of several tools approved by the CDM 
Executive Board to calculate the emission factor for an electricity system, to demonstrate and 
assess project additionality, to identify the baseline scenario and to calculate project emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion. 
Data to be collected: The quantity of net electricity generation supplied by the project 
plant/unit to the grid needs to be measured, and data on the GHG-intensity of the grid (if not 
already published by national institutions) needs to be collected for CDM projects covered by 
methodology ACM0002. 
Transparency 
Public availability of emission data: The UNFCCC publishes information on the CERs issued to 
all of the CDM projects that have successfully completed the MRV requirements associated with 
the CDM project cycle. 
Public availability of additional data: Information on the status of a CDM project (i.e. regis-
tered, rejected, under review) is also available from the UNFCCC, as well as the Project Design 
emission reductions. 
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Cost-efficiency 
Cost of MRV system: Transaction costs (i.e. project identification, methodology development, 
project documentation) are an important factor influencing the cost-effectiveness of the CDM. 
The cost of monitoring, reporting and verifying the emission reductions from CDM projects 
results in considerable costs and risks to the CDM project developer and particularly undermine 
the incentive for developing small-scale renewable projects. 
Institutional Framework 
Responsible authorities: The CDM Executive Board supervises the CDM and is responsible for 
the registration of CDM projects and the issuance of CERs. A Methodologies Panel was estab-
lished to support the CDM Executive Board by providing recommendations on methodologies 
for baselines and monitoring plans. Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) are responsible for 
independently validating the PDDs and verifying the emission reductions reported by a project 
owner. In addition, a Designated National Authority (DNA) is required to approve the develop-
ment of a CDM project proposed by a CDM project developer. 
The CDM institutional framework has been criticised due to its low effectiveness in dealing 
with the large flow of projects (both at the DOE and the CDM Executive Board level), and to 
misaligned incentives for DOEs, which by being hired by the project proponents have an incen-
tive to satisfy the client and facilitate registration, rather than to ensure environmental quality 
(e.g. Lund 2010). 
Transferability 
Given that the CDM is an offsetting mechanism to facilitate emission reductions in developing 
countries, the MRV system is already applied to developing countries. However, the CDM relies 
upon international institutions and capacity building would therefore be necessary if the MRV 
system would only be administered by developing countries. 
4.3.3 Cement under the CDM and the Cement Sustainability Initiative 
c-
by the Cement Sustainabil-
ity Initiative (CSI), building on its voluntary protocol for calculating and reporting CO2 emis-
sions from the cement sector, The Cement CO2 Protocol (the CSI Protocol). Because of the close 
similarity between these two MRV systems, this section analyses both systems together. 
NM0302 is useful in understanding how the CSI Protocol has been adapted for a carbon offset-
ting purpose. As this study aims at providing recommendations for an MRV system for sectoral 
crediting mechanisms, our analysis on the MRV technicalities mainly focuses on NM0302. 
However, NM0302 lacks implementation experience because it was eventually rejected by the 
UNFCCC in May 2011. In order to complement this, we also analyse the implementation as-
pects of the CSI Protocol (e.g. data management, institutional framework). This is justified be-
a-
base). 
NM0302 is applicable to CDM projects reducing GHG emissions from clinker or cement produc-
tion facilities, be they newly constructed or already existent. Either a single or a combination of 
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mitigation measures can be implemented, such as the substitution of fossil fuels by alternative 
fuels, the use of alternative raw materials, cement blending, energy efficiency improvements, 
electricity generation from waste heat recovery and renewable energy, etc. Because of this, this 
methodology is a good starting point for a MRV system for a whole sector. 
The methodology uses a benchmark approach for the assessment of plant-wide emission per-
formance, expressed in CO2 emissions per ton of clinker or cement (tCO2e/t clinker or cement). 
The benchmark is used for both baseline setting and additionality demonstration, but different 
stringency levels are applied for each of them (i.e. dual benchmark). 
The baseline benchmark for existing plants is set as the emission performance at the top 45
th
 
percentile of the existing production volume in the region. The baseline performance of new 
plants is determined by two types of parameters: global and local parameters. The global pa-
rameters (specific heat and electricity consumption) are benchmarked at the top 45
th
 percentile 
of the worldwide production volume of plants built in the last five years. The local parameters 
(fuel mix, calcinations and clinker to cement ratio) are strongly influenced by local conditions, 
thus they are benchmarked at the top 45
th
 percentile of the existing production volume in the 
region. The additionality benchmark for existing and new plants is established in a similar way 
to the baseline benchmark, with an exception that the top 20
th
 percentile is used as a bench-
mark stringency level. The benchmarks are updated every year according to the historical 
trend in the improvement of emission performance recorded in the CSI GNR database. 
Leakage is determined by a simple, conservative approach. Emission reductions outside the 
boundary (e.g. reduced transportation) are not taken into account. Emission increases outside 
the boundary (e.g. increased transportation) are accounted for by a 5% downward adjustment 
of the emission reductions. Also, emissions from the cultivation of renewable biomass at a ded-
icated plantation are taken into account using a default leakage factor of 5 tCO2e per TJ of bi-
omass used in the project. 
The required data are MRVed applying the CSI Protocol and registered in the CSI GNR data-
base. The CSI retained PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to design and manage independently the 
CSI GNR database to ensure accuracy of the information and adequate safeguards to protect 
confidential business information (WBCSD 2011a). 
Environmental integrity 
Completeness: NM0302 and the CSI protocol are highly complete in terms of the coverage of 
GHGs and emission sources within plants. Only very minor GHGs and emission sources are ex-
cluded (e.g. CO2 emissions from combustion of wastewater injected into kilns, CH4 and N2O 
from kilns). However, as the benchmark parameters are calculated on the basis of the installa-
tions included in the CSI GNR database, the benchmark calculation is based on incomplete data 
of worldwide and regional production. This in turn affects the accuracy of the emission reduc-
tion estimations, as discussed below. 
Consistency: The MRV systems do not contain any major source of randomness, so emission 
data should be comparable over time by using the same version of the MRV system. The CSI 
protocol is currently in its third version. The initial version, published in 2001, was field-tested 
for two years, reviewed and revised based on comments received from both users and review-
ers (UNFCCC 2011a). The changes from the first to the second version were made to improve 
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user-friendliness and adherence to the principles of relevance, completeness, consistency, 
transparency and accuracy (WBCSD 2005). The main change from the second to the third ver-
sion was to address the need for accounting CO2 emissions from on-site power generation, 
which was practiced in plants owned by new members of the CSI (WBCSD 2011b). The revision 
history of the CSI protocol shows that the MRV system has been revised to improve complete-
ness and accuracy. 
Accuracy: The reasons for the rejection of NM0302 explain where the MRV system lacks accu-
racy and conservativeness of emission reduction calculation. One key reason is that emission 
reductions through cement blending cannot be ensured by only monitoring the share of 
blended cement produced at the level of the project plant, as suggested in NM0302 (UNFCCC 
2011a). If a cement plant increases the share of additives in its cement products, the availability 
of additives in the market decreases and could prevent other cement plants from using addi-
tives. In order to account for this leakage effect, one would need to monitor the share of blend-
ed cement produced by all cement plants in a relevant market. However, this solution is not 
feasible because the coverage of the CSI GNR database is still limited in many developing coun-
tries. 
Conservativeness: The other key reason for the rejection is the deviation of the methodology 
from the benchmark stringency level stipulated in the Marrakech Accords (the average of top 
20% performers). The CDM Methodologies Panel argued that such deviation could be accepta-
ble only if there is no technology that can easily go beyond the benchmark, or if the percent-
age of plants that can go beyond the benchmark is very small, or if the level of incentives re-
quired for moving plants beyond the benchmark is huge as compared to the CDM incentive 
(UNFCCC 2011a). The methodology developer could not substantiate the choice of benchmark 
stringency with an analysis of real plant data. 
In summary, the environmental integrity of the two cement sector MRV systems analysed can 
be a concern. Although they are highly complete within plants and consistent, there are two 
major shortcomings that can lead to an inaccurate (or non-conservative) estimation of emission 
reductions: the unjustified choice of benchmark stringency and the inadequate treatment of 
cement blending activities. 
Data availability 
Data availability: The data required for the application of NM0302 (and the CSI protocol) are 
available for the following years: 1990, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (WBCSD 2011a). 
Early dat n-
structed up to 15-year old historical records of cement production, fuel purchases, company 
ating in the 
CSI GNR database have used an independent third party to verify their data at least every 3 
years. Other participants to the CSI GNR database are strongly encouraged to adopt data assur-
ance practices (WBCSD 2011a). As a result, 83% of the 2009 data is verified by independent 
third parties (WBCSD 2011a). 
The CSI GNR database now covers over 900 cement plants, owned by 46 companies. This repre-
sents about 26% of the global cement production (WBCSD 2011a). The key challenge is that the 
CSI GNR database has limited data coverage in key developing countries (e.g. China, India, and 
the rest of Asia) (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Regional coverage of cement production in the CSI GNR database in 2006 
 
Source: WBCSD 2009a 
Anti-trust laws in Europe, the US and Japan require that collection of business-sensitive infor-
mation be properly managed to avoid disclosure to competitors (WBCSD 2009a). The CSI GNR 
database complies with the anti-trust laws and is managed by an independent third party ser-
vice provider (PwC). Confidential information on individual companies or plants is not dis-
closed, nor made accessible, and is protected by contractual and data security measures 
(WBCSD 2011a). 
In addition, a Project Management Committee (PMC) was set up to serve as the single contact 
point for all communications between participants in the CSI GNR database and PwC. The PMC 
ta que-
ries submitted by stakeholders (WBCSD 2011a). 
Data to be collected: The following data on emission and energy performance are collected 
(WBCSD 2011a): 
 Specific gross and net CO2 emissions per ton clinker and cement product; 
 Absolute gross and net CO2 emissions; 
 Thermal energy consumption per ton clinker; 
 Electric energy consumption per ton cement; 
 Fuel mix (fossil fuel / fossil waste / biomass); 
 Clinker to cement ratios. 
To enable calculation of the percentiles, trend lines and correlations, the following information 
is also collected (WBCSD 2011a): 
 Clinker and cement production volumes; 
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 Differentiation by grey and white clinker; 
 Type of installation; 
 Location of installation; 
 Nominal production capacity; 
 Year of construction. 
Transparency 
Public availability of emission and additional data: The results of the baseline and addition-
ality benchmark analyses will be made publicly available. Due to the data confidentiality con-
cerns, data obtained for individual plants cannot be disclosed. Thus, the benchmark results will 
be publicly available only at an aggregate level (i.e. regional level or country level for major 
producers such as China, India and Brazil) (UNFCCC 2009). 
Upon approval by the PMC, other data in the CSI GNR database can be released to anyone, 
even outside the CSI membership. The PMC will review every data query, evaluating if the in-
formation is available and if response to the query would fall within the limits of the confiden-
tiality and anti-trust constraints applicable to the CSI GNR database (UNFCCC 2009). 
Cost-efficiency 
Cost of MRV system: Existing CDM methodologies for the cement sector address only single 
measures. However, the implementation of a single measure yields only a limited amount of 
emission reductions in this sector. Thus, transaction costs, which mainly come from MRV, have 
been an important barrier for cement projects under the CDM (WBCSD 2009b). Against this 
background, the holistic MRV approach in NM0302 and the CSI protocol is expected to improve 
cost-efficiency of MRV systems for the cement sector because it streamlines MRV procedures 
and the combination of measures can achieve a higher amount of emission reductions. 
There is no published data on the cost-efficiency of the application of NM0302 or the CSI proto-
col. However, the fact that over 900 cement plants have voluntarily participated in the CSI GNR 
database indicates that the application of the CSI protocol does not result in unreasonably high 
costs. 
Institutional framework 
Responsible authorities: On top of the CDM institutional framework described above under 
4.2.5, the CSI GNR experience shows that it is indispensable to have an independent third party 
manage business-sensitive data. The database manager needs to ensure non-disclosure of confi-
dential information and compliance with anti-trust laws. It is also helpful to have a body that is 
authorised to make decisions on data submission schedules and on disclosure of data to stake-
holders. 
The existing bodies (PwC, the PMC, independent auditors) have addressed these tasks since the 
start of the CSI GNR initiative in 2006. Thus, there is already a functioning institutional frame-
work for the application of the MRV system. 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
41 
Transferability 
The CSI protocol has already been applied to plants in developing countries. Thus, the MRV 
system is in principle transferable to these countries. However, the limited coverage of the CSI 
GNR database indicates that there are some practical reasons why certain developing countries 
have not participated in the MRV initiative. 
In the case of China, one of the key reasons for the limited data coverage is related to its ce-
ment market structure. The participants to the CSI GNR database are usually large, multina-
tional companies. In contrast, the Chinese cement market is dominated by small- to medium-
sized domestic companies, and the multinational CSI GNR participants are not present in the 
Chinese market (Müller 2011). Moreover, the smaller size of Chinese cement producers makes it 
more difficult to have an internal audit team to assure the quality of emissions and energy data 
collected (Müller 2011), which is an essential requirement for the participation in the CSI GNR 
database (WBCSD 2011a). 
The MRV system is ready for use in any developing countries. However, the Chinese case shows 
that its implementation is easier in developing countries where there is a concentrated cement 
market with plants owned by large companies. 
4.3.4 Buildings under the CDM 
(version 1
switching measures in new building units in the following categories: 
 Residential: single-family, multi-family 
 Commercial: office, hotel, warehouse, mercantile, etc. 
 Institutional: education, public assembly, health care, etc. 
A building unit is defined as a distinct space in a building allotted to a specific user, which can 
be either a tenant or owner. If a building is used by a single tenant/owner, the building unit is 
equal to the entire building. 
A single benchmark is applied to baseline setting and additionality demonstration. That is, the 
stringency of baseline and additionality benchmarks is set at the same level. Thus, any emission 
reductions achieved beyond the benchmark are deemed additional. Only in the case fuel 
switching measures are implemented, additionality of these measures needs to be demonstrat-
ed by an investment analysis. 
The benchmark is expressed in emissions per gross floor area (tCO2e/m
2
). Its stringency is set at 
the average emission performance of the top 20% performer building units in similar circum-
stances to project building units, which are built and occupied in the last five years. The simi-
larity in circumstances is assessed by geographical location, climatic conditions, socio-
economics status of building occupants, building unit type and size, and occupancy patterns. 
The methodology evaluates the building emission performance at an aggregate (building unit) 
level. Therefore, one does not have to separately monitor every single measure implemented in 
each building unit (e.g., air-conditioners, compact fluorescent lamps, multi-glazed windows). 
The methodology can account for emissions from the consumption of electricity, fossil fuels, 
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and chilled/hot water as well as refrigerant leakage (e.g. through refrigerators and air condi-
tioners). The comprehensive coverage of efficiency measures and emission sources provides 
flexibility in choosing mitigation measures according to specific requirements of building units 
(Michaelowa & Hayashi forthcoming). 
Environmental integrity 
Completeness: Among the approved CDM methodologies available for the building sector, 
AM0091 has the most comprehensive coverage of GHGs and emission sources. The methodolo-
gy monitors the total energy consumption of building units, without looking into the energy 
consumption of each energy efficiency measure implemented. As opposed to most other meth-
odologies focusing on specific mitigation measures (e.g. efficient lighting, refrigerators), this 
technology-neutral approach has the advantage of accommodating a wide range of mitigation 
measures. The only major emission sources excluded from this methodology are the consump-
tion of biomass and biogas. This is because complex procedures are necessary for calculating 
baseline and leakage emissions for these fuels. In order to avoid a possible emission increase 
from these emission sources, the methodology is made applicable only if the project building 
units do not consume biomass and biogas. 
Accuracy and conservativeness: The technology-neutral approach requires a compromise in 
accuracy in the emission reduction calculation. As MRV is performed only at the building unit 
level, it cannot evaluate which mitigation measures result in how much emission reduction (i.e. 
weak causality between the measures and emission reduction). However, the stringent bench-
mark level set in the methodology (the average of the top 20% performers) would very likely 
result in a conservative estimation of emission reductions. Thus, the conservative benchmark 
acts as a safety valve for the environmental integrity. In addition, the methodology requires all 
measurement equipment to be calibrated according to relevant industry standards. The emis-
sion reduction estimates are conservatively adjusted for the measurement uncertainty as well as 
errors associated with building unit sampling. 
Consistency: The methodology does not contain any major source of inconsistency. The meth-
odology was approved in June 2011 and has not been revised since then. Thus, it is not possible 
to assess consistency in methodology revisions specifically for AM0091. In general, however, 
approved CDM methodologies are revised to improve conservativeness and accuracy of emis-
sion reduction estimation methods, or to improve the usability of the methodologies (UNFCCC 
2010). 
In summary, the methodology maintains a high level of environmental integrity. It has a com-
prehensive coverage of GHGs and emission sources, and provides proper justification for the 
exclusion of biomass and biogas usage. The technology-neutral benchmark approach needs a 
compromise in the accuracy of emission reductions estimation. But the conservative bench-
mark is expected to safeguard the environmental integrity. Though the methodology is yet to 
be revised since its initial adoption, its consistency can be expected to be high. 
Data availability 
Data to be collected: The benchmark approach applied in AM0091 requires extensive data. 
The key data for emission reduction calculation are gross floor area of building units (activity 
data), and energy consumption and refrigerant leakage (emission data). 
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Data availability: The gross floor area data need to be collected every third year from a sample 
of building units that is used for the calculation of baseline and project emissions. The data can 
be obtained from building plans or on-site measurement, if the former is not available. In de-
veloping countries, the data are not readily available. For example, in Abu Dhabi, the United 
Arab Emirates (where the CDM project underlying the development of AM0091 is situated), a 
building database is available with the Land and Real Estate Division of the Abu Dhabi Munici-
pality. However, this database only has data about land area (plot plan) and designs, but not for 
the total gross floor area of building units. Thus, the data must be collected by building surveys 
(Prakash 2010). 
The energy consumption data (electricity, fossil fuels and chilled/hot water) need to be collect-
ed every year. This is because annual variation in climatic conditions has a large impact on the 
building energy consumption. Such data are easier to obtain if the energy is supplied by local 
utilities and appropriate metering systems are implemented. This is likely the case with grid 
electricity supply and distribution of chilled/hot water through a district system. However, if 
the energy is purchased or generated individually by building unit occupants, it would be chal-
lenging to collect energy consumption data directly from the occupants (e.g. through energy 
purchase bills). This is more likely to be the case with captive electricity, fossil fuels (e.g. LPG, 
charcoal) and chilled/hot water supplied by individual systems within building units or by a 
central system captive to buildings. The refrigerant leakage data are to be collected every third 
year. But, if the actual monitoring is difficult, conservative IPCC default factors are allowed to 
be used. 
Data confidentiality is less of a concern for the building sector than it is for the power and ce-
ment sectors. This is because building unit occupants, the key data source, are not market 
competitors as in the other sectors. The confidentiality issue may arise with the socio-economic 
data of building unit occupants, which are necessary for the identification of baseline building 
units. The socio-economic status can be measured by income levels of the occupants or proper-
ty prices of the building units. Census data could be used if they contain income level infor-
mation. However, such data are uncommon in developing countries. The methodology thus 
allows for the use of property prices as a proxy for income levels, which can be obtained 
through a real estate market survey without raising confidentiality issues. 
Transparency 
Public availability of emission and additional data: The methodology requires transparent 
documentation of all the steps for the calculation of baseline/project emissions, including a list 
of the baseline/project building units identified as well as the relevant data used for the calcu-
lation for the baseline/project emissions. 
No CDM project has been submitted applying the methodology. Therefore, it remains to be 
seen to what extent project developers and validators fulfil the requirement of transparent 
documentation. But, compared to other carbon offset mechanisms, the CDM generally main-
tains a very high standard of transparency in the project data documentation. All key, non-
confidential data are usually made publicly available, and confidential data, though not made 
publicly available, are communicated to the UNFCCC through DOEs for their assessment for 
project registration and issuance of CERs. 
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Cost-efficiency 
Cost of MRV system: The methodology requires extensive data for the emission reduction cal-
culation. Most of the key data are not readily available in developing countries. Furthermore, 
the methodology requires actual monitoring of data and offers only a limited number of de-
fault factors (e.g. refrigerant leakage). This is because building energy consumption patterns 
are heavily influenced by various local conditions (e.g. climate, geographic location, building 
size, occupancy patters). As it is difficult to establish widely applicable default factors, the 
methodology currently does not offer much scope for reducing MRV costs. Thus, MRV costs for 
the building sector would likely be very high. The methodology however allows to reduce costs 
by permitting the use of sampling in the data monitoring process. 
Another option for reducing MRV costs lies in the possibility of proposing a Programme of Ac-
tivities (PoA). This can be achieved by allowing for bundling of an unlimited number of CDM 
Project Activities (CPAs), and by simplifying procedures for registration of CPAs (CPAs can be 
added to a PoA without assessment by the UNFCCC) and for verification of a PoA (one could opt 
for verification of a sample of CPAs). PoAs are especially relevant to the building sector because 
it involves a number of small and dispersed emission sources. 
Institutional framework 
Responsible authorities: In applying AM0091, key steps of the monitoring and reporting stag-
es are (1) identification of baseline building units for benchmarking, and (2) monitoring of en-
ergy consumption of the baseline/project building units. The institutional framework required 
for these steps are described below. The verification stage is addressed by the regular CDM bod-
ies such as DOEs and the CDM Executive Board. Thus, it is not discussed below. 
The identification of baseline building units requires building surveys for collecting the neces-
sary information on building unit characteristics. The data collection effort can best be built on 
the existing database and data collection procedures of local government bodies responsible 
for issuing permits to new building constructions. Such bodies may have better access to in-
come level information in census data, if such are available. If the income level data are not 
available, the government bodies need to work closely with real estate agencies regularly col-
lecting building property price information. 
The monitoring of building energy consumption requires a close collaboration with local utili-
ties supplying electricity, fossil fuels and chilled/hot water to baseline/project building units. 
Their regular metering procedures can be adapted to the methodology application (e.g. use 
utility bills). In the case the energy is purchased or generated in a decentralised manner, the 
energy consumption data need to be collected directly from building units occupants. There is 
no existing body exercising such data collection, thus a new institution needs to be created for 
this building survey. 
Transferability 
The methodology is suitable for advanced developing countries that have the capacity to im-
plement the rather demanding MRV system, and where building units consume modern ener-
gy carriers. 
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The implementation of the MRV system is easier if local utilities have already implemented 
appropriate metering of building energy consumption, and records of new building construc-
tions are maintained centrally. It is also helpful if a census survey is carried out regularly on 
income levels. Otherwise, there should be a functional real estate market so that building prop-
erty prices can be obtained. 
It is best if the building units consume modern energy carriers (e.g. electricity) because they are 
usually distributed by central energy suppliers and MRV of their consumption is easier. In addi-
tion, the methodology currently does not allow for the use of biomass and biogas. As they are 
essential energy carriers for less advanced developing countries, the methodology requires a 
revision to be applicable to these countries. 
4.4 Proposals for MRV of new market-based mechanisms 
This chapter describes the main institutional and data requirements for a MRV within NMBM. 
The proposals are based on the analysis of existing systems (CDM, EU ETS) in the chapters be-
fore and the existing literature. Taking our criteria from the introduction the main require-
ments for a MRV system are environmental integrity (completeness, accuracy and consistency 
of data), transparency and cost-efficiency. 
4.4.1 Institutional requirements 
A well-functioning MRV system will need a series of domestic (host country) and international 
institutions. We describe here the minimum of institutions needed for a credible MRV system 
within NMBM, while we do not discuss the institutions needed for the implementation of new 
market-based mechanisms (e.g. planning and implementing policy measures, and translating 
the price signal to the private sector). 
In-country institutions 
In NMBM, host country institutions will have a central role in monitoring and reporting, while 
they may also participate in verification. The role of domestic institutions is similar to that in 
the EU ETS and more important than in the CDM case (because of the policy-nature of NMBM 
and the sectoral scale). Each host country will need at least a national coordinating entity (NCE) 
and regulations, and in many cases also technical intermediaries and national verifiers. 
 A National Coordinating Entity (NCE) is needed for coordinating the baseline assess-
ments, national monitoring and reporting, reviewing the data quality, and approving 
the sectoral programme proposals as well as monitoring reports before sending them to 
international institutions. The NCE will help to avoid overlaps of different sectoral pro-
grams, coordinate all in-country institutions (see the experience of the EU ETS and the 
cement sector) and assure consistency of data from different sources and with the na-
signation National Author-
ity (or the other way round) is not necessary but has the advantage of sharing infor-
mation and building on existing capacity. 
 Regulations and administrative procedures (here also seen as institutions) are also re-
quired for a MRV system to function. New market-based mechanisms will cover the 
emissions of multiple private (and public) entities, which have to be obliged to monitor 
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and report their emissions (Aasrud et al. 2010; Duggan 2010). The way this is achieved 
(only national or also subnational, soft or hard rules) will be country- and sector-specific. 
 Technical Intermediaries (TIs) will in most cases also be needed because of several rea-
sons. First, some of the emitting entities will not have the capacity to monitor and re-
port their emissions on their own (see the experience of the building sector in the CDM). 
Therefore, local governments, utilities or consultants will have to collect data. Second, 
TIs may be needed in aggregating local data and assuring data quality, as the NCE itself 
may not have the outreach or capacity to assure accurate and complete data country-
wide. Depending on the national circumstances, the TIs can be private and/or public, 
split in many institutions or unified in one body. 
 National Verifiers will be most important in the case of decentralized governance of 
NMBM, where only generic guidelines and rules are decided on the international level, 
while concrete MRV is undertaken at the national level (and only loosely reviewed on 
the international level). As learned from the EU ETS and the cement sector, independ-
ence of theses verifiers is needed to ensure confidentiality. 
In most countries and for all described institutions, substantial capacity has to be built for the 
MRV system to operate smoothly (see Schneider and Cames 2009; Aasrud et al. 2010, Duggan 
2010; Fujiwara et al. 2010; World Bank 2010). The Table below shows that a pre-assessment 
needs to be undertaken before capacity is built and systems have to be tested before implemen-
tation. These three steps are interactive; learning-by-doing will enable capacity building over 
the long term. We can derive from lessons under the CDM that capacity building programmes 
have to be coordinated and linked to concrete programme/project proposals to increase effec-







Pre-assessment of data requirements, data availability and collecting capacity 
(Schneider & Cames 2009; Duggan 2010; Fujiwara et al. 2010; World Bank 2010) 
 Capacity building on collection, reporting and verification of reliable data (Dug-
gan 2010; Fujiwara et al. 2010) 
 Testing of MRV systems (Aasrud et al. 2010; Fujiwara et al. 2010)  
Source: Extracted and adapted from a table in Stadelmann & Michaelowa (2011) 
International institutions 
At the international level, institutions are needed to review the proposals of sectoral schemes 
and, in the case of an internationally coordinated system, to verify baselines, emissions and to 
issue credits. Learning from the CDM, we suggest that there is at least a governing body, a 
technical body, an administrative support unit, while verification may be conducted by inde-
pendent verifiers. 
 A governing body (similar to the CDM Executive Board) should decide on politically 
sensitive issues, such as the main MRV guidelines. In the case of an internationally co-
ordinated u-
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programme documents (including crediting baselines, programme design) and verified 
monitoring reports, and will issue credits. In the case of an uncoordinated system, the 
body will just provide an analysis of reported information. While it would be theoreti-
cally desirable to have an independent non-political body, the politically sensitive nature 
of decisions will in the end require balanced representation of experts from developed 
and developing countries. Learning from the CDM, it is important that the governing 
body is professionalised once the workload increases. It can lower its workload by focus-
ing on politically sensitive decisions (e.g. crediting baselines, see Schneider & Cames 
2009), while delegating technical analysis to other bodies. 
 Technical bodies: The technical bodies will carry out the technical work that exceeds 
the capacity of the governing body (similar to the CDM Methodology Panel, Accredita-
tion Panel, Small Scale Working Group and Registration & Issuance Team). In an inter-
nationally uncoordinated governing system, the technical bodies will mainly elaborate 
guidelines and analyse the information on NMBM submitted by Parties (e.g. MRV sys-
tem, achieved reductions, traded credits), while in an coordinated governing system the 
technical bodies will also elaborate baseline and MRV methodologies, and assess critical 
information in programme documents (e.g. crediting baselines). De Sépibus & Tuerk 
(2011) argue that programme-specific analysis will have to be undertaken also on the 
ground, in interaction with national stakeholders, to better understand the data and 
country circumstances. 
 Accredited verifiers (similar to DOEs in the CDM) will probably be needed in the case of 
an internationally coordinated governance system, as assessing all information will ex-
ceed the capacity of the technical bodies. Two lessons on independent verifiers can be 
learned from the CDM: First, they should only be responsible for data that is easily veri-
fiable (e.g. data on fuel use, calibration of measurement equipment, compliance with 
procedures) while politically and technically challenging tasks (e.g. assessing a counter-
factual baseline) have to be undertaken by technical bodies under political guidance. 
The second lesson is that verifiers should not be directly appointed and paid by the sec-
toral programme owner (the host country) but appointed by international bodies (see 
e.g. Lund 2010). 
 An administrative support unit would receive, stores and forward documents, in order 
to facilitate the work of the governing and the technical bodies. 
 Last but not least, overarching institutions are needed to integrate the units generated 
by NMBM into a broader GHG accounting framework. While the Kyoto Protocol encom-
passes those institutions, including the international carbon unit, the international 
transaction log (ITL) for credits, and national registries for emission allowances, it is un-
clear if these institutions will continue to exist as the fate of the Kyoto Protocol is uncer-
tain and the negotiations under the UNFCCC do not provide clear signals whether Kyoto 
institutions will be maintained. For assuring an environmentally integer MRV system for 
NMBM, the existing institutions have to be continued and a sound link to new MRV el-
ements, including International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) as well as MRV of NA-
MAs has to be established (de Sépibus & Tuerk 2011). 
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 Additionally, an appeal body may be required, in order to enable stakeholders to ap-
peal against decision of the governing body (see experience within the CDM) 
4.4.2 Data requirements 
Data required for environmental integrity 
NMBM can build on the experience of the CDM and EU ETS, when defining the type of data 
needed. The minimum information required in any sectoral programme document should en-
compass the following; 
 Definition of scope of sector, covered greenhouse gases and installations (Aasrud et al. 
2010) 
 Past and current emissions, including data sources, methodologies and tools; link to in-
ventory data 
 Projected business-as-usual emissions and assumptions (e.g. growth, technological 
change) 
 Proposed sectoral policies and measures, including expected GHG impact and financing 
 Proposed crediting baseline (in the case of sectoral crediting) or emission cap and allo-
cation (in the case of sectoral trading) 
Information required in any monitoring report should encompass the following; 
 Measured emissions, including data sources, methodologies and tools; link to inventory 
data 
 Implementation of sectoral policies and measures, estimated GHG impact and financing 
 Calculation of emission reductions (compared to baseline) 
Methodology approach 
The information requirements listed above are just broad data categories. In practice, each sec-
tor or sub-sector will require methodologies on the detailed type of data needed, guidance for 
data collection and formulas for combining the numerous variables. These methodologies will 
have to be updated or revised once better evidence for emission calculations is present. For this 
substantial challenge of setting up and revising methodologies, NMBM can build on existing 
methodologies of the CDM, but the challenge will be to adapt the largely single-measure and 
project-based methodologies to holistic ones that can assess emissions and baselines of entire 
sectors and can accommodate several measures. The CDM methodologies closest to sectoral 
methodologies are the ones in the power, cement, and building sector. In addition, lessons can 
be drawn from the EU ETS, mainly in terms of emissions data monitoring in industrial sectors 
and in terms of determining sectoral benchmarks. 
Accuracy versus flexibility 
We have set out in the beginning that any credible MRV system should ensure completeness, 
accuracy and consistency of data, in order to warrant environmental integrity. However, we 
can learn from the EU ETS and the CDM that highest accuracy sometimes has to be traded for 
practicability and flexibility, but should not be traded for conservativeness. As the question of 
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accuracy vs. flexibility/practicability in NMBM will certainly come up in the future, the govern-
ing body will be better off considering this from the beginning. We propose the following rules 
of thumb, derived from lessons in the EU ETS; 
 Flexibility at the beginning: to trigger early deployment of NMBM and enable capacity 
building and learning, NMBM should only demand full accuracy and completeness if 
the host country has enough capacity. The tiered approach for accuracy of data as ap-
plied in the case of the EU ETS is an interesting tool to be applied in NMBM, which may 
also enhance cost-efficiency of MRV systems. In order to create financial incentives from 
the outset, NMBM should receive fully fungible units right from the beginning, but to 
ensure conservativeness part of these credits should be cancelled or not issued at all. 
 Strict rules in the mid-term: Some years after NMBM have started, the governing body 
should try to tighten the rules and ensure full environmental integrity of NMBM, in or-
der to enhance credibility and ensure net emission reductions (see Michaelowa 2009 for 
the case of the CDM). This phase will also allow for testing the level of environmental in-
tegrity that is achievable. 
 Flexibility in the long term: After 7-10 years of operation, existing NMBMs will have to 
consider the lessons learned from the pilot phases: which data is absolutely required, 
where can more flexibility be allowed? Are there still loopholes in environmental integ-
rity? A reform of NMBM will probably be required, similar to the reforms after Phase I 
and II of the EU ETS. 
Confidentiality 
Particularly the Cement Sustainability Initiative but also discussions in the aluminium and steel 
sector have shown that confidentiality of industry data can be a hurdle for data collection. 
Therefore, only accredited verifiers and technical bodies should be allowed to view and analyse 
installation-level data after having signed confidentiality clauses, while only showing aggregate 
data to the public. This certainly contradicts full transparency, which may lower political ac-
ceptance. A fine balance between confidentiality and transparency has to be found. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Accurate monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emission reductions is an essential 
element for ensuring environmental integrity of new market-based mechanisms (NMBM), 
which have the double goal of better integrating developing countries in the global carbon 
market and enabling cost-effective mitigation for industrialised countries. The creation of a 
sound MRV system can be accomplished by ensuring completeness, accuracy and consistency of 
data through the setup of both domestic and international institutions and detailed but realis-
tic rules for data collection. 
The shaping of MRV systems for NMBM can draw lessons from three existing systems: First, the 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) as the only established carbon market mechanism in-
volving developing countries. The CDM can provide a good starting point with its established 
methodologies, rules and institutions but the framework has to be adapted when moving from 
the project to the sectoral level (e.g. the role of national MRV institutions will be more im-
portant). Second, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as the largest and 
technically most advanced ETS worldwide provides important lessons for the setup of institu-
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tions and MRV of data at the sectoral and national level (e.g. flexibility needed, tiered approach 
of data accuracy, role of national institutions). However, the availability of data and capacity 
for accomplishing MRV functions will be different in developing countries, and the EU ETS is 
more similar to some NMBMs (sectoral trading) but rather different to other (sectoral crediting). 
Third, new data collection, reporting and verification systems for developing countries are be-
ing currently negotiated: MRV of internationally supported Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs), International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) of non-supported NAMAs and 
procedures for biennial update reports including national inventories. While all these systems 
are not yet implemented, the MRV of NMBM should be consistent with these systems to avoid 
double counting and overlaps. 
From the analysis of the EU ETS and CDM methodologies covering data of whole sectors (build-
ings, cement and power), we derive the following institutional and data requirements for a 
credible MRV system of new market-based mechanisms: 
Regarding institutions, various national and international institutions will need to be created. 
Particularly the national ones will be important, very similar to the EU ETS, as data from whole 
sectors has to be monitored and reported. We assume that at least a national coordination enti-
ty and national regulations are required. In addition, technical intermediaries for data collec-
tion and aggregation as well as national verifiers may be needed. Most institutions will require 
substantial capacity building, which should be combined with concrete sectoral programmes 
and start as early as possible. 
At the international level, we propose to establish an institutional architecture that is very simi-
lar to the one of the CDM: a governing body taking politically sensitive decisions, several tech-
nical groups as well as an administrative support unit assisting the governing body, and inter-
nationally accredited verifiers, who are responsible for time consuming tasks and easily verifia-
ble data. The concrete role of bodies will very much depend on the post-2012 architecture of 
the climate regime. In the case of an internationally more coordinated MRV system, the tech-
nical bodies will do detailed work on methodologies, rules and approval of verifiers, while their 
tasks would be limited to elaborating general guidance and analysing (or reviewing) submitted 
information of national NMBM in a decentralized system. Und a lesser coordinated approach, 
the governing body would only be approving the work of the technical bodies, while under the 
internationally coordinated approach the governing body has to take much more important 
decision on caps and crediting baselines. 
Regarding data requirement, we assume that proponents of a sectoral programme would have 
to submit at least information on emission coverage, current and projected emissions, proposed 
caps or crediting baselines, planned policies and measures, expected impact and funding, as 
well as actually measured emissions. Detailed data requirements would have to be elaborated 
in sector-specific methodologies, which can partly build on methodologies and data in the 
CDM, particularly in the cement, building and power sector. Experience from the CDM and the 
EU ETS illustrates that an encompassing data collection system can create substantial transac-
tion costs. In order to encourage the short-term implementation of NMBM, flexibility in terms 
of tiered data requirements may be needed, which however need to be strengthened with in-
creasing experience and hence data availability. While providing flexibility is key also to re-
duce transaction costs, conservativeness of emission reduction estimations should not be com-
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promised. Finally, confidentiality of data will be a hurdle in competitive industries, so a system 
to balance transparency and confidentiality has to be elaborated. 
The most important conclusion is that MRV of NMBM will very much depend on the outcome 
of the climate negotiations, mainly whether NMBM are governed internationally coordinated 
or not. An internationally coordinated MRV system would more easily ensure environmental 
integrity because of common rules and accounting. However, a rather uncoordinated system is 
not unlikely given the current negotiations. Therefore, more analysis has to be done on institu-
tions and MRV guidelines required to ensure a minimum of environmental integrity of NMBM 
in the case of an internationally uncoordinated regime. De Sépibus & Tuerk (2011) have made 
some first attempts by emphasising the importance of international reviews of NMBM docu-
ments in the case of uncoordinated governance. 
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5 Setting baselines for the new market mechanism: 
Examples from the power, cement and buildings sectors 
Work package 4, by Paula Castro, Daisuke Hayashi, Axel Michaelowa (IPZ), Ralph Harthan, Mar-
tin Cames (Öko-Institut), 30 November 2012 
The establishment of a new market-based mechanism (NMBM) for the climate change regime 
post-2012 was decided upon in December 2011 during COP17 in Durban, with a view to defin-
ing its modalities and procedures during 2012. One of the crucial design elements to consider 
when establishing market-based mechanisms is the definition of a reference scenario or base-
line on the basis of which emission reductions are calculated. Whereas for project-based mech-
anisms, emission reductions were historically calculated as the difference between the baseline 
and project emissions, for NMBMs their calculation will start from a level that is lower than the 
baseline in order to generate global emission reductions. We hence differentiate between the 
baseline emissions level and the emissions target or crediting threshold. This paper considers 
past experience in setting reference scenarios, from both the academic literature and existing 
market mechanisms, to draw lessons for the NMBM. 
While the exact nature of the NMBM has not yet been defined, it is supposed to stimulate miti-
thus focus on market-based mechanisms that seek to target a whole economic sector, such as 
sectoral trading or sectoral crediting. 
Under sectoral trading, an emissions target is set for a specific sector within a country, and 
a-
tions ex ante. Installations need to implement measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions up to the level of their allocated allowances or else buy more allowances in the market
11
. 
Under sectoral crediting, a crediting threshold is set for a specific sector within a country. The 
government provides incentives to the activities within the sector to reduce emissions and meet 
the crediting threshold. The emission levels of the sector are then monitored during a crediting 
period. Emission credits corresponding to the amount of reductions achieved below the thresh-
old are issued ex post. These credits can be traded in the international market and the revenue 
can be used for financing policies and measures or for rewarding those installations that con-
tributed to the reductions. If the crediting threshold is not met, no penalty is applied. 
Under both approaches  sectoral trading and sectoral crediting  a baseline needs to be de-
fined upfront below which the allocation of allowances or the crediting threshold is set. 
                                            
11
 In principle, sectoral trading does not need to rely on an intra-sectoral emissions trading scheme as depicted 
here. The allowances for the whole sector could be kept and managed by the government, which would imple-
ment applicable policies and measures to reach the sectoral target. In this case, if the target is not met, it would 
be up to the government to buy more allowances in the international market and to penalise those installations 
within the country which failed to contribute sufficiently to emission reductions. In this paper, however, we focus 
on sectoral trading as the design that more easily transfers responsibility and a carbon price signal to the private 
sector. 
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Definition: 
A baseline is the expected development of GHG emissions over time under the assumption that 
from a certain point in time no new mitigation measures would be undertaken. It constitutes a 
reference scenario with respect to which the emission targets or the crediting thresholds are 
set. The baseline should predict business-as-usual (BAU) as accurately as possible. Approaches 
for determining the baseline could range from simply drawing a flat line from status quo emis-
sions (if no other reliable information is available) to complex scenarios which take into ac-
count all covered activities, their estimated emission performance, their vintage and expected 
economic lifetime as well as projections of demand and socio-demographic indicators, etc. 
 
See Figure 3 for a schematic representation of the relationship between BAU baseline, emis-
sions target or threshold, actual performance, and credits or allowances obtained. 
 
Figure 3: Baselines under the new market mechanism 
 
Source: Adapted from Aasrud et al. (2010) 
Thus, the way in which this baseline is set  and the way in which the stringency of the sectoral 
target or crediting threshold is defined  plays a crucial role for determining how many emis-
sion reductions are credited or allowances allocated. If the baseline predicts higher emission 
levels than those generated by the actual business-as-usual development, and the tar-
get/threshold is lenient, this may result in overallocation of allowances or crediting of reduc-
tions t
or crediting threshold need to be considered when assessing the environmental integrity of the 
mechanism. 
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion about how to set baselines for a sectoral NMBM 
by presenting and discussing possible sectoral baseline designs for three economic sectors: 
power, cement and buildings. We will first review the literature on the different design com-
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priateness of different baseline designs for the NMBM. And finally, we will assess different base-
line designs for the three sectors, on the basis of available data on sector composition.
12
 The 
selection of sectors allows the complexities of setting baselines in sectors with large-scale instal-
lations (power and cement) and in those with dispersed installations (buildings) to be consid-
ered. It will also allow assessment of different design possibilities for cases where sectors com-
prise heterogeneous technologies and installation types. Finally, lessons for new market-based 
mechanisms are drawn. 
5.1 Overview of the literature on baseline setting 
Substantive analysis on how to set baselines for emission reduction targets or for crediting sys-
tems has been available since the late 1990s when the discussions on how to implement the 
Kyoto Protocol and its flexibility mechanisms began. Drawing on the analysis made by Michae-
lowa (1998); Lazarus et al. (1999); Probase (2002); Broekhoff (2007); Schneider and Cames 
(2009); Hayashi et al. (2010); Prag and Clapp (2011); among others, we consider the following 
design elements of baseline setting: 
- Scope or level of aggregation: Defines what categories of activities are covered by the 
emissions baseline. There are several dimensions in which the scope of a baseline can be 
defined: 
o Process: whether the baseline is differentiated by technology or process (e.g. a 
single baseline for the whole power sector, versus separate baselines for coal- or 
gas-fuelled power plants; or a baseline for direct emissions from fuel combustion 
in cement production, versus a baseline that also includes indirect emissions 
from electricity consumption). 
o Product: whether the baseline is differentiated according to the type or quality 
of product (e.g. primary/secondary aluminium as opposed to aluminium in gen-
eral; or clinker versus cement). 
o Time: whether the baseline is based on the performance of installations of a spe-
cific vintage in a sector (e.g. average carbon intensity of all steel plants, versus 
average carbon intensity of all plants installed in the past 5 years). 
o Space: the geographic boundaries for which the baseline is applicable and from 
which data are drawn to establish the baseline (country, subnational region, 
group of countries, continent, whole world). 
- Reference data: considers whether the baseline is set on the basis of the historical data 
within the scope defined above, or whether some kind of projection of future emission 
levels is performed. In the case of historical data, the baseline can further be based on a 
                                            
12
 The objective of the case studies is to illustrate how sectoral baselines could be designed and what the challenges 
arising from such an exercise are. They should not be taken as proposals of real sectoral baselines in a specific 
country, but as examples of how baselines can be estimated and what considerations need to be taken into ac-
count. In order to make the case studies as close to reality as possible, they rely on real world datasets for specific 
countries. Where sufficient data is not available, plausible assumptions will be made and reported. 
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single time period (e.g. the 1990 base year for the Kyoto Protocol emission reduction 
commitments), or on the average emissions across several periods. If some kind of fu-
ture projection is used, it can be a simple linear extrapolation of the emissions trend 
over several time periods, a projection based on expected changes in growth rates of the 
sector, or a more complex model that incorporates the effects of expected changes in 
other variables (economic and demographic variables, existing and expected policies, 
etc.). Data quality is also considered here. 
- Updating: establishes whether the baseline is updated periodically once future infor-
mation is available, how often this updating should take place, and which baseline pa-
rameters need to be updated. 
- Metrics: whether the baseline should be set in absolute terms (total emission levels), in 
relative terms (emission levels indexed with respect to an indicator or a set of indicators 
such as economic size, or production output), or in terms of a technology penetration 
rate (share of a specific technology with respect to the whole output of a sector). 
- Stringency and conservativeness: Operationalization of business as usual through an 
indicator can take many forms and it is often challenging to decide which indicator best 
represents business as usual. A conservative baseline setting approach, for example, uses 
a high percentile of the performance of all installations in a sector, instead of the sector 
average. Conservativeness helps to reduce the risks for environmental integrity arising 
from future uncertainty. But even if baselines are not conservative, targets / thresholds 
can be set in a stringent manner, i.e. significantly below the baseline. A stringent target 
or threshold contributes both to reducing the uncertainty problem and to the host 
country generating its own emission reduction contributions. 
Figure 4 schematically shows that baseline uncertainty increases over time. Target A, 
ge. 
Target B remains stringent under all circumstances.
13
 
                                            
13
 As explained above, in this study, we consider a baseline to be the projection of future emissions in a sector un-
der a BAU scenario. This is different to some other conceptualizations in which the baseline itself is expected to 
The rationale behind our treatment is that we propose that a BAU baseline can 
(and should) be established on the basis of technical-economic data, while the stringency level will have a politi-
cal component related to the choice of policy measures and ambition level by a specific government. By separat-
ing the technical from the political component, decision-making can be made more transparent. However, the 
operationalization of the baseline may still be done in a conservative way to reduce uncertainties about the actu-
al business-as-usual path. A conservative baseline would be placed on the lower bound of the uncertainty inter-
val, a lenient one on the higher end. 
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Figure 4: Baseline conservativeness compared to target/threshold stringency 
 
 
Sectoral baselines are more comprehensive and potentially more complex than baselines for 
individual projects since they include all emissions of existing and future installations of the 
covered sectors. Determining such baselines is thus more similar to determining emission tar-
gets for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol than to baseline setting under the CDM. 
Experience from project-based approaches can provide important insights but needs to be 
complemented by knowledge of emission projections for sectors and/or countries. 
5.1.1 Baseline scope 
As outlined above, the scope of a baseline defines what activities it covers. If we consider the 
NMBM as potentially becoming a sectoral crediting or sectoral trading mechanism, then the 
of what a sector is, as existing emission measurement systems (e.g. the IPCC classification for 
GHG inventories, or the EU ETS definition of covered sectors) frequently employ different defi-
nitions. Furthermore, while the widespread idea of a sector reflects the notion of an industry 
devoted to producing one type of product or service (e.g. cement, iron and steel, electricity, 
etc.), within these industries there are large differences in terms of production processes, prod-
uct quality, age and size of installations that may make the installations not fully comparable 
(see e.g. Prag and Briner 2012). 
Thus, for heterogeneous sectors there may be a need to establish separate baselines for differ-
ent subgroups of products or installations and to determine an aggregate baseline that is, how-
ever, composed by multiple indexes that help to characterize the differences across subgroups 
(Schneider and Cames 2009). A similar approach would be required if implementing countries 
were intending to cover more than one sector or subgroup within their broad segment. A sepa-
rate baseline would have to be established for each of the covered sectors or subgroups based 
on general and specific data and assumptions. Once the individual baselines are determined 
they can be combined to one aggregated baseline for the entire broad segment. This way it can 
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be ensured that reliable and conservative baselines are determined while countries would still 
have the flexibility to optimize their reduction efforts among the sectors or subgroups covered 
under their broad segment once the NMBM is implemented. 
As described by Hayashi et al. (2010), several dimensions can be used to define subgroups of 
installations that are covered by a baseline. The first two dimensions  process and product  
consider disaggregation across technologies and product types or qualities. In general terms, 
the more disaggregated the baseline, the higher its accuracy in terms of representing the ex-
pected emissions level of a particular technology or product. However, the more disaggregated 
the baseline, the less it allows for broader mitigation options, and potentially also the more 
data-intensive it is. A fully disaggregated baseline would be akin to the project-type specific 
baselines used currently in the CDM. 
 
Example: 
A sectoral baseline for the transport sector could be defined as the level of emissions from 
transportation divided by the level of GDP in the country. Such a baseline would be relatively 
easy to estimate on the basis of data on overall consumption of transportation fuels and default 
emission factors. It would, however, be relatively imprecise in projecting future emissions be-
cause GDP is not the sole driver of transport emissions. But it would allow inclusion of the 
broadest possible range of mitigation measures, ranging from specific energy efficiency im-
provements, modal shift (e.g. from private to public transport, or from air to ground transport), 
to reductions in transport needs. A more disaggregated baseline, for example in terms of emis-
sions per passenger-km or tonne-km in each transportation mode (road, railway, air, water), 
would more accurately reflect emission patterns in these subsectors, but would not incentivize 
emission reductions through modal changes and would be data-intensive (Schneider and 
Cames 2009). 
 
Another critical aspect for a sectoral approach is whether to account for indirect emissions of 
electricity consumption in production processes. Considering these emissions allows for the 
inclusion of measures that reduce electricity consumption within the sector, but may lead to 
double counting if the broad segment covers the electricity sector as well. 
The other two dimensions  time and space  may need to be taken into account for address-
ing further heterogeneity in a given sector. Determining the baseline for the entire sector will 
require a certain level of knowledge about the capacities, vintages and emission performances 
of the covered activities. In contrast to the CDM  where project-based baselines are mainly 
determined by the question what investors of new installations or retrofits would do in the ab-
sence of the CDM  baselines need to take into account all activities, i.e. existing ones of various 
vintages with or without a potential for retrofitting and projected new activities, under a sec-
toral approach. Recent capacity additions should, like the benchmark approach according to 
new activities, but will require activity-specific data (Lazarus et al. 1999). However, the emission 
performance of new activities cannot be applied to project the business-as-usual emissions of an 
entire sector, particularly if the share of existing installations with high emission intensity is 
large. In most cases a more sophisticated approach would be required which takes into account 
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closures of very inefficient activities as well as emission performances of retrofits in existing 
activities and of new installations based on a benchmark approach. 
though other options may in some cases be more appropriate. On the one hand, subnational 
differences may arise in terms of feedstocks or fuel types for products such as cement, or in 
terms of heating and air conditioning needs for buildings in different geographic environ-
ments. This may be reflected by either different baselines or different input values for certain 
parameters of the baseline according to regional characteristics. On the other hand, in neigh-
bouring countries with small markets and similar economies it may make more sense to estab-
lish baselines that are applicable to a group of countries in order to reduce data collection costs 
and avoid competitiveness and leakage issues. Here again, the more aggregated the baseline, 
the lower are the data and transaction costs. 
Lazarus et al. (1999) discuss the essential trade-off between level of aggregation and types of 
mitigation measures incentivized. Aggregated baselines for entire sectors will be more efficient 
in terms of finding the least carbon intensive options throughout the whole sector. In hetero-
geneous sectors, this approach will provide the strongest mitigation incentives to subsectors 
that are, due to their specific characteristics, energy- or emissions-intensive. Lazarus et al. (2000) 
propose an hybrid approach to deal with this trade-off in the case of the electricity generation 
in the CDM: they propose a baseline composed of fuel-specific benchmarks that would be ap-
plicable for same-fuel efficiency improvement projects, and of a sector-wide benchmark that 
would be applicable to fuel switching projects or new installations. In the case of a sectoral 
NMBM, a similar effect could be achieved if sectors are disaggregated into existing and new 
installations. 
As discussed by Murtishaw et al. (2006), spatial differentiation does not need to be set on the 
basis of administrative boundaries. For example, in the CDM different baselines are set for in-
dependent electricity grids within countries, which follows the delimiting lines of the transmis-
sion infrastructure. For land-use activities or buildings, spatial boundaries may follow biophysi-
cal characteristics, such as weather conditions or ecosystems. However, availability of aggregat-
ed data for determining sectoral baselines may often follow administrative boundaries. 
5.1.2 Reference data 
Ultimately, all baselines are based on historical data, which can either be used directly as the 
baseline  i.e. the past performance of existing facilities in the sector would be the reference 
for comparison  or can be used to project expected emission levels into the future. While pro-
jection-based baselines seek to more accurately reflect what activities would be displaced by the 
mitigation measures to be credited, they depend on many subjective and often intransparent 
assumptions, and are hence easier to manipulate (Michaelowa 1998; Lazarus et al. 1999). 
In more detail, the following types of reference data can be used to set up a baseline: 
- A single historical time period 
- The average emissions level across several historical time periods 
- A simple linear extrapolation of the emissions trend over several historical time periods 
- A projection based on expected changes in growth rates of the sector 
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- A projection that incorporates the effects of expected changes in other variables (eco-
nomic and demographic variables, existing and expected policies, etc.) 
- In the absence of actual energy consumption or emissions data, nameplate parameters 
raph-
ical region(s) could be used (see Lazarus et al. 2000: 3-2). 
Murtishaw et al. (2006) looked at the effect of different ways to use past reference data (without 
complex projections) on the baseline. They discussed that if emission levels remain stable his-
torically, any past period could be used to establish an appropriate baseline. But if there is a 
downward or upward trend in past emissions, the more recent data periods should be used. If 
emission levels vary with no clear trend (they may depend on climatic or other external fac-
tors), an average over several years should be used to capture a representative level. Finally, if 
the historical emissions trend shows a clear break, it would be important to identify what 
caused that change in the trend and whether such change will be stable or not. If the break in 
the trend is due to, for example, a new policy or a technological breakthrough, the baseline 
should be established on the basis of the emissions data after the break point. In general, they 
recommend using longer time periods to minimize the effect of fluctuations. 
On the basis of case studies of power sector installations in five developing countries, Lazarus et 
al. (1999) concluded that variations in the emissions intensity were unpredictable and unsys-
tematic and could be affected by factors such as energy price shocks, new resource discoveries, 
technological advances and regulatory changes. They found that fuel choice was a better pre-
dictor of changes in emissions intensity than efficiency improvements. Thus they conclude that 
in the power sector, historical performance data are more reliable than projections as the latter 
are highly sensitive to the underlying assumptions. They found that projections made by differ-
ent specialized bodies  or even by the same body but at different points in time  have high 
discrepancies with each other and can thus yield considerably different baselines. They there-
fore recommend that the baseline be based on historical data and be updated frequently to 
s conditions, but that the frequency 
of updating needs to be balanced against certainty for investors. Larger groups of entities usu-
ally show lesser variance than individual installations. Therefore the conclusions of the analysis 
of individual installations cannot be directly transferred to the determination of sectoral base-
lines. Nevertheless, these conclusions illustrate the difficulties that need to be addressed when 
baselines are based on emission projections. 
While the experience in using emission projections as the basis for setting emission reduction 
baselines is still limited (all Kyoto Protocol targets are based on historical emissions, EU ETS 
allocations are based on historical data or on benchmarks derived from existing installations), 
substantially more experience using models to predict future emission levels exists in Annex I 
national communications and in studies intending to estimate future abatement potentials. In 
their national communications to the UNFCCC, Annex I countries are supposed to report future 
emission projections for indicative purposes. Some of these projections include a business-as-
usual scenario (BAU), a scenario that includes some mitigation measures, and a more ambitious 
scenario with more mitigation measures. These projections also rely on assumptions regarding 
economic growth, development of population and energy demand, etc. Similar projections also 
exist for some non-Annex I countries and have been prepared with a view to estimating future 
emission abatement potentials (see e.g. Cai et al. 2008 for the case of five economic sectors in 
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China). Here again, comparisons have revealed that different projections for the same country 
vary substantially (Prag and Clapp 2011). If models are to be used for baselines of the NMBM, 
either the assumptions behind the baseline calculations need to be revealed very transparently 
by the proposers, or a central authority under the UNFCCC needs to define a set of standard 
assumptions that apply equally to all baseline calculations. Examples of such standard assump-
tions could be: whether mitigation policies should be considered as part of BAU and if so, 
which policies and up to what year, how to project GDP and population growth, etc. 
5.1.3 Dynamics and updating 
Baseline emission levels may be fixed over time or be dynamic and incorporate some type of 
updating as conditions change (Lazarus et al. 1999). 
Fixed baselines would, for example, refer to the 20% best emissions of all steel plants in the 
country over the years of 2005-2010. Investors in the sector would have full information about 
how to account for their emissions. Baselines could include an autonomous emissions im-
provement factor (e.g. baseline emission levels decline at a rate of 1% emissions each year) and 
assumptions on the development of demand. In this case, while the baseline emission levels 
change every year, the investor still has full information. 
Dynamic baselines, in contrast, would be based on new empirical data (e.g. baseline emission 
levels are calculated as the rolling 3-year average emissions level of all steel plants in the coun-
try, calculated each year anew). In this case, the baseline would more clearly reflect the evolu-
tion of the sector, but its calculation would be more data-intensive and investors would not 
know future baseline emission levels in advance. 
In addition to the dynamics that can be introduced in the baseline calculation itself, even fixed 
baselines may need to be updated periodically (every certain number of years, e.g. for new 
monitoring periods) to reflect changes in economic, social, technological and environmental 
circumstances, as happens for projects with several crediting periods under the CDM. Such up-
dates may cover the whole baseline or just specific parameters within it (Hayashi et al. 2010). 
The frequency of updating or the need to establish dynamic baselines depends on the speed 
with which the sector evolves in response to technological, policy or other environmental 
changes, on the cost of the revisions to the baseline and on considerations of certainty for in-
vestors (Lazarus et al. 1999). 
Updating of baselines may undermine the investment certainty if investors of GHG mitigation 
strategies expect that the established baseline may be made more lenient at some point in 
time. To address such concerns and in order to provide sufficient investment certainty, as a 
general rule, baselines should be established for a long period of time on the one hand  ideal-
ly until the GHG emissions of the respective sector or subgroup become zero  and on the other 
hand updating should only be used for strengthening the baseline (e.g. every five years)
14
. This 
may result in a reluctance to initially agree to ambitious baselines but may also provide a gen-
                                            
14
 Investment uncertainty in this case is only reduced, though, if baseline updating is known ex-ante (i.e. during the 
time of the investment decision). 
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eral investment climate that makes a later strengthening of baselines more likely because low 
GHG technologies are spread more widely and quicker. 
5.1.4 Metrics 
There is substantive discussion on whether the baselines of a NMBM should be established on 
the basis of absolute emissions levels or of emissions levels with respect to output (i.e. emissions 
intensity, relative emissions or indexed emissions). Other proposals suggest using alternative 
metrics such as the share of a specific technology with respect to the output of a sector (pene-
tration rates). This discussion is summarized in Prag et al. (2011). 
An absolute baseline implicitly or explicitly makes assumptions about the expected level of ac-
or to factors that are difficult to predict, such as economic growth, relative or indexed baselines 
are preferred. This is likely the case in developing countries, whose economies are growing at a 
much faster pace than in Annex I countries. The absolute emission levels of relative or indexed 
baselines depend on the development of one single indicator or a set of indicators. The indica-
tors, the data sources and the algorithm to calculate baseline emissions, all are determined ex 
ante while the absolute values of the baseline emissions are determined ex post. 
However, relative or indexed emission thresholds are subject to the risk that they do not lead to 
a reduction of total emissions. This would be the case if the growth in output levels outweighs 
the reduction in relative emissions (Prag et al. 2011) which is frequently seen in rapidly grow-
ing developing countries with voluntary emission intensity pledges, e.g. China. To avoid re-
strictions to their economic development, developing countries may be reluctant to agree to 
ambitious absolute emission thresholds. If the underlying assumptions on economic develop-
ment do not ultimately materialize, absolute emission thresholds may, on the other hand, re-
sult in substantial amounts of hot air, i.e. emission reductions are not result of mitigation ef-
forts but of other factors (Schneider and Cames 2009). 
Another metric that is being supported by stakeholders from developing countries is using 
technology-based standards to determine baseline emissions intensity. Such baselines would not 
directly be defined as emission levels, but derived from a predefined level of penetration of a 
desirable technology (e.g. X MW or Y % of renewable energy generating capacity). If defined as 
targets/thresholds, they would be substantially above the BAU course of action. This type of 
baseline and derived targets/threshold would reduce MRV costs, but the estimation of resulting 
emission reductions would need to be based on assumptions or estimations (again based on 
historical or similar data) for how the specific technology performs in terms of emissions 
(Lazarus et al. 1999; Prag et al. 2011). The uncertainty of such approaches is high. 
5.1.5 Stringency level and conservativeness 
As discussed above, there are two elements of stringency: choice of a conservative baseline 
among all possible baselines within the uncertainty range, and choice of a stringent tar-
get/threshold level with respect to the chosen baseline. This is expected to be a core area of 
political discussions in the UNFCCC, which needs to be informed by a thorough technical anal-
ysis. One example would be to set the baseline at the average or median emissions levels of the 
installations included within the sector boundaries defined above, which would reflect a repre-
sentative performance of the sector, and would reward any activity that is even slightly better 
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than the average. It would hence not incentivize substantial improvements over BAU. Better-
than-average target or threshold levels (based e.g. on a pre-defined percentile of the best per-
forming installations, or on the emissions level of a desirable technology) could be used to re-
ward only activities that imply a significant improvement beyond the average level. However, 
the more ambitious the target or threshold, the fewer the installations that will effectively be 
incentivized to undertake a mitigation measure. Thus, the stringency level needs to be set at a 
i-
cient incentives for inv (Hayashi et al. 2010). As Broekhoff (2007) puts it, calibrating 
-additional 
a-
ctually additional are deemed to be non-additional, be-
cause the threshold was set too stringent). There is no technically correct way to calibrate the 
stringency level. Therefore, the calibration needs to be done according to the policy goals of 
the policy-makers. 
In the end, however, it is likely that stringency levels will be a negotiated outcome between the 
host country representatives and a central authority or expert panel that assesses each pro-
posed sectoral baseline. If host countries are left free to choose across design options regarding 
20% best performance percentile established for the CDM under the Marrakesh Accords) cannot 
exist, and a desirable level needs to be established on a case by case basis. 
5.2 Criteria for assessing baselines for the NMBM 
In this study, we consider the following criteria for assessing the appropriateness of design op-
tions for baselines of new market-based mechanisms: 
- Environmental integrity: it needs to be made clear that the conceptualization of envi-
ronmental integrity is different under a sectoral market mechanism than under a pro-
ject-based mechanism like the CDM. Under the CDM, demonstrating the additionality of 
a single mitigation measure in a single installation was the key for assessing whether 
individual measures is no longer as important, and does not need to be proven. But on 
aggregate, additionality is still important, as business-as-usual should by definition mean 
the sectoral production path with the highest profit level. As the emission reductions are 
to be credited for a whole sector, it is also no longer important to establish a clear cau-
sality link between an individual mitigation measure and the emission reductions 
achieved. As credits or allowances are issued only with respect to achievement of the 
overall emissions threshold or target, it is eventually a matter for the national govern-
ment to decide how it rewards good performers and penalizes bad ones. From an inter-
national point of view it is crucial that the overall threshold constitutes a deviation from 
BAU (additionality at the sectoral level), and that the BAU emissions level for the sector 
is credibly defined. We will consider the following indicators of environmental integrity: 
o Scale of real and additional emission reductions: whether the threshold leads 
to emission reductions below BAU; 
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o Consideration of policies in baseline setting: whether the baseline incorpo-
rates the effect of existing climate-friendly policies under the BAU scenario; 
o Possibility of allocating reductions to own effort, supported activities and 
credited activities: whether the baseline type allows for differentiating reduc-
tions that are due to own effort (e.g. existing or new policies), to international fi-
nancial support (NAMAs) and to the NMBM. 
- Transparency: whether all assumptions leading to the baseline can be clearly commu-
nicated and understood. 
- Flexibility: whether the baseline-setting methodology provides the host country with 
flexibility in terms of design options that are most suitable for its own circumstances. 
- Data requirements: whether the baseline setting methodology has data requirements 
that can be easily met by developing countries in a sectoral manner. 
5.3 Assessing baselines for the NMBM: power sector 
5.3.1 General characteristics of the sector 
The power sector is one of the most important sectors globally. Global electricity generation 
was 11.8 PWh in 1990 and 21.4 PWh in 2010. Under current policies, global electricity genera-
tion may rise to 36.5 PWh in 2030. CO2 emissions in the power sector were 7.5 Gt in 1990 and 
12.5 Gt in 2010. CO2 emissions are expected to rise to 14.7 Gt in 2030. The power sector is 
therefore of utmost importance for the mitigation of climate change. The main fuel consump-
tion for power generation in 2010 stems from coal (46%), followed by natural gas (23%) and 
nuclear (15%). Renewables accounted for 10% of overall fuel consumption for electricity gener-
ation in 2010 (IEA 2012). 
The highest contribution to the overall climate impact of electricity generation comes from CO2 
which is directly linked to the type and amount of fuel consumed by the power plants. Minor 
contributions stem from CH4 and N2O and are dependent on the type of fuel used as well as the 
combustion conditions of the respective technology. 
The size of power plants ranges from small decentralised installations such as diesel generators 
or photovoltaics to large central power plants such as based on nuclear, coal, natural gas or 
hydro. Power plants can be classified according to a range of features. They may be based on 
renewable, fossil or other fuels (such as nuclear). Power plants may produce electricity only (e.g. 
condensing-type power plants or wind generators) or may co-produce heat for space heating or 
industrial process heat (so-called combined heat and power (CHP) plants). There is also a wide 
variety of technology types applied such as steam turbines, gas turbines, combined cycle power 
plants, different renewable technologies or a combination of different technologies. Power 
plants may be operated by central operators or independent power producers (IPP) and may 
serve both the overall supply of the area (e.g. power plants operated by electric utilities) or 
more specifically the electricity demand in a specific sector, e.g. in the industry (captive power 
plants). The heterogeneity of technologies as well as the number of installations and of opera-
tors depends on the specific circumstances in each country. 
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CO2 emissions from electricity generation depend on the type of fuel used. In this regard, lig-
nite has the highest specific CO2 emissions (101 t CO2/TJ), followed by hard coal (94.6 t CO2/TJ
15
) 
and natural gas (56.1 t CO2/TJ) (IPCC 2006). Renewable energy sources do not generate direct 
CO2 emissions. The amount of CO2 produced furthermore depends on the electric efficiency of 
the power plant, which may range from 30% (or less) for old inefficient power plants to 60% for 
new combined cycle natural gas-fired power plants. The resulting specific CO2 emissions range 
from 0 g CO2/kWh for renewables over 350 g CO2/kWh for a state-of-the-art natural gas-fired 
combined cycle power plant to 1,200 g CO2/kWh (or more) for an old lignite-fired power plant. 
Overall CO2 emissions of the power sector finally depend on the overall electricity demand. 
Against this background, several options are available to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from electricity generation. One option is the increase of the electric efficiency of power plants. 
On the one hand, new power plants have higher electric efficiencies than older plants. On the 
other hand, the electric efficiency may be increased retrospectively (e.g. by retrofitting or re-
powering) or by choosing a different plant configuration (e.g. combined cycle instead of single 
cycle). Another option relates to fuel switch, for instance from lignite to hard coal or from hard 
coal to natural gas. A further possibility is to build and operate power plants in cogeneration 
mode rather than in electricity-only mode
16
. Furthermore, the increased use of renewable elec-
tricity generation reduces greenhouse gas emissions in the power sector. Another option is the 
capture of CO2 from the flue gas of the power plant and the disposal in storage sites under-
ground, so-called carbon capture and storage (CCS). However, this option is still under research. 
There may also be different combinations of the options mentioned above, such as the shift 
from an old coal-fired power plant to a new high-efficiency combined cycle natural gas-fired 
power plant. Finally, the electricity demand directly affects greenhouse emissions in the power 
sector. 
A potential baseline for the power sector therefore needs to deal explicitly with the following 
specific design elements with respect to its level of aggregation: 
- Process: Depending on the data availability, different electricity generation technolo-
gies may be differentiated. 
- Product: No differentiation needed due to a single homogeneous product (electricity)17. 
                                            
15
 (IPCC 2006). 
16
 It has to be noted, though, that the electric efficiency of CHP plants is usually lower than of the same power plant 
in condensing mode. However, since CHP plants also produce heat for space heating or industrial use, fuel con-
sumption may be reduced in other sectors (e.g. by displacing the use of natural gas or light fuel oil to produce 
heat in boilers). However, this reduction effect would only be visible in the final consumption sectors. 
17
 Cogeneration of electricity and heat constitutes a special case since it cannot be directly compared to electricity-
only power plants. Extensive literature is available on this matter. However, this specific case is not further inves-
tigated as part of this case study. Furthermore, electricity generation may be differentiated with regard to load 
characteristics (base load, intermediate load, peak load). Different power plant types are dispatched to cover 
these load ranges. In this regard, specific CO2 emissions also depend on the load range. However, since the whole 
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- Time: The baseline may consider the development of the power plant in the past (fuel 
types, electric efficiencies, etc.) as well as the autonomous improvement of efficiency in 
the future. 
- Space: Generally all power plants in the sector under consideration should be included 
in the derivation of the baseline. The sector in this regard may, for instance, cover all 
power plants of a country or region. However, different regions (and even countries) 
may be connected by the same grid. Therefore, the delineation of the sectoral boundary 
may be set at all power plants serving a power grid or a set of connected grids operat-
ing in synchronous mode. The definition of the sectoral boundary also addresses specific 
geographical conditions, such as the availability of renewable or fossil resources in the 
area or grid, which should be considered for baseline setting
18
. 
In the following section, we present examples of how baselines for the power sector could be 
developed on the basis of publicly available bottom-up data for an advanced developing coun-
try. 
5.3.2 Case study of sectoral baselines in the power sector 
For the purpose of the case study, the choice of the country was guided by two principles. First-
ly, the power sector should be sufficiently large in order to represent an important source of 
greenhouse gas emissions and thus of climate mitigation. Secondly, the public availability of 
detailed power plant data is crucial for baseline setting. Against this background, India was 
chosen as the example for the case study. However, the exercise may be carried out for other 
countries, too. 
Electricity generation in India amounted to 960 TWh in 2010. The main part stems from coal 
(68%), followed by natural gas and hydro (each 12%). Minor shares come from oil, nuclear and 
wind (Figure 5). Overall installed electrical capacity amounted to 189 GW in 2010 with 53% 
coming from coal, 21% from hydro and 11% from natural gas-fired power plants. Overall CO2 
emissions from power generation amounted to 872 Mt in 2010 (IEA 2012). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
power plant sector is considered, all kinds of load situations (off-peak, peak, etc.) are covered. For this reason, 
there is no differentiation according to load ranges for the derivation of sectoral baselines. 
18
 For instance, in a grid without hydro resources, hydro power plants can be ruled out as potential power plant 
option for baseline setting. 
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Figure 5: Electricity generation in India (TWh), 2010 
 
Source: IEA 2012 
For the assessment of potential sectoral baselines in the power sector, two sources of data were 
assessed for suitability, the IEA GHG CO2 Emissions Database and a database from the Central 
Electricity Authority of the Government of India. 
The IEA GHG CO2 Emissions Database (IEA 2008) contains emissions data from over 8,000 large 
point sources such as from the power sector, iron & steel, the chemical industry and several 
other industry branches. The quality of CO2 
n factors and capaci-
 
In the case of India, all data are estimated based on the unit capacity of the power plant, as-
sumed operating hours and a specific CO2 emission factor depending on the type of fuel. There 
is no further differentiation of operating hours or CO2 emission factors. Vintages of power 
plants (construction years) are not available. Emissions data are available for some years; how-
ever, there is no systematic time series of emissions. 
Based on this dataset, it is not possible to derive an absolute CO2 emission baseline since a sys-
tematic time series is not available. Also, since there is no information on vintages, efficiencies 
(and corresponding specific CO2 emission factors) and operating hours for different years, it is 
not possible to derive an indexed baseline based on trends related to specific CO2 emissions, 
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The database by the Central Electricity Authority of the Government of India (Central Electricity 
Authority 2012a) provides data on Indian power plants including installed capacity, fuel as well 
as electricity generation, CO2 emissions and resulting specific CO2 emissions for five years (2006 
to 2010
19
). The database covers installations with an installed capacity of at least 3 MW for hy-
dro and 10 MW for other power plants. Both utilities and independent power producers (IPP) 
are covered. However, captive power plants
20
 and non-conventional renewables such as wind, 
biomass, solar photovoltaic and hydro below 3 MW of installed capacity are not included. Data 
are available for the Northern, Eastern, Western and North-Eastern grids (NEWNE) as well as for 
the Southern Grid. The two grids are expected to be synchronously operated in the next few 
years. Also, the Southern Grid already has some connections to the Western and Eastern Grid. 
As part of this analysis, it is therefore assumed that by the time a new market-based mechanism 
is introduced, the whole of India is integrated in one grid. For this reason, all power plants in-
cluded in the database (NEWNE grids and Southern Grid) are considered in the following anal-
ysis. The power plants usually include several units with a specific commissioning date each. In 
the analysis, each unit is considered separately, allowing for a more detailed differentiation 
according to vintages (construction years). It has to be noted, though, that for the individual 
units, only the construction year and the installed capacity are available in most cases whereas 
the yearly electricity generation and the corresponding CO2 emissions are only available for all 
units of the same power plant together. For the analysis, electricity generation and CO2 emis-
sions are therefore distributed to individual units by considering the installed capacities of the 
unit. The dataset does not allow differentiation of operating hours or specific CO2 emissions 
between the different units
21
. Some power plants run on two fuels (main fuel and auxiliary fuel, 
such as for start-up of the power plant). In the following, only the main fuel is considered for 
the classification. Furthermore, the dataset is corrected for abnormal operating conditions. On 
the one hand, the first year of operation of each newly-commissioned power plant is not con-
sidered in the analysis since fuel consumption and specific CO2 emissions may be abnormally 
high due to initial testing of the power plant. On the other hand, the specific CO2 emissions of 
a power plant in individual years are neglected that are at least 5% above the lowest value of 
all years. The underlying rationale is that the lowest specific CO2 emissions are generally 
achievable by the power plant from a technical point of view and that significantly higher spe-
cific CO2 emissions are therefore not plausible. An increase of 5% over the lowest value consid-
ers normal technical variations such as operation in part load or deterioration of plant efficien-
cy over time due to tear and wear. Table 2 gives an overview of the net electricity generation 
                                            
19
 The respective fiscal years are considered. 
20
 Captive power plants play an important role in India due to the instability of the grid, and produced 90 TWh in 
2008, i.e. around 10% of the total electricity (Nag 2010, p. 199). 
21
 This constitutes a significant data limitation. Power plants may comprise several units with different technologies 
and construction years. Therefore, in reality, operating hours and electric efficiencies (and ensuing specific CO2 
emissions) may differ significantly between the individual units of a power plant. 
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and CO2 emissions of the Indian power plants included in the database (after correction for 
abnormal values) for the years 2006 to 2010
22
. 
Table 2: Net electricity generation and CO2 emissions of Indian power plants, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
In the following, two different baselines are proposed: an absolute baseline based on the overall CO2 emis-
sions of the power sector (section 0) and an indexed baseline based on specific CO2 emissions of the power 
sector and the fuel mix (section 0). 
 
Absolute baseline 
A baseline related to the development of overall CO2 emissions of the sector over time can be 
derived in several ways. The future development may be projected as a trend extrapolation of 
historical CO2 emissions with the possibility of using different reference periods (e.g. 2000-2010, 
2005-2010, etc.). The development of overall emissions may also come from more sophisticated 
macro-economic modelling, taking into account the development of fuel prices, economic 
growth, the interactions between sectors, etc. 
If it is assumed that the absolute CO2 emissions of the Indian power sector follow between 2010 
and 2030 the same trend as between 2006 and 2010, the absolute CO2 emissions would more 
than double and grow from 463 Mt in 2010 to 940 Mt in 2030
23
 (Figure 6). 
                                            
22
 Due to the restrictions related to coverage mentioned above, the overall electricity generation is less than report-
ed by IEA (2012). Furthermore, variations between the years may be due to correction for outliers. 
23
 It has to be noted that the coverage of power plants in the dataset may not be homogeneous over the years due 
to the correction for abnormal values (see above). Therefore, the estimated trend involves some uncertainty. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total 497 503 482 578 625 370 380 357 439 463
Nuclear 14 14 13 16 20 0 0 0 0 0
Lignite 18 20 18 21 20 25 29 25 30 29
Coal 310 322 304 367 386 324 336 314 378 398
Gas 43 27 33 62 67 20 13 15 28 29
Diesel 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Oil 1 1 0 5 2 1 1 0 3 1
Naphtha 1 0 6 1 12 0 0 3 0 5
Hydro 110 117 108 106 115 0 0 0 0 0
CO2 emissions (Mt)Net generation (TWh)
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Figure 6: Overall CO2 emissions in the absolute baseline 
 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
 
However, since the basis for such a trend projection which can be derived from the databases 
used for this analysis is quite short, this trend cannot be considered as a reasonable trend pro-
jection of the Indian power sector. 
Indexed baseline based on specific CO2 emissions of the power sector and the fuel mix 
In order to derive an indexed baseline based on specific CO2 emissions of the power sector and 
the fuel mix, an analysis has to be conducted related to the existing power plant fleet. In the 
following, the Indian power plant fleet is analysed with regard to specific CO2 emissions of the 
power sector as a whole, with regard to specific CO2 emissions of individual power plant types 
and with respect to the development of the fuel mix in the sector. Based on these analyses, a 
consolidated indexed baseline based on specific CO2 emissions of the power sector and the fuel 
mix is derived. 
Development of specific CO2 emissions of the power sector as a whole 
Specific CO2 emissions of the power sector as a whole can be calculated in several ways. On the 
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different reference periods for the calculation (see section 0). On the other hand, it may consid-
er only recently built power plants as a proxy of the most probable investments in the future.
24
 
For the purpose of this case study, two types of specific CO2 emission of the power sector as a 
whole are derived. For the operating margin, specific CO2 emissions of all power plants from 
2006 to 2010 are considered, including thermal, nuclear and hydro. For the build margin, spe-
cific CO2 emissions of new power plants are calculated for the years 2006 to 2010 based on the 
power plants built in each respective year and four years prior to the year under consideration. 
For instance, the build margin of the year 2010 corresponds to the specific CO2 emissions of all 
power plants commissioned in the years 2006 to 2010 (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Specific CO2 emissions of the power sector according to the operating margin and the build margin, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
Specific CO2 emissions based on historical levels (operating margin) remain rather constant at 
approximately 750 g CO2/kWh. This is due to the fact that the net electricity generation and 
CO2 emissions grow in parallel between 2006 and 2010 and the fuel mix also remains rather 
constant (Table 2). The build margin, in contrast, features lower values for all years (642 to 694 
g CO2/kWh). This can be explained by the fact that new power plants are generally more effi-
cient than incumbent ones. Also, capacity additions of hydro and natural gas-fired power plants 
                                            
24
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partly compensate for the higher specific CO2 emissions of hard coal-fired power plants (Figure 
8). 
Figure 8: Capacity additions in the Indian power sector, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
The build margin is based on the years 2006 to 2010. However, the calculation may require 
updating since investment conditions, exploitation potential (e.g. hydro) and technical specifi-
cations (such as the electrical efficiency) may change over time and therefore cannot simply be 
assumed as ongoing in the future. 
Development of specific CO2 emissions of individual power plant types 
For the purpose of this case study, two types of specific CO2 emissions of individual power plant 
types (differentiated by fuel) are derived. The methodology generally follows the same rationale 
as for the specific CO2 emissions of the power sector as a whole. For the operating margin, spe-
cific CO2 emissions in the years 2006 to 2010 are considered. The build margin of new power 
plants is calculated for the years 2006 to 2010 based on the power plants built in the respective 
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Figure 9: Specific CO2 emissions of power plant types (natural gas, hard coal and lignite) according to the operating margin 
and the build margin, 2006-2010 
 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
Generally, it can be expected for all power plant types that specific CO2 emissions decrease over 
time as more efficient power plants are put online. This holds true both for the operating and 
the build margin. Also, the build margin is expected to have lower values than the operating 
margin due to more recent construction years and the correspondingly higher efficiencies of 
power plants. However, due to specific operating conditions (cycling, etc.), specific CO2 emis-
sions may also increase temporarily. 
In Figure 9, the operating margin of lignite-fired power plants in the dataset is rather constant 
over time at around 1,410 g CO2/kWh. The build margin of lignite-fired power plants shows a 
significant increase of specific CO2 emissions between 2008 and 2010, which even goes beyond 
the specific CO2 emissions of the operating margin in 2010. This is not plausible for the reasons 
mentioned above. Therefore, the lower build margin values of lignite for the years 2006 and 
2007 are considered as the most realistic values (1,270 g CO2/kWh). 
Both the operating margin and the build margin of hard coal-fired and natural gas-fired power 
plants indicate a rather constant trend (approx. 1,040/1,000 g CO2/kWh for hard coal-fired 
power plants and 450/400 g CO2/kWh for natural gas-fired power plants). Values for the build 
margin lie below the ones for the operating margin, which is plausible for the above-
mentioned reasons. 
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Similarly, to the trend in specific CO2 emissions, the development of fuel mix in the power sec-
tor can be analysed (Figure 10). The development of the fuel mix between 2006 and 2010 
shows a sensible increase of the share of gas-fired electricity generation (from 9% in 2006 to 
11% in 2010) whereas the share of other fuels remains rather constant. Hydro features a de-
creasing trend (from 22% in 2006 to 18% in 2010), which may be due to variations in hydrolog-
ical conditions. 
Figure 10: Fuel mix (basis electricity generation), 2006-2010 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
Consolidated indexed baseline based on specific CO2 emissions of the power sector and the fuel 
mix 
In reality, several aspects of the power sector may evolve simultaneously, specific CO2 emissions 
of individual power plant types, fuel mix and overall electricity consumption. Different combi-
nations thereof may be modelled. For the purpose of this case study, a combined indexed base-
line based on specific CO2 emissions of power plant types and the fuel mix is proposed. An ab-
solute baseline is subsequently derived based on assumptions regarding the development of the 
electricity consumption. 
Based on the analysis above, the following rationale for deriving the baseline is used: 
Specific CO2 emissions of individual power plant types (for all power plants of the same fuel) 
start at the operating margin of 2010: 1,416 g CO2/kWh for lignite, 1,031 g CO2/kWh for hard 
coal and 429 g CO2/kWh for natural gas. It is assumed that the average efficiency of all power 
plants in the sector reaches the level of the build margin of the years 2006 to 2010 by 2020 
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sioned and replaced by (more efficient) ones. In 2020, specific CO2 emissions of all power plants 
therefore reach 1,270 g CO2/kWh for lignite-fired power plants, 1,000 g CO2/kWh for hard coal-
fired power plants and 400 g CO2/kWh for natural gas-fired power plants. State-of-the-art pow-
er plants today feature specific CO2 emissions of 950 g CO2/kWh for lignite-fired power plants, 
750 g CO2/kWh for hard coal-fired power plants and 350 g CO2/kWh for combined cycle natu-
ral gas-fired power plants. For 2030, it assumed that the share of state-of-the-art power plants 
has increased significantly, in a way that average specific CO2 emissions in 2030 are only 10% 
-of-art power plants (1,045 g CO2/kWh for lignite-fired power plants, 825 g 
CO2/kWh for hard coal-fired power plants and 385 g CO2/kWh for natural gas-fired power 
plants). This development can be considered as autonomous improvement of the power sector 
(Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Historical and assumed projected specific CO2 emissions of individual power plant types, 2006-2030 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
Fuel mix: The starting point of the development of the fuel mix is the fuel mix in 2010. It is 
assumed that the contribution of natural gas to the overall electricity mix continues to grow in 
the same manner as in 2006-2010 (Figure 10). Furthermore, it can be expected that due to sig-
nificant cost decreases, renewable electricity generation, especially based on wind and PV, will 
grow substantially. An overall share of renewables of 40% in 2030 is assumed (starting from 
18% hydro in 2010). The contribution of other fuels to the fossil electricity generation remains 
the same. Overall due to the increase in renewable electricity, natural gas is the only fossil fuel 
that shows a resulting increase of the generation share whereas all other fossil fuels have de-
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Figure 12: Historical and assumed projected fuel mix, 2006-2030 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
Figure 13 shows the development of the specific CO2 emissions of the power sector resulting 
from the above-mentioned development of the specific CO2 emissions of individual power 
plants and the fuel mix
25
. 
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Figure 13: Indexed baseline of specific CO2 emissions of the power sector based on specific CO2 emissions of individual power 
plant types (natural gas, hard coal and lignite) as well as an assumed trend of the fuel mix, 2006-2030 
 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
The figure shows that the autonomous development of the power sector, i.e. the shift in the 
fuel mix (more natural gas-fired electricity generation, significant increase of renewables) and 
efficiency improvements of individual power plants, lead to significantly decreasing specific 
CO2 emissions of the power sector from 740 g CO2/kWh in 2010 to 401 g CO2/kWh in 2030. 
In order to assess the impact of the autonomous development of the power plant fleet on abso-
lute CO2 emissions, the development of the electricity generation up to 2030 needs to be esti-
mated. The development of the electricity demand is dependent on a range of factors such as 
the development of economic growth, socio-economic development and the implementation of 
energy efficiency measures. Electricity generation has increased from 497 TWh in 2006 to 625 
TWh in 2010
26
, which corresponds to an annual growth of 5.9%. For this rough analysis it is 
assumed that this growth rate continues until 2020. Between 2020 and 2030, it is assumed that 
the annual growth of electricity generation can be limited to 3% due to an increased uptake of 
                                            
26
 It should be noted that electricity generation is derived from the CEA dataset. Please refer to the discussion of 
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readily available efficiency measures. In such a scenario, electricity generation would increase 
from 625 TWh in 2010 to 1,490 TWh in 2030 (Table 3)
27
. 
Table 3: Estimated development of the electricity generation of Indian power plants, 2006-2030 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
On the basis of the indexed baseline of specific CO2 emissions of the power sector (Figure 13) as 
well as on the development of the electricity generation (Table 3), absolute baseline CO2 emis-
sions can be calculated (Figure 14). 
Figure 14: Absolute baseline CO2 emissions based on an indexed baseline, 2006-2030 
 
 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012a), calculations by Oeko-Institut 
In such a scenario, absolute CO2 emissions increase from 463 Mt CO2 in 2010 to 650 Mt CO2 in 
2020. Although specific CO2 emissions of individual power plants decrease and the share of 
renewables increases, the efficiency gains are more than outweighed by the significant growth 
of the electricity consumption. Only after 2020, absolute CO2 emissions decrease (to 597 Mt CO2 
                                            
27
 Different scenarios for the development of electricity demand are also available in Central Electricity Authority 
(2012b). However, forecasts reach until 2021/22 only. 
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in 2030) due to the increased uptake of energy efficiency measures and thus the limitation of 
growth of electricity consumption. 
Result 
This analysis demonstrates that a mere extrapolation of absolute CO2 emissions (Figure 6) ne-
glects important aspects of autonomous development of the power sector, namely the in-
creased efficiency of individual power plants, fuel switch and the promotion of renewables. 
Also, potential (autonomous) abatement measures in other sectors (energy efficiency, expressed 
in yearly growth of electricity consumption) are not considered by a mere extrapolation of ab-
solute CO2 emissions. It can therefore be concluded that a plausible and conservative estima-
tion of baseline emission needs to consider several key drivers at the same time. A purely tech-
nical analysis (based on benchmarks, etc.) does not lead to a robust baseline. The use of projec-
tion techniques (which allow considering a range of variables at the same time) should there-
fore be further explored. 
5.4 Assessing baselines for the NMBM: cement sector 
5.4.1 General characteristics of the sector 
The cement industry is a crucial economic sector globally. Cement is produced practically in 
every country in the world, and is required to build the basic infrastructure needed for devel-
r-
age growth of 6.7% over the last 5 years (US Geological Survey 2012). The CO2 emissions associ-
ated with cement production can be estimated at 2.72 GtCO2e in 2011.
28
 
emissions represented 8% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Müller and Harnisch 2008). 
Economic development has been recognized as the main driver of the cement industry. Per 
capita cement consumption tends to increase with income up to an income level of 15,000 
USD/capita. After reaching this income level, cement consumption stabilizes (Müller and 
Harnisch 2008). As a result of such trend, most new production capacity needed in the next 10-
20 years is expected to be installed in low- to middle-income countries. Already now, over half 
of global cement production takes place in China, and about ¾ of it occurs in just 12 develop-
ing countries (Lee et al. 2011). 
Cement production involves several GHG (mainly CO2) emission sources. About 50% of total 
emissions occur in the form of process (non-energy related) CO2 emissions from limestone cal-
cination; 40% occur through energy (coal) consumption in clinker production; the rest com-
prises mainly indirect emissions from electricity consumption (e.g. for grinding of raw material 
and clinker), and emissions from transportation. On average, 0.8 tCO2 are emitted per tonne of 
cement (Lee et al. 2011). Such diversity of emission sources implies that, according to the IPCC 
guidelines for GHG inventories (IPCC 2006), cement sector emissions need to be accounted for 
in several IPCC sector definitions: process emissions are accounted within the IPCC 2 A 1 cate-
gory (mineral industry  cement production); direct energy emissions are considered in the 
                                            
28
 Based on an estimated CO2 intensity of 0.8 tCO2e/t cement (Lee et al. 2011) and a production level of 3.4 Gt ce-
ment in 2011. 
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1 A 2 f category (manufacturing industries and construction: non-metallic minerals); electricity 
emissions are included in the 1 A 1 a category (main activity electricity and heat production); 
transport emissions are considered within the 1 A 3 sector (transport). This already illustrates 
 
At the same time, the existence of all these emission sources gives place to several mitigation 
opportunities, such as the use of alternative raw materials for clinker production in kilns, the 
use of alternative kiln fuels, energy efficiency measures including waste heat recovery, an in-
creased blending of clinker with cementitious materials, and, potentially, carbon capture and 
storage (Lee et al. 2011). With respect to fuel use, while similar fuels are generally used world-
wide (usually coal), a mix with waste or biomass is possible, depending on their availability and 
on the applicable legal framework. In terms of energy efficiency, nowadays similar production 
technologies are applied worldwide in new plants, with a limited number of equipment manu-
facturers supplying the market (Hayashi et al. 2010). However, as production technology has 
become more efficient over time, plant vintage matters, and, particularly for existing installa-
tions, technology types (e.g. wet versus dry kilns) are also relevant. While using alternative ma-
terials to produce clinker or to mix with it is a theoretically available option to reduce emis-
sions, it strongly depends on local availability of appropriate materials. 
A potential sectoral baseline for cement therefore needs to explicitly deal with following specif-
ic design elements with respect to its level of aggregation: 
- Process: Consideration of two types of processes: dry and wet kilns (especially if the 
baseline is to be applied to retrofits of existing kilns, as new kilns usually apply the dry 
technology). If electricity emissions are included in the baseline, differentiation could be 
included in terms of plants with or without captive power plants. 
- Product: Baselines could be set for clinker or for cement production. If set for cement, a 
potential market fragmentation could exist in terms of the blending ratio of clinker with 
alternative cementitious materials. 
- Time: Consideration of autonomous efficiency improvements over time  estimates for 
the US put such autonomous improvement at between 0.5% and 1% per year, and relate 
them to an increased capacity of dry process kilns, energy efficiency improvements, and 
lower clinker to cement ratios (Worrell and Galitsky 2004). 
- Space: Differentiation needed in terms of availability of alternative fuels, raw and 
blending materials, and of legal framework to allow the use of such materials. If elec-
tricity emissions are included in the baseline, differentiation could be needed in terms 
of the relevant electricity grids. 
In the following section, we present an example about how a baseline for the cement sector 
could be developed on the basis of publicly available top-down (aggregated) data for an ad-
vanced developing country. As the particular local conditions existing in the case study will be 
fixed for this specific country, the analysis will not discuss the issues related to level of aggrega-
tion at length, but rather focus on the other design elements for sectoral baselines reviewed 
above: reference data, dynamics and updating, metrics and stringency level. 
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5.4.2 Case study of sectoral baselines in the cement sector 
For the case study of the cement sector, we rely on the cement production and CO2 emissions 
data that has been collected by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(CSI 
2012). Due to confidentiality reasons, the publicly available data does not display production or 
emissions data per plant, nor vintage information of individual plants. Hence, only aggregated 
data (at the region level) is available for the years 1990, 2000, and 2005 onwards. This data will 
be used to illustrate how top-down, aggregated emission baselines for a whole sector up to the 
year 2030 could be established. For the case study, we have chosen to focus on the Indian ce-
ment sector because data for this country is reported separately by CSI, and has a relatively 
high coverage because complementary data from industry organisations is available, and be-
cause Indian cement production is, despite its already quite high energy efficiency, a large (and 
growing) contributor to GHG gases. 
India is the second largest cement producer in the world, with a share of about 6% of global 
production (Parliament of India 2011). The industry comprises 154 large cement plants with an 
installed capacity of 230.8 million tonnes (Parliament of India 2011)
29
 as well as over 365 mini 
plants with an installed capacity of about 11.1 million tonnes (Indian Brand Equity Foundation 
2011). Cement production has grown at an average rate of over 8% over the last 5 years 
(Reserve Bank of India 2011), and emitted about 130 mtCO2e in the year 2007, which repre-
30
 (Ministry of Environment and Forests 
2010). percent-
age being exported (CMA 2010). There are no reports of cement or clinker being imported. 
In terms of process, the Indian cement industry hence comprises both new state-of-the-art 
plants using the efficient dry process technology, and smaller and inefficient wet process kilns. 
Production from the large plants accounts for about 97% of total production. While detailed 
statistics for small plants do not seem to be available, estimates show that production from 
small plants has not significantly grown in the last 15 years, remaining around 6 million 
tonnes per year. 
With respect to products, mainly three types of cement are produced. Portland Pozzolana Ce-
ment has a share of 67% of production, followed by Ordinary Portland Cement (25%) and Port-
land Slag Cement (8%). The present share of blended cement (75%) is expected to continue in-
creasing in the future. Clinker substitutes for such blending are still available in large quantity: 
The Parliament of India (2011) estimates that currently 34 million tonnes of fly ash and 8 mil-
lion tonnes of blast furnace slag are used as clinker substitutes per year. According to their es-
timations, 130 million tonnes of fly ash and 13 million tonnes of blast furnace slag are availa-
ble each year. Another estimate cites a total of 161.5 million tonnes of these and other alterna-
tive cementitious materials per year (Pahuja 2008). However, due to increasing demand, also 
from competitive uses such as brick manufacturing, these originally free waste products have 
                                            
29
 Other sources cite 139 large plants with a capacity of 234.3 million tonnes per year (Indian Brand Equity Founda-
tion 2011). Large plants are those with an installed capacity above 1 million tonnes/year. 
30
 Without considering indirect emissions from electricity use, and without counting LULUCF. 
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now become a priced commodity, which represents a cost barrier for a wider use(Parliament of 
India 2011). Technically, high blending levels are possible without affecting the performance of 
cement. In practice, some countries have achieved a clinker-to-cement ratio (CCR) of around 
0.7, with Brazil reaching even 0.65 (in comparison, the current ratio in Indian large plants is 
about 0.77); some cement blends reach a CCR of 0.25 (Müller and Harnisch 2008; CMA 2010; 
Graus et al. 2011). 
The CSI data covers 72 plants from 8 companies operating in India, which represents about 
50% of current total production (see Table 4). The small number of plants and large coverage in 
terms of production suggests that the database only contains information from large produc-
tion plants. In terms of process, the database includes only dry kilns, of which between 93% 
and 100% include a preheater and a precalciner, and 0-7% include only a preheater. In terms of 
fuel, mostly fossil fuels are used, but their share has decreased from about 100% in the years 
1990 and 2000 to 97.9% in 2010, being replaced mostly by waste materials, but also by bio-
mass.
31
 Similarly, the use of blending materials has increased from 13.6% in 1990 to 29.2% in 
2010. 
The data reports emissions from the calcination process and from fossil fuel combustion. Emis-
sions from biomass and waste combustion are considered to be zero. Indirect emissions from 
electricity consumption are not included. While the CSI data includes an electricity consump-
tion indicator (kWh per tonne of cement), finding an appropriate emissions factor for electrici-
ty consumption is problematic as an increasing number of plants has captive power production 
(probably based on co-generation or waste heat recovery). This is a significant drawback of the 
data, as some studies have pointed out that, while new cement plants usually incorporate state 
of the art clinker kilns, there is higher variation in the electricity-consuming equipment in-
stalled (e.g. grinding units). Thus, in new installations, there may be more scope for achieving 
efficiency gains from electricity consumption in grinding mills than from fuel combustion in 
clinker kilns (Ruth et al. 2000). In addition, 30% to 40% of total heat input in cement plants is 
released as waste heat. In India, the cement sector has an estimated potential of 400 MW elec-
tricity generation from co-generation, but so far only 13.5 MW are in operation and 71.5 MW 
under construction (frequently as part of CDM projects). Due to the imported technology, capi-
tal costs of co-generation are still higher than those of coal-fired power plants. In addition, state 
governments impose a duty on captive power generation and also demand a payment for grid 
power use even if the plants are self-reliant. This reduces the competitiveness of co-generation 
also in terms of operation costs (Parliament of India 2011). 
                                            
31
 While different types of fossil fuels have different carbon intensities, the CSI database does not report what types 
of fossil fuels are used in cement production in India. Data from the CMA show that besides coal, lignite and pe-
troleum coke have been used since the early 1990s in shares ranging from 1 to 13% of total fuel consumption. 
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Table 4: Cement statistics for India, CSI database and official statistics compared 
Year 

















cement ratio  








1990 18'700 25 100.0% 0.864 48'900   38.2%   
2000 49'600 48 100.0% 0.852 100'110   49.5% 
 2005 70'700 54 93.0% 0.778 147'810   47.8% 
 2006 76'400 54 93.0% 0.749 161'640   47.3% 
 2007 82'500 57 94.0% 0.728 174'310 136 47.3% 41.9% 
2008 89'100 59 93.0% 0.713 187'610 145 47.5% 40.7% 
2009 103'000 65 100.0% 0.715 206'940 156 49.8% 41.7% 
2010 106'000 72 100.0% 0.711 215'560 161 49.2% 44.7% 
a CMA data are based on financial years from 1 April to 31 March. 
b The remaining plants are dry kilns with a preheater only. 
Sources: CMA (2010); CSI (2012). For year 2010: ACC Limited (2012); Ambuja Cements Ltd. (2012); CMA (2012). 
In addition, basic socioeconomic data (GDP, GDP per capita and population) and current indus-
try statistics will be used for projecting future cement production levels. The historic socioeco-
nomic data up to 2010 was obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2012), and future projections up to 2030 were gathered from the US Energy Information Ad-
(EIA 2011). Historic ce-
ment production levels were obtained, for the years 1981-1988, from the Reserve Bank of India 
(2011), and for the years 1989- (CMA 2010). 
The main factors influencing direct (non-electricity) emissions from the cement sector are fuel 
consumption and thermal efficiency in the clinker production process, and the blending ratio. 
Accordingly, the following types of baselines could be proposed: 
- Indexed baseline based on CO2 emissions per unit of cement production: This baseline 
would account for the effect of both the clinker production process and blending of 
clinker with other cementitious materials on emission levels. 
- Indexed baseline based on CO2 emissions per unit of clinker production: This baseline 
would incorporate only the effect of the clinker production process on emission levels. 
- Absolute emissions baseline based on historical emissions and trends: This baseline 
would implicitly include also the size of the industry as a factor affecting emission lev-
els. 
These baselines will be compared with an hypothetical emissions goal for the cement sector in 
(WBCSD and IEA 2009): 0.426 
tCO2/t cement, which represents a 36% reduction with respect to the emissions intensity of In-
dian cement production in 2005 (as covered by the CSI database). 
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Indexed baseline based on emissions per unit of cement production 
When emissions levels are indexed with respect to cement production, the thermal efficiency 
in the clinker production process, the amount of fossil fuels in the fuel mix, and the blending 
ratio of clinker with other materials (CCR) influence emission levels.
32
 Hence, projections of 
future emission levels should ideally take these predictors into account. The slightly longer time 
series available for cement emissions than for power emissions allows us to display the effect of 
different types of projections into the future on the shape of the baseline. To illustrate the ef-
fect of using different projections and predictors on estimated future emission levels, we use 
the available historical data to generate four types of projections, as detailed in Table 5. Source:
 CSI (2012) Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009) 
Figure 15 presents the results of the different projections, and illustrates how different ways of 
estimating a baseline on the basis of historic data may yield very different results. In all the 
projections, the trend is towards lower emissions per unit of cement production. However, the 
longer the time period projected, the more divergent the results are, hence the higher the un-
certainty of the projections. According to these projections, the direct CO2 emissions from ce-
ment production in India in the year 2020 may be anywhere between 0.483 and 0.578 tCO2/t 
cement. It is interesting to note that the most ambitious projections (in terms of less emissions 
per unit of cement) are obtained by using a simple linear extrapolation of the current trend. In 
the case of the Indian cement sector, energy efficiency is already among the highest in the 
world. Compared to the projections on the basis of realistic efficiency, fuel mix and blending 
achievements up to 2030, the simple linear projection of current trends would clearly require 
quite high blending or fuel shift percentages in the future, which may become challenging. 
Table 5: Baselines based on projections of indexed emissions per unit of cement production: assumptions 
Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal emissions on the basis of all 
the existing indexed emissions 
data 
Continuation of historical emission trends. 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal emissions on the basis of the 
indexed emissions data for the 
last 6 years 
Continuation of historical emission trends, but using only 
the most recent data with a continuous time series. This 
would avoid potential bias due to missing data and due to 
longer term changes in the emission trends. 
Linear projection from the last 
data point assuming an auton-
omous 1% annual improvement 
in emissions performance 
Following historic improvements cited by the literature. This 
improvement factor would account for both energy efficien-
cy improvements and changes in the fuel mix or blending 
proportions. 
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 As described above, the CSI data does not report indirect emissions from electricity consumption, so that this 
emissions source will not be considered in our analysis. 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
86 
Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear regression with respect to 
projected fossil fuel consump-
tion and clinker to cement ratio 
(CCR) 
Relates cement emissions to its underlying causes: the use of 
fossil fuels in clinker production (influenced by energy effi-
ciency improvements and by the use of biomass or waste as 
fuels) and the level of blending of clinker with other ce-
mentitious materials. Four scenarios about the future projec-
tion of fuel use and CCR are modelled: 
- In 2030, fuel consumption reaches best available technolo-
gy (BAT) levels, but alternative fuels are not used. Fossil fuel 
consumption hence evolves linearly from current levels 
(3097 MJ/t clinker in 2010) to 2717 MJ/t clinker in 2030. An 
optimistic CCR of 0.57 is reached in 2030. 
- In 2030, fuel consumption reaches BAT levels, and 10% 
alternative fuels are used. Fossil fuel consumption evolves 
linearly from current levels to 2459 MJ/t clinker in 2030. An 
optimistic CCR of 0.57 is reached in 2030. 
- In 2030, fuel consumption reaches BAT levels, but alterna-
tive fuels are not used. Fossil fuel consumption evolves line-
arly from current levels to 2717 MJ/t clinker in 2030. A pes-
simistic CCR of 0.69 is reached in 2030. 
- In 2030, fuel consumption reaches BAT levels, and 10% 
alternative fuels are used. Fossil fuel consumption evolves 
linearly from current levels to 2459 MJ/t clinker in 2030. A 
pessimistic CCR of 0.69 is reached in 2030.
33
  
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CSI (2012) Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009) 
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 BAT thermal energy consumption levels were obtained from (Indian Brand Equity Foundation 2011). Assuming 
BAT in 2030 means that existing old installations will be replaced or retrofitted to achieve the highest existing ef-
ficiency levels by 2030. With the rising costs of fuels, such an assumption is plausible even without policy inter-
vention. The assumption on alternative fuels reaching 10% by 2030 is relatively pessimistic, if we consider that 
some European countries have already managed to source up to 47% of thermal energy from alternative fuels 
(Bischoff 2008), and individual plants up to 98% (WBCSD and IEA 2009). WBCSD and IEA (2009) expect that in 
developing countries, rates of substitution of 10-20% on average can be achieved by 2030. Different types of 
waste fuels are available in large quantities in India: Rajasekar (2008) cites a potential for heat substitution in 
clinker production of 47% from hazardous waste, municipal solid waste and tires in India. Trial runs in several 
cement plants with effluent treatment plant sludge, tar waste from petroleum industries, used tires, refinery 
sludge and paint sludge have had positive results (Bischoff 2008). However, there are regulatory barriers to the 
use of hazardous wastes for cement production, and the use of biomass as fuel is being adopted slowly (Kumar 
2008). Other factors also influence the decision to adopt alternative fuels, such as the proximity of the fuel source 
to the plant, the sustainability of the supply, type of manufacturing process and compatibility of the fuel with it, 
and the infrastructural facilities needed to handle the alternative fuel (Pahuja 2008). 
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Figure 15: Baselines based on projections of indexed emissions per unit of cement production 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009); CSI (2012) 
In order to be able to estimate total emission levels for an indexed baseline, the baseline needs 
to be related to total cement production levels. Usually, such activity data is monitored over 
time, so that the absolute emissions are not known in advance. In this case study, in order to 
illustrate the range of absolute emission levels that would be covered by the indexed baselines 
estimated above, we generate future cement production projections on the basis of historic 
industry data (CMA 2010; Reserve Bank of India 2011) and assuming different scenarios, as de-
tailed in Table 6. 
Table 6: Projections of cement production up to 2030: assumptions 
Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal production data  
Continuation of historical cement production trends. 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal production data (only last 10 
years) 
Continuation of historical production trends, but using only 
the most recent data. This would avoid potential bias due to 
longer term changes in the underlying economic develop-
ment trends. 
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Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal production data  
Continuation of historical cement production trends. 
Exponential projection of histor-
ical production data  
The historical trend shows an exponential growth of cement 
production in India. An exponential projection is better suit-
ed to reflect this trend than a simple linear one as above. 
Linear regression with respect to 
projected GDP per capita and 
population levels  
Relates cement production to its underlying causes: econom-
ic and population growth. GDP per capita and population 
projections follow the reference case in EIA (2011). Different 
specifications for the regression were tested and the one 
with the best fit was used: 
cement_prod =  + 1 GDPcap + 2 population + 3 popula-
tion2 
Linear regression with respect to 
projected total GDP  
Relates cement production to its underlying causes: econom-
ic and population growth. Total GDP summarizes the effect 
of GDP per capita and population in a single variable. It is 
projected as in the reference case in EIA (2011). Different 
specifications for the regression were tested and the one 
with the best fit was used: 
cement_prod =  + 1 GDP 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CMA (2010); EIA (2011); Reserve Bank of India (2011); World Bank (2012) 
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Figure 16: Projections of Indian cement production up to 2030 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CMA (2010); EIA (2011); Reserve Bank of India (2011); World Bank (2012) 
Figure 16 presents the results of the different cement production projections, and makes clear 
that the range of different results is even larger than in the case of indexed emissions. In the 
year 2020, cement production is projected to be anywhere between 234 and 478 million 
tonnes, up from 207 million tonnes reported for the year 2009. This uncertainty in production 
levels is implicitly included in baselines that are based on absolute emission levels, which sup-
ports the idea that indexed baselines are better suited for countries with uncertain future 
growth projections. It is likely that the highest projection displayed in Figure 16 (exponential 
projection) is not realistic, as it would imply reaching a production level of 698 kg cement per 
capita in 2030, which is much higher than current European consumption (450 kg/cap). IEA 
expects that current Indian annual consumption of cement (120 kg/cap) will raise to 450 
kg/cap until 2050, to match current European consumption (Tam 2008). 
Assuming that production levels in the year 2020 will be at the average between all the shown 
projections (378 million tonnes cement), total cement-related direct emissions in India will 
amount to 182.6  218.5 mtCO2 in the year 2020. 
Indexed baseline based on emissions per unit of clinker production 
When emissions levels are indexed with respect to clinker production, only the thermal effi-
ciency in the clinker production process and the amount of fossil fuels in the fuel mix influence 
emission levels. We generate the projections described in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Baselines based on projections of indexed emissions per unit of clinker production: assumptions 
Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal emissions on the basis of all 
the existing indexed emissions 
data 
Continuation of historical emission trends. 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal emissions on the basis of the 
indexed emissions data for the 
last 6 years 
Continuation of historical emission trends, but using only 
the most recent data with a continuous time series. This 
would avoid potential bias due to missing data and due to 
longer term changes in the emission trends. 
Linear projection from the last 
data point assuming an auton-
omous 1% annual improvement 
in emissions performance 
Following historic improvements cited by the literature. This 
improvement factor would account for energy efficiency 
improvements and changes in the fuel mix. 
Linear regression with respect to 
projected fossil fuel consump-
tion 
Relates cement emissions to its underlying cause: the use of 
fossil fuels in clinker production (influenced by energy effi-
ciency improvements and by the use of biomass or waste as 
fuels). The blending level does not play any role in this indi-
cator. Two scenarios are modelled: 
- In 2030, fuel consumption reaches best available technolo-
gy (BAT) levels, but alternative fuels are not used. Fossil fuel 
consumption hence evolves linearly from 3097 MJ/t clinker 
in 2010 to 2717 MJ/t clinker in 2030. 
- In 2030, fuel consumption reaches BAT levels, and 10% 
alternative fuels are used. Fossil fuel consumption evolves 
linearly from current levels to 2459 MJ/t clinker in 2030.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009); CSI (2012) 
In Figure 17 we see the results of the projections on emissions per tonne of clinker produced. 
Here again we have a trend towards lower emission intensities, but quite a large divergence 
between the different results. According to the results, business-as-usual direct CO2 emissions 
per tonne of clinker production will be between 0.748 and 0.822 tCO2/t clinker in the year 
2020. 
To estimate future absolute emission levels on the basis of this set of indexed baselines, we pro-
ject clinker production levels into the future by using the projections of cement production 
presented above and assuming an optimistic and a pessimistic evolution of the clinker-to-
cement ratio as presented in Table 5. In the optimistic case, CCR would reach 0.61 in 2020 and 
0.57 in 2030; in the pessimistic one, it would reach 0.70 in 2020 and 0.69 in 2030. Under these 
assumptions, clinker production would range from 143.2 to 333.6 million tonnes in 2020, with 
an average production level of 247.2 million tonnes. Assuming this average production level, 
total clinker-related direct emissions in India will amount to 184.9  203.4 mtCO2 in the year 
2020. 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
91 
Figure 17: Baselines based on projections of indexed emissions per unit of clinker production 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009); CSI (2012) 
Absolute emissions baseline based on historical emissions and trends 
So far, we have projected future emission baselines on the basis of indexed emissions, which 
are independent of the production level. In the climate regime, however, emission targets have 
usually been expressed in absolute terms. In this section we therefore illustrate how absolute 
emissions baselines could be estimated on the basis of historical data and projections. To avoid 
distortions caused by the changing coverage of the CSI database over time, the CSI data on ab-
solute emissions have been scaled so that they represent a coverage of 100%. The projected 
baselines and their assumptions are explained in Table 8. 
Figure 18 shows the results of the projections. It is interesting to see that the absolute level of 
emissions is largely determined by the assumptions about future cement production levels, and 
ratio) will evolve. 
The projections of absolute emissions lead to an estimated emissions from total cement produc-
tion in India of 131.4 to 253.6 mtCO2 in the year 2020. 
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Table 8: Baselines based on projections of absolute emissions up to 2030: assumptions 
Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal absolute emissions data  
Continuation of historical emissions trends. 
Linear extrapolation of histori-
cal absolute emissions data (only 
last 6 years) 
Continuation of historical emissions trends, but using only 
the most recent data. This would avoid potential bias due to 
missing data and longer term changes in the emission 
trends. 
Linear regression with respect to 
projected cement production 
levels, fossil fuel consumption 
and CCR  
Relates the absolute emissions to its underlying causes: the 
size of the industry, the use of fossil fuels in clinker produc-
tion, and the amount of clinker replaced by substitutes. Dif-
ferent scenarios are created: 
- High cement production, high fossil fuel use and CCR: As-
sumes the exponential projection of cement production 
from Table 6 and Figure 16, fossil fuel consumption reach-
ing BAT in 2030, CCR reaching 0.69 in 2030. 
- High cement production, low fossil fuel use and CCR: As-
sumes the exponential projection of cement production 
from Table 6 and Figure 16, fuel consumption reaching BAT 




- Low cement production, high fossil fuel use and CCR: As-
sumes the linear projection of cement production from Ta-
ble 6 and Figure 16, fossil fuel consumption reaching BAT in 
2030, CCR reaching 0.69 in 2030. 
- Low cement production, low fossil fuel use and CCR: As-
sumes the linear projection of cement production from Ta-
ble 6 and Figure 16, fuel consumption reaching BAT in 2030 
with 10% alternative fuels, CCR reaching 0.57 in 2030. 
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 Both high cement production scenarios had very similar results in terms of projected absolute emission levels. 
Hence, only one of them is shown in Figure 18. 
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Projection Rationale and assumptions 
Linear regression with respect to 
projected total GDP and fossil 
fuel consumption 
Relates cement production to its underlying causes: econom-
ic and population growth. Total GDP summarizes the effect 
of GDP per capita and population in a single variable. Two 
scenarios are modelled: 
- High fuel consumption: assumes fossil fuel consumption 
reaching BAT in 2030. GDP projection follows the reference 
case in EIA (2011). 
- Low fuel consumption: assumes fuel consumption reaching 
BAT in 2030 and 10% substitution with alternative fuels. 
GDP projection follows the reference case in EIA (2011).
35
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009); CMA (2010); EIA (2011); Reserve Bank of India (2011); CSI 
(2012); World Bank (2012) 
 
Figure 18: Baselines based on projections of absolute emissions 
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 Both scenarios had very similar results in terms of projected absolute emission levels. Hence, only one of them is 
shown in Figure 18. 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009); CMA (2010); EIA (2011); Reserve Bank of India (2011); CSI 
(2012); World Bank (2012) 
Comparison to hypothetical emissions goal 
The WBCSD and IEA have proposed a technology roadmap for the cement industry with emis-
sion reduction goals up to 2050 (WBCSD and IEA 2009). We take their 2050 goal under a low 
cement demand scenario as an appropriate hypothetical target for the Indian cement industry 
in 2030, because the Indian cement industry has already begun a transition towards higher 
efficiency and stronger use of clinker substitutes, with current thermal efficiency of 3.1 GJ/t 
clinker, and clinker-to-cement ratio of 71% (as reported by the CSI database). Such a good per-
formance can be explained partly because the CSI database does not cover the part of the in-
dustry that is less efficient; in addition, the large-scale Indian cement plants are already among 
the most efficient in the world. 
The WBCSD-IEA target implies reaching an emissions intensity of 0.426 tCO2/t cement, which is 
to be achieved through a combination of BAT in terms of thermal energy efficiency (3.2 GJ/t 
clinker), a share of alternative fuels of 37%, a clinker-to-cement ratio of 71%, and a number of 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) plants in commercial operation. Compared to the current 
performance of the Indian cement industry covered by the CSI database, such a hypothetical 
goal means a substantial change in the fuel mix used, and probably also some application of 
CCS. 
Such a goal implies a reduction in emissions intensity of about 36% with respect to the perfor-
be achieved by 2030. 
Our projections based on indexed emissions from cement production indicate that in 2030, 
BAU emissions should be in the range between 0.368 and 0.557 tCO2/t cement. The comparison 
indicates that the hypothetical target is in line with the lowest end of the BAU projections we 
have made previously. 
Figure 19 shows how this hypothetical goal compares to all our estimated baseline emissions in 
2030 in absolute emission terms. The dots represent the estimated level of emissions under the 
different assumptions for each baseline type. Besides the three types of baselines we have esti-
mated, we also show what ranges of absolute emissions would be achieved with the hypothet-
ical emissions intensity goal if different projections of future cement production are used. The 
horizontal lines show both the current Indian cement emissions (as of year 2007), and the emis-
sions under the hypothetical goal for an average cement production projection. The compari-
son between the indexed baselines and the average hypothetical goal (red line) shows that the 
hypothetical goal lies at the lower end of our indexed BAU baseline projections. As discussed 
assumes a linear trend in reduction of emissions intensity in an industry that is already quite 
efficient; the second-to-lowest assumes reaching BAT in fuel consumption by 2030, 10% of al-
ternative fuel use and an optimistic clinker-to-cement ratio of 57%. While stronger ambition 
might still be possible, the hypothetical goal already makes sure that emission reductions are 
achieved below the most credible BAU scenarios presented. The graph also illustrates that the 
uncertainty of future projections is large, especially when projections of cement production 
levels are included (as has been done in the absolute type of baseline and in the hypothetical 
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goal spread to the right). Finally, it also shows that Indian BAU total emissions from the cement 
sector are expected to grow significantly due to the expected growth in the sector, even if posi-
tive trends in energy efficiency, changes in the fuel mix and cement blending are considered. 
Figure 19: Comparison of estimated baselines with political emissions goal in the year 2030 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009); CMA (2010); EIA (2011); Reserve Bank of India (2011); CSI 
(2012); World Bank (2012) 
5.5 Assessing baselines for the NMBM: buildings sector 
5.5.1 General characteristics of the sector 
About 30 to 40% of global primary energy is used in residential, commercial and institutional 
buildings. According to the 4
th
 IPCC report (Levine et al. 2007), direct greenhouse gas emissions 
from the buildings sector amounted to about 5 Gt CO2eq in the year 2004; of this total, 3 Gt 
were CO2 emissions. If indirect emissions from electricity use are included, CO2 emissions 
reached 8.6 Gt/year, which represents almost one quarter of total global CO2 emissions. The 
2 emissions, including indirect emissions from electricity, grew by about 2% per year 
globally between 1971 and 2004. Halocarbons (CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs) represent more than 
15% of total GHG emissions from buildings, and are caused mainly from the use of refrigera-
tors, air conditioners and insulation. 
Levine et al. (2007) estimate an emissions reduction potential of about 3 GtCO2 in developing 
countries by 2030. The main drivers of emissions growth in these countries will be the high 
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demographic growth, urbanization trends and economic development. Using a bottom-up en-
gineering-economics model of energy consumption from appliances and lighting in residential 
and commercial buildings up to 2030, McNeil et al. (2008) find that, if current best energy effi-
ciency practices were adopted globally, cumulative CO2 emissions from 2010 to 2030 could be 
reduced by 21.3 Gt. Regionally, Centrally Planned Asia (China, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, 
Mongolia and Vietnam) has the highest mitigation potential, followed by the rest of Asia. In the 
residential sector, refrigeration and lighting have the greatest potential for emission reduc-
tions, while in the commercial sector most reductions can be achieved in space cooling and 
lighting. 
However, this high mitigation potential from the buildings sector has so far not been tackled 
by the CDM despite approval of several baseline methodologies in the last years. Only projects 
and programmes to replace traditional incandescent lighting by energy-saving bulbs have been 
meaningfully included. In addition, a few recent projects aim at introducing efficient cooking 
stoves in poor countries. The sectoral approach for a NMBM could allow for moving from such 
single-measure projects to whole-building ones. Minimising energy consumption in a building 
requires that the building as a whole is optimised by addressing as many as possible of its com-
ponents at the same time: building form, orientation, envelope, glazing, mechanical and elec-
trical systems, and appliances. Such system-thinking can lead to positive synergies in reducing 
energy consumption and thus emissions (Hayashi et al. 2010). 
Setting meaningful emission baselines for the buildings sector represents a critical challenge, 
due to the high complexity of the sector. First, the buildings sector can be decomposed into 
two large sub-sectors: (i) residential and (ii) commercial / institutional buildings. Energy con-
sumption patterns differ largely among them, so that baselines need to be distinguished be-
tween these types of buildings. 
But further disaggregation is also possible. Within residential buildings, one can differentiate 
between single-family and multi-family buildings. Within commercial buildings, a study about 
energy use in commercial and institutional buildings in Canada in the year 2000 distinguished 
between following types of uses (Natural Resources Canada 2003): 
- Commercial and institutional accommodation 
- Entertainment and recreation 
- Office 
- Food retails 
- Non-food retails 
- Food service 
- Non-food service 
- Shopping malls 
- Warehouse / wholesale 
- Administration 
- Education 
- Health care 
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- Public assembly. 
The study shows that buildings devoted to these different types of activities have very different 
energy intensity levels (defined as energy consumption per unit of floor space). Due to the in-
terrelations between this and other factors influencing energy consumption, it is however very 
difficult to establish any clear causal relationship (Natural Resources Canada 2003). A problem 
for setting baselines is that no universal classification by types of activities exists, which makes 
any comparison extremely difficult (Perez-Lombard et al. 2008). Comparing data from the US, 
Spain and the UK, Perez-Lombard et al. (2008) find that office and retail buildings are the most 
energy-intensive buildings among non-residential ones, followed by hotels and restaurants, 
hospitals and schools. Air conditioning is the main energy consumer, followed by lighting and 
appliances. Agreeing with the Canadian study, they also find that building type is a critical fac-
tor determining energy intensity and how energy use is distributed. A potential classification of 
building types may be based on the one used by the approved CDM methodology for whole-
building efficiency projects (AM 0091)
36
, which provides a list of building types based on infor-
mation from several building codes and building efficiency programmes worldwide (for the 
background of the methodological approach see Hayashi et al. 2010). 
Beyond the purpose of the buildings, many other factors influence their emissions levels. Natu-
ral Resources Canada (2003) finds that energy intensity also varies regionally, by year of con-
struction, building size, and type of owner. UNEP (2007) in addition emphasizes the role of cli-
mate differences and of income levels for both energy intensity and distribution across differ-
ent uses and/or energy carriers. With respect to climate, the number of heating and cooling 
degree days can be useful in estimating how much energy is needed for different uses such as 
heating, air conditioning, refrigerators and other appliances. In terms of income levels, a clear 
transition can be observed from, for example, the high use of biomass for cooking and heating 
in poor households, to the use of other fuels and finally to electricity as income rises. In addi-
tion, the preferences and culture of the users also influence energy use, as do the design and 
orientation of buildings. 
Hence, buildings emissions are generated by different fuel types and uses, which in turn de-
pend on the factors mentioned above: building types, climate zones and level of economic de-
velopment. According to UNEP (2007) in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa between 90 and 
100% of household energy consumption is used for cooking. In developed countries, on aver-
age, most residential energy is used for space heating, and then for water heating and domes-
tic appliances. The main emission sources can be classified into electricity use (indirect emis-
sions), use of fossil fuels (e.g. for heating or cooking), external supply of chilled or hot water 
(indirect emissions), refrigerant leakage, and use of unsustainable biomass (for cooking). 
While these different fuel types and uses can be regarded independently from each other to 
establish emission baselines, it is also known that they interact with each other. For example, 
savings in lighting can lead to reductions in energy use for ventilation and cooling, due to the 
reduced heat produced by the lighting equipment. It has been estimated that for every three 
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watts of lighting energy reduction about one watt of air-cooling energy can be saved (UNEP 
2007). 
5.5.2 Considerations for setting baselines 
Baselines for the buildings sector need to deal with all the elements discussed above within 
their level of aggregation: 
- Process: Depending on the data availability, baselines can be established on the basis of 
a whole building approach (e.g. with indicators such as energy consumption or emis-
sions per square meter of building area) or can be differentiated across individual uses 
(heating, cooling, lighting, cooking, other appliances, etc.). 
- Product: Baselines need to be differentiated between commercial and residential build-
ings, and within these categories between different sub-types of buildings. The size of 
the building may also have an effect on energy efficiency and emissions. 
- Time: Baselines can consider the different technological standards existing in new ver-
sus existing buildings. 
- Space: Baselines need to be set up for buildings within regions with similar climatic and 
socio-economic conditions. Differences may exist between urban and rural areas, and in 
large countries between different regions. 
Beyond the complexity of the buildings sector, the lack of sufficient and consistent information 
is also a barrier for setting baselines (Perez-Lombard et al. 2008). Developed countries nowa-
days regularly perform comprehensive surveys on the energy consumption of residential and 
commercial buildings, e.g. by Natural Resources Canada or by the Energy Information Agency 
in the US. Such studies can be a useful reference for developing countries wishing to start tack-
ling energy efficiency and emissions in this sector. 
Opportunities to tackle emissions in the buildings sector hence range from energy efficiency 
measures (for heating through insulation and multi-glazed windows, for air conditioners and 
electric appliances, and for lighting), to fuel switch (e.g. in heating systems), use of renewable 
energy (centralized or decentralized at the building level), replacement of refrigerants and be-
havioural changes. How many of these opportunities can be grasped by a baseline depends, as 
in the case of power and cement, on its scope. A whole-building approach (e.g. as used in the 
CDM Methodology AM 0091) can be used to tackle as many emission reduction measures as 
possible per building unit. Such an approach allows estimation of an indexed emissions base-
line in terms of tCO2e per m
2
 of residential building area, and accounting for synergies across 
different energy uses as described above. Its drawback is, however, the extensive data require-
ments. Data on energy consumption and refrigerant leakage need to be available per building 
unit, data on floor area and socio-economic status of occupants (income level or property price) 
can be collected for a representative sample (Castro et al. 2011). Wehner et al. (2010) use a 
simplification of the whole building approach, differentiated according to climatic zone in cal-
culating a baseline for the Mexican residential sector. 
Another approach to tackle emissions in the buildings sector could be to focus at individual 
measures, as has been done so far in the CDM. At a sectoral level, the task could be simplified if 
monitoring would be done at the supply side. For example, for energy efficient appliances, 
baselines could be set on the basis of how many refrigerators with a certain energy efficiency 
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level are sold in the country. In this way, the rate of penetration of specific technologies could 
be used as a baseline metric. Measures such as labelling and setting energy efficiency standards 
could then be introduced and their impact could be measured by looking at the change in pur-
chase patterns ex post. The actual emission reductions could be estimated by surveying a sam-
ple of users in terms of hours and patterns of use, lifetime of equipment, etc. and by taking into 
account the relevant grid emissions factor and typical energy consumption levels of the appli-
ance. 
A more complex but also comprehensive possibility is the modelling approach adopted by 
McNeil et al (2008) in their study of energy efficiency potentials in the buildings sector. On the 
basis of global macro-regions and macroeconomic data and projections (income levels, per-
centage of urbanization, percentage of electrification), this study forecasts how major applianc-
es will diffuse in the residential sector, how floor space of commercial buildings will grow and 
how different equipment will penetrate the sector per region up to 2030. The model is based 
on the notion that the level of energy services demanded by households and businesses de-
pends on economic growth. As growth projections are uncertain, this is the component of the 
model that is most uncertain, too. The growth projections are used to forecast levels of activity 
for the different components analysed on the basis of econometric techniques: diffusion of cer-
tain type of appliances in households (i.e. how many of these appliances are used per house-
hold), and floor space of commercial buildings. To estimate energy consumption, the model 
relies on estimations of the typical annual energy consumption of appliances in each region, 
which depend on what types of appliances are used (e.g. what size of refrigerator), the average 
energy efficiency of the appliances used, and on use patterns (driven by climate  heating and 
cooling degree days). Finally, the model can also estimate energy saving potentials by model-
ling scenarios of future diffusion of efficient appliances. Such an approach would allow gener-
ating baselines in terms of energy consumption per type of appliance per household. 
As in other sectors, baselines for the building sector would ideally need to take into account the 
existence of policies that already affect emission levels. This is, for example, carried out by 
Wehner et al. (2010) in their baseline for a NAMA in the Mexican residential building sector. 
Even though developing countries frequently have enacted policies to regulate energy con-
sumption in buildings (building codes, but also economic incentives such as tax rebates and 
financial support for retrofitting measures), enforcement and compliance are often insufficient. 
The lack of financial and human resources leads to weak monitoring mechanisms. Price dis-
torting subsidies for energy prevent changes in energy consumption patterns. Information bar-
riers and lack of capital prevent investments in energy efficiency. Richerzhagen et al. (2008), 
for example, provide a detailed account of the challenges in China to enforce the energy effi-
ciency policies supported at high political levels. Hence, not only the existence but also the real 
application of such policies needs to be taken into account in baselines. 
5.6 Qualitative discussion of illustrative baselines 
In order to evaluate the suitability of the proposed options for setting the baseline and poten-
tial sectoral targets outlined in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the different approaches should be evaluat-
ed against the different design elements and corresponding evaluation criteria described in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
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With regard to the baseline scope, all power plants in the electricity system (or in a specific 
grid like the NEWNE grids or Southern Grid) or all cement plants in a country should ideally be 
included in the sector. However, in practice, databases usually cover only a part of all installa-
tions in the system. In the power plants database used for this analysis, captive power plants 
that cover 10% of electricity production are not included, nor are certain renewables and small 
units (section 5.3.2). In the cement case study, only 50% of the sector is covered by the CSI da-
tabase, and notably small and inefficient plants are not included. In addition, the coverage of 
the database has changed over time (section 5.4.2). For the purpose of baseline setting and sub-
sequent monitoring, it should be ensured that the coverage is consistent throughout the time 
series. For instance, if the coverage of power plant operators varies over time or if the cut-off 
criteria for inclusion of power plants is modified (e.g. 5 MW in one year and 20 MW in another 
year), artefacts of emission reductions or increases may occur which do not reflect the real de-
velopment. This effect may jeopardise the environmental integrity of the system. 
In this report, we have started from the idea that the NMBM will be based on specific economic 
d) economic 
sectors, e.g. electricity and heavy industry. In this case, individual baselines should be estab-
lished for each of the economic sectors included (electricity, cement, steel, etc.) while they can 
then be aggregated to one overall baseline. Basing the emissions threshold (or target) on this 
overall baseline is advisable because it allows for flexibility (and cost reduction) in terms of how 
to reach the emissions goal. But by first establishing individual baselines for each of the sectors 
more transparency about real trends in emissions and hence about the environmental implica-
tions of the baseline (and the threshold or target) can be achieved. 
The product to be evaluated can be homogeneous or not within a sector. In the power sector, 
due to the homogeneity of electricity, there is no issue of definition. However, in some cases, 
power plants may co-produce heat (combined heat and power (CHP) plants) which may be used 
to reduce fuel consumption in other sectors (reducing fuel consumption of boilers). In this case, 
the product heat should be considered, too, and the scope of the analysis may need to cover 
final consumption sectors, too. However, this is methodologically challenging which is demon-
strated by several studies on the evaluation of CHP. In the case of cement, baselines can be 
based on clinker or on cement production, and could be further disaggregated if different 
types of cement have different properties affecting its final use. 
For the buildings case, we have seen that baseline scope will need to be more narrowly defined 
than at the whole sector level. Sub-sectoral approaches will be more able to reflect the differ-
ences in energy service consumption between urban and rural areas, residential and commer-
cial buildings, and regions with different climates. In addition, separate baselines can be estab-
lished for different appliances or other equipment or uses, or a whole building approach can 
be used. 
With regard to further differentiation, the dataset should include information on vintages, ca-
pacities, fuel types, other raw materials, technology and energy efficiencies at the most dis-
aggregated level possible. This allows a more sophisticated evaluation of power and industrial 
sectors over time. Aggregated data (e.g. as mentioned above, specific CO2 emissions are not 
available for individual power plants, but only for the power plant as a whole) may reduce sig-
nificantly the validity of the calculated baseline. 
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With regard to the reference data used, several lessons can be learned. Firstly, the analysis 
shows that different approaches of using reference data for establishing the baseline show simi-
lar results, within ranges of uncertainty, if projections of activity levels are left constant. How-
ever, sectoral targets are very much dependent on the type of data and assumptions used for 
the calculation. In addition, if potential variation in projected activity levels is incorporated 
into the baseline (as we did in the case of absolute emissions from the cement sector, see Figure 
18), very high uncertainty is the result. Thus, if a high emissions projection is chosen, the cred-
very good statistical fit, may not be realistic, as in the case of projected Indian cement produc-
tion levels up to 2030. One way to deal with such uncertainty is to be transparent about the 
assumptions of the projections and the methods used, and to show different projections, as we 
have done above, so that a conservative estimate of future emissions can be chosen among the 
several projections. It is also important to be clear about the implications of the projections, 
e.g. in terms of projected per capita demand or needs of blending materials, or expected gains 
in energy efficiency (are they realistic?). An approach to take this into account is to incorporate 
caps in the projections, as is the case for the power case study. In order to reduce uncertainty of 
projections, frequent updates of the activity levels underpinning the baseline could also be con-
sidered. 
Secondly, the projections that we have estimated are based merely on historic data on produc-
tion levels, emission levels, and some drivers of emissions (in the case of cement, fuel mix, fuel 
consumption and clinker to cement ratio), and on some future projections of other drivers (GDP 
and population). No consideration of the effect of past policies or of technological costs and 
financial viability of the projected emissions paths has been included in the estimations. This 
means that the idea of financial (or policy) additionality, very important in the CDM context, 
has been left out of our consideration of baselines for the NMBM. 
Thirdly, our projections are based on a limited dataset (the Central Electricity Authority in-
cludes 5 years, the CSI database 8 years). This, of course, leads to substantial uncertainty in pro-
jections for much longer timescales. It also makes it statistically difficult to include many emis-
sion drivers as predictors for future emissions. Having longer historic time series would hence 
be very helpful for improving the reliability of future projections, and in recognising potential 
changes in observed trends and their causes. Nevertheless, if sufficient reliable data is not 
available, it can also be gathered in a pre-implementation phase. In this regard the situation of 
many developing countries is not that much different to the situation of many developed coun-
tries before they started to implement market-based GHG mitigation policies. Availability of 
reliable data may be a difficulty in the domestic implementation of the NMBM but should not 
prevent any such implementation. If required, implementing countries would need to establish 
a data gathering and compilation phase before the proposal for the implementation of the 
NMBM can be submitted. 
Fourthly, the inclusion of the appropriate emission drivers in the projections is important, also 
in relation to the scope of the baseline. As we have seen for the case of cement, for a baseline 
that is indexed on clinker production, mainly the energy consumption and fuel type determine 
emission levels in our case study. For a baseline indexed on cement production, the blending 
percentage comes in addition (and also indirect, electricity-related emissions, but this data was 
not available). In other countries with a more diverse industry, other factors may need to be 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
102 
taken into account such as type of technology. For cement, emission levels are very different 
between the dry and the wet process, and between different kiln designs and sizes. In India, 
however, at least among the plants covered by the CSI, only the dry process is used. The many 
small plants that very likely have higher emission levels are outside of the scope of the base-
lines that we have estimated, as they are not covered by the CSI data. In a real-world situation 
they would need to be included. In all cases, a balance needs to be found between inclusion of 
potential emission drivers in the modelled scenarios and transparency of the assumptions and 
projections. The more drivers are included, the more data needs to be projected into the future 
and the more assumptions need to be made for calculating these projections. This may leave 
room for manipulating assumptions to reach more favourable baselines. Again, being trans-
parent about assumptions and displaying several projections with different assumptions is nec-
essary to demonstrate the reliability of a baseline. One option would be to agree ex-ante on 
certain standard parameters to be used in projections, e.g. future demographic and economic 
growth or the type of sensitivity analysis that should be conducted. 
In terms of dynamics and updating, the baselines we have illustrated have relied exclusively 
on historic data or projections based on historic data. As discussed above in the literature re-
view, the reliability of the baseline can be improved substantially if it is related to parameters 
that are monitored in real time, or if it is updated periodically on the basis of such monitored 
parameters. For example, an indexed baseline could be set on the basis of historic trends in 
energy efficiency improvements, but on a yearly measured fuel mix and blending percentage. 
The difficulty in this case would be to disentangle the effect of changes that are taking place 
because of BAU developments, and changes that are a result of policies oriented to reducing 
GHGs. In the case of the Indian power sector, the analysis showed that estimated specific CO2 
emissions of some power plant types are expected to increase. Technologically this is unlikely 
to be persistent; it could be linked to start-up problems of new plants, as well as incentives to 
over-report fuel use. In the longer term, the autonomous improvement of power plants should 
prevail, which leads to decreasing specific CO2 emissions over time. Therefore updating of data 
for baseline setting may be required. Alternatively, this could be addressed by setting a strin-
gent sectoral target, which outweighs the uncertainty related to baseline setting. 
Concerning metrics, the environmental effectiveness of baseline options and sectoral targets 
depends on the methodology and assumptions. Absolute baselines may be increasing (as in this 
analysis) or decreasing. Similarly, (politically negotiated) absolute sectoral targets may be more 
or less ambitious. The advantage of using absolute values is that all kinds of measures can be 
considered at the same time: efficiency improvements, fuel switch and demand reduction. In-
dexed baselines or sectoral targets do not necessary lead to decreasing overall emissions, espe-
cially if specific emissions are expected to increase. In the case of applying benchmark values 
for individual power plants, overall emissions also may increase due to the overall increasing 
trend of electricity generation or cement production. Overall emission reductions are then only 
achievable if there is a dedicated sectoral target leading for a far-reaching decarbonisation of 
the sector, either by (politically) specifying decreasing specific CO2 emissions or an increase of 
emission-free fuels in the overall fuel mix. In addition, a target in terms of energy consumption 
per unit of GDP can act in combination with the sectoral indexed baseline (and target or 
threshold) to address the demand side. 
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5.7 Conclusions and recommendations for baselines of a sectoral NMBM 
The case studies of sectoral baselines in the power, cement and buildings sectors provide sever-
al lessons that need to be considered when discussing baseline setting and the modalities and 
procedures for a NMBM. 
In its conception, a sectoral-level NMBM is more similar to international emissions trading than 
to the CDM, and the development of baseline-setting methodologies for the NMBM needs to 
take this into account. Sectoral baselines need to include all emissions of existing and projected 
new installations of the covered sector(s); ideally, they need to take into account the drivers of 
emissions in order to generate realistic projections about how the sector will develop into the 
future. Developments at the sector level include not only adding new, state-of-the-art installa-
tions, but also retrofitting or decommissioning old ones. This kind of logic is very different to 
the CDM-like approach of determining what investors of individual new installations would 
most likely do in the absence of the CDM. It is more similar to emissions trading  where base-
line setting has been difficult, politically contested and too lenient in most cases, or to the pro-
jections of future emissions included in national communications. This sectoral logic for base-
line determination has important implications in terms of the data requirements and assump-
tions for projecting future trends. 
In terms of data quality, the coverage of the data needs to be as comprehensive as possible, so 
that possibly a whole sector can be considered in the baseline. The coverage needs to remain 
consistent over time to avoid potential biases in the future emission projections. In sectors as 
complex as the buildings sector, where data collection at the building level is very costly, a 
NMBM could be started at the sub-sectoral level, e.g. by focusing on specific types of appliances 
and by monitoring their consumption at the supply side (e.g. retailers). Ideally, GHG emissions 
data is needed, but if it is not available, activity data or penetration rates of a technology and 
an emissions factor can also be used. Data should also be available on vintages, capacities, fuel 
types, other raw materials and energy efficiencies at the most disaggregated level as possible, 
to allow for a more sophisticated evaluation of the drivers of emissions over time. Aggregated 
data may be used for setting sectoral baselines, but may reduce its validity if the sector is het-
erogeneous. The longer the time series of available historical data, the more accurate the pro-
jections will be, and the more emission drivers may be considered for setting the baseline. 
However, if appropriate data is initially not available, it may be gathered in a pre-
implementation phase. Moreover, a tiered approach may be considered where uncertainty dis-
counts are relaxed as soon as more reliable data becomes available. 
In heterogeneous sectors with many products or technology types (and vintages), or in broad 
segments that include several economic sectors, it is advisable to establish a baseline for each 
of the products or sectors, and then aggregate it into an overall baseline. This ensures that the 
baselines are reliable and conservative by promoting transparency into the data and assump-
tions, but it also provides flexibility in how to reach the envisaged emission reductions. 
Another important lesson for ensuring the environmental integrity of sectoral baselines and 
targets is the transparency of assumptions. As shown above, many different approaches may 
be used to project expected emission levels into the future, from simple linear projections of 
historical emissions levels, to regressions on the basis of drivers of emissions, to more complex 
models of a whole economy. While, ideally, information on all potential drivers of emissions 
can thus be used for setting the baseline, this should be weighed against the cost of collecting 
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all these data and the simplicity and transparency of the baseline. Different types of projections 
may yield similar results (within levels of uncertainty), especially if projected activity levels are 
left constant. However, if absolute baselines are used, potential variation in projected activity 
levels is incorporated into the baseline, so that very high uncertainty may result. Thus, trans-
parency about the assumptions of the projections and the methods used is necessary, and if 
possible, different projections (e.g. by relying on different projection methodologies as done 
above, or by slightly varying some of the critical assumptions) should be shown so that the sen-
sitivity of the baseline to these assumptions can be assessed. Then, a conservative estimate of 
future emission levels can be chosen among the several projections. 
A decision needs to be taken at UNFCCC level about whether it is advisable to let developers of 
baselines choose what types of projections and assumptions they use (provided these are com-
municated clearly and can be replicated) or whether it is necessary to develop ex-ante guide-
lines and agreements about the methods (e.g. extrapolations, regressions, modelling, sensitivity 
analysis), the metrics (absolute, indexed baselines, or baselines based on technology penetra-
tion rates) and specific parameters (e.g. IPCC default emission factors, a centralised source of 
future demographic and economic growth) to be used for the projections. 
Important is also to make sure that the projections are realistic in terms of what is achievable 
with the existing technology, but that they keep the incentive towards reducing emissions. 
With a given technology, a declining trend in relative emission levels may not be possible to 
continue ad infinitum because the efficiency limit of the technology will be reached at some 
point. This may need to be taken into account in the projections, e.g. by incorporating caps. At 
the same time, however, an incentive to invest in research and development of zero-emission 
technologies needs to be maintained because for a transition to a carbon free economy all 
emission rates will eventually need to reach zero. In addition, if the existing (historical) data 
shows unrealistic patterns (e.g. as seen above, increasing specific CO2 emissions of power plants 
over time), this may point towards unreliable data, or towards missing emission drivers that 
still need to be taken into account. In principle, having an indexed baseline (a projection of 
specific emissions per unit of output) that increases over time should not be allowed as it goes 
against the goal of reducing emissions and against the expectations that technologies improve 
over time. To keep long-term incentives for technological change and to provide investment 
certainty, baselines should be valid as long as possible, but this increases uncertainty regarding 
the realism of the baseline. A realistic baseline would require frequent updates (e.g. every 5 
years); updates should only be allowed when they lead to strengthening the baseline, not to 
relaxing it. 
Overall, determining baselines for a sectoral NMBM implies a different way of thinking that 
departs from the CDM; it requires better and broader data and agreement on guidance about 
critical assumptions and minimum transparency requirements. This will be challenging; how-
ever, the experience already gathered  from existing emissions trading schemes, from projec-
tions of future emissions in national communications, and from industry efforts to collect sec-
toral data  will make the determination of sectoral baselines possible. 
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6 Institutional design 
Work package 5, by Martin Cames (Öko-Institut), 20 September 2011 
The presentation below was held by Martin Cames at the OECD climate change expert group 
(CCXG) meeting in September 2011 in Paris, France. This presentation embodies, together with 
further deliberations on the institutional design of the NMM, which were directly included into 
the draft of the EU submission as of 5 March 2012 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/awg 
lca15/eng/misc06.pdf, pp. 7-16), the result of work package 5. 
A key issue in the design of the NMM is whether it would be coordinated internationally ex 
ante or whether parties would establish their own schemes and try then ex post to link these 
schemes in order to enhance the coverage of the carbon market and thus increase efficiency. 
Basically both approaches would be feasible. However, the first approach may postpone an 
agreement since negotiations may need longer discussions before an agreement among all 
parties could be agreed. The latter approach may seem to be quicker since parties could build 
up their own market-based scheme right away. Nevertheless, linking with other market-based 
schemes may take even longer or may not be possible at all since their designs may be too di-
verse. 
Two further disadvantages of the uncoordinated approach are: 
 If there is no common international standard on the environmental stringency and the 
level of ambition, each party which intends to link its market-based scheme with anoth-
-
there are only a few parties who want to link there scheme, this may be straight for-
have to be scrutinised by 9 other countries while the 10
th
 country would have to scruti-
nise 9 other market-based schemes  unless countries who have linked there scheme do 
not actually start to coordinate internationally. 
 If two countries are already linked and are approached by a third country and it would 
turn out that one country would assess the third countries scheme as too week and not 
linkable with its own scheme than this country would need to insist that the other coun-
try does not link with the third country either. Otherwise the rejection of the first coun-
try would by undermined by the acceptance of the second already linked party. Extend-
ing the coverage or linked countries would thus always require the agreement of al-
ready linked countries. Extending the coverage would need to follow accession rules as 
they are applied in the WTO or in the EU. Experience shows that this is a time consum-
ing process. 
In addition to these disadvantages of it has to be taken into account that schemes which com-
ply with significant different standards in terms of environmental integrity need to be kept 
separate and cannot be linked. Otherwise the scheme with the lowest standard would trigger a 
race to the bottom and thus finally establish the standard for the entire scheme. Keeping mar-
ket-based scheme separate would, however, result in lower economic efficiency and would thus 
certainly not be an optimal solution. 
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7 Draft modalities and procedures for a new market-based mechanism 
under the UNFCCC 
Work package 6, by Martin Cames (Öko-Institut), Pedro Martins Barata, 29 May 2012 
Note: This paper was not published but only submitted to DG CLIMA, which focused in a simi-
lar research and consultancy project on legal aspects of the design of a new market-based 
mechanism. These legal aspects, below highlighted in blue, were not elaborated further in this 
paper. Together both documents were used as a basis for a submission of the European Union 
on draft modalities and procedures for the new market-based mechanism (http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/2012/awglca15/eng/misc06a06.pdf pp. 3-15). 
7.1 Background, Purpose and Sources 
7.1.1 Background of the Project 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a strawman proposal that can act as a starting point for 
discussions at EU level on actual textual proposals to put forward in the run-up to COP18 in 
November in Doha, Qatar. 
7.1.2 Sources for the current strawman on Modalities and Procedures 
Modalities and Procedures as attached in the following sections have had as sources: 
- the submission of the European Union and its Member States of March 2012 on the mo-
dalities and procedures for a new market mechanism under the Convention; 
- Decision 3/CMP.1 (Modalities and procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism) 
- Decision 1/CP.16 (the Cancun Agreements) 
- Decision 2/CP.17 (Outcome of the Ad Hoc Group on Long Term Cooperative Action) 
- Schneider and Cames 2009: A framework for a sectoral crediting mechanism in a post-
a SCM 
7.2 “Strawman” for a Convention Market Mechanism Decision 
 
Decision XXX/CP.18 
Modalities and Procedures for a Convention Market Mechanism 
The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 
Recalling the ultimate objective and principles of the Convention 
Recalling previous decisions from Cancun and Durban (Cancun Agreements and Durban Plat-
form) 
Recalling the outcome of Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Action under the Convention 
on the definition of new market mechanisms; 
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Recognizing the experience of many parties with the implementation of Kyoto Mechanisms, 
namely the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and International Emission 
Trading; 
Emphasizing the need for mitigation actions to take place under a rules-based system, with 
broad participation of all parties in mitigation efforts, and appropriate contribution to mitiga-
tion reflecting the capabilities of Parties, 
Adopts the modalities and procedures for the Convention Market Mechanism (CMM) contained 
in the Annex below: 
7.3 ANNEX 
Part I: Definitions 
A. Definitions 
1. For the purposes of the present annex the following definitions shall apply: 
a. a o-
dalities contained in this Annex, and is equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent, pursuant to decision x/CP.17. 
b. 
categories or sub-categories pursuant to decision 18/CP.8 and decision 13/CP.9. 
c. 
Convention Market Mechanism. This decision defines two implementation tracks: 
crediting and trading. 
d. -post issuance of CMU in respect of emission reduc-
tions achieved in relation to an ex-ante determined crediting threshold for a cov-
ered sector, category or sub-category during a baseline period; 
e. -ante issuance of CMU in respect of emissions al-
lowed for a covered sector, category or sub-category during a baseline period; 
f. on of activities under a proposed scope for 
the Convention Market Mechanism and shall include all relevant information on 
emission drivers relevant for the proposed scope; 
g. ub-
category or a broad segment of the economy; 
h. 
proposed implementation track. It shall take the form of a crediting threshold in a 
crediting implementation track and a trading cap in a trading implementation 
track; 
i. for which CMU can be issued under a particular 
implementation of the CMM and during which neither the baseline nor threshold 
are being revised or updated; 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
116 
j. is any factor that is foreseen to have a relevant impact on the 
evolution of emissions in a particular sector, category or sub-category of the econo-
my; 
Part II Institutions 
B. The Implementation Committee (IC) 
2. The Implementation Committee shall act as supervisor of the implementation of the 
Convention Market Mechanism. In particular, the Implementation Committee shall: 
a. 
proposal raised by the Independent Review Team have been clarified; 
b. notify to Parties that any outstanding question 
raised by the Independent Review Team have been clarified ; 
c. develop generic guidance on determining baselines and thresholds; 
d. develop guidance on means of implementation. 
3. The Implementation Committee shall be composed of technical experts with the re-
quired competence in analysis of environmental policy, economic modeling and green-
house gas emission mitigation technologies. Members shall be selected by regional con-
stituencies in accordance with the Terms of Reference for members of the Implementa-
tion Committee inscribed in Appendix IV. 
4. The Implementation Committee shall be composed of two members nominated by Par-
ties included in Annex I, three members nominated by Parties not included in Annex I, 
one member nominated by each of the regional groups, and one member representing 
the Alliance of Small Island States. Constituencies shall ensure that the nomination pro-
cedure is competitive, open and transparent. Calls for candidates shall be open six 
months before the start of the term. 
5. Members shall serve a maximum of two terms of three years each. 
6. Members of the Implementation Committee serve in their independent and personal 
capacity. Members shall be covered by privileges and immunities in accordance with the 
United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 1946. Provisions in the legal 
outcome of the Ad Hoc Group on the Durban Platform shall ensure that these privileges 
and immunities are awarded to members of the Implementation Committee. 
7. Members shall ensure that no conflict of interest arises with respect to participation in 
the Implementation Committee. Where such a conflict of interest is deemed to poten-
tially exist, by virtue of nationality, prior or existing financial relations, with any propo-
nent or Party involved with a proposal before the Implementation Committee, the 
member shall recuse himself/herself from the discussion of such proposal and abstain 
from related decisions. 
C. The Independent Review Teams (IRT) 
- description of the role of the IRT (similar to the ERT for review of inventories) 
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- terms of reference (perhaps the mandate of the existing ERT can be enhanced, ex-
panded to review proposals for implementation of NMM and sectoral inventories; i.e. 
no new/additional body) 
- composition and selection process 
The IRT needs to be composed of a team of experts with relevant sector and/or regional exper-
tise to carry out the review of the national implementation of the NMM. The experts should be 
selected by the IC or UNFCCC secretariat from an international roster of experts. 
- privileges and immunities 
- conflict of interest and code of conduct provisions 
D. The National Implementation Authority (NIA) 
- designated by UNFCCC Focal Point to the UNFCCC 
Part III Modalities 
E. Role of the existing institutions 
8. The Conference of the Parties shall provide generic guidance to the Convention Market 
Mechanism and respond to any requests for specific guidance forwarded to it by the 
Implementation Committee. 
9. Parties implementing the CMM domestically may authorize legal entities to participate 
in actions leading to transfer or acquisition of CMUs. Participation is subject to whatever 
guidance may be provided by the Implementing Committee of the Convention Market 
Mechanisms. A Party that authorizes legal entities to transfer or acquire CMUs shall re-
main responsible for any obligation inscribed in its implementation proposal and shall 
ensure that such participation is consistent with the present annex. Legal entities may 
only transfer and acquire CMUs if the authorizing Party is eligible to do so at that time. 
10. The Compliance Committee 
- Compliance control 
- Enforcement/infringements 
F. Scope of implementation proposal 
11. The coverage of sources, activities and gases, and the proposed length of baseline period 
define the scope of any particular implementation of the Convention Market Mecha-
nism. 
12. (Structure of proposals) Proposals for implementation of the Convention Market Mecha-
nism shall include the following elements: 
a. the proposed implementation boundary, including a clear definition of the broad 
segment of the economy and the regional coverage in accordance with articles 15 
to 21 below; 
b. the chosen implementation track (crediting or trading) for each sector, category or 
sub-category covered under the proposal; 
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c. the proponent, if it is an entity other than the NIA; 
d. the list of gases to be covered; 
e. a proposed length of the baseline period; 
f. a set of baseline scenarios for each sector, category or sub-category covered under 
the proposal; 
g. a baseline for each sector, category or sub-category and one aggregated baseline for 
the broad segment of the economy; 
h. a proposed threshold for each sector, category or sub-category and one aggregated 
threshold for the broad segment of the economy; 
i. a monitoring plan including a detailed plan for the monitoring, reporting and re-
view of emission and activity data throughout the baseline period in accordance 
with article 30 below; 
j. an implementation plan including detailing policies and measures to achieve the 
threshold pursued under the proposal; 
k. an estimate of the average annual emission reduction during the baseline period. 
13. (Principles for coverage) Any specific implementation proposal must take into account 
the following generic principles of coverage for the Convention Market Mechanism: 
a. (Objectiveness): the geographical extension of the proposed coverage must be clear-
ly and unambiguously defined; as a default, the appropriate geographical extension 
shall be the national territory of the Party proposing to implement the Convention 
Market Mechanism. Derogations from this default may be considered by the Imple-
mentation Committee, if adequately substantiated. The Implementation Committee 
shall elaborate further on the allowed scope for derogation. 
b. (Comprehensiveness (activities)): all covered activities/entities must be clearly de-
fined and identified. 
c. (Distortion across production in multi-product facilities): all installations that pro-
duce more than one product must have all their production covered under the im-
plementation proposal. 
d. (Comprehensiveness (gases)): all greenhouse gases and sources within the sector, 
category or sub-category must be accounted for. 
e. (Avoidance of leakage): leakage is minimized. 
f. (Data completeness and quality): only relevant data of high quality must be used in 
defining both baseline and implementation scenarios 
14. (Sectoral and sub-sectoral scope) As a general rule, the scope of each implementation is 
aimed at universal coverage within a sector, category or sub-category, defined either 
through reference to sectoral scopes under the IPCC reporting guidelines or to interna-
tional or national economic and statistical references. 
15. (Double counting provisions) Double counting of emission reductions within implemen-
tation proposals of the Convention Market Mechanism shall be avoided. To that end, it 
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shall be ensured in the proposal that there is no overlap across allocation of emission al-
lowances and emission reductions. In particular, emission reductions from a crediting 
implementation track that may directly or indirectly affect emissions in sectors, catego-
ries or sub-categories covered by a trading implementation track must be unequivocally 
attributed. In case of potential double attribution, the National Implementation Author-
ity shall rule on the attribution of coverage, so as to avoid double counting of emission 
reductions. 
16. (Double counting with CDM) Double counting of emission reductions issued as certified 
emission reductions to project activities registered under the Clean Development Mech-
anism shall be avoided. In line with paragraph 18, it is the responsibility of the National 
Implementation Authority to ensure that provisions are in place to avoid double count-
ing of emission reductions certified under the Clean Development Mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
17. The baseline period shall not be shorter than three years. Every five years after the start 
of the baseline period, an Independent Review Team will conduct a review of the ap-
plicability of the threshold. If required in light of the review, the level of ambition in the 
threshold shall be increased; under no circumstances shall the level of ambition in the 
thresholds be decreased. 
18. Baseline periods shall take into account the periods set out for any pledges by the rele-
vant Parties under the Cancun Accords, and any commitments to be established under 
the legal outcome of the Ad Hoc Group on the Durban Platform. 
G. Baseline scenarios and baselines 
19. (Principles of baseline setting) The following principles for baseline scenarios shall be 
observed in any implementation proposal of the Convention Market Mechanism: 
a. Baseline scenarios shall take into account all relevant sources of greenhouse gas 
emissions within the proposed implementation boundary; 
b. Baseline scenarios shall deliver a conservative assessment of expected greenhouse 
gas trends over the baseline period, as well as conservative assessments of trends in 
emission drivers; 
c. Baseline scenarios shall take into account the technical lifetime of existing activities 
or installations, emission performance rates of best available technologies for new 
activities or installations and projected developments of demand for products or 
services; 
d. Baseline scenarios shall take into account existing and planned policies and 
measures; 
e. Baseline scenarios may be established in a differentiated way, if justified by the dif-
ferent nature of facilities or activities within the proposed scope of the implementa-
tion proposal. Acceptable criteria for differentiation include: vintage of installations 
or equipment, product or service differentiation within the proposed scope and dif-
ferentiation of emission drivers across different activities within the proposed scope. 
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f. A methodology for developing a baseline scenario in a given activity type or source 
category shall be replicated, mutatis mutandis, for all further implementation pro-
posals for similar activities. 
g. Where activities or facilities under the proposed scope are covered by CDM project 
activities, the baseline scenario for the proposed implementation of the Convention 
Market Mechanism shall consider the development of these project activities. 
20. The following principles shall guide the development of baselines under an implemen-
tation proposal: 
a. (accuracy) The implementation proposal shall describe GHG emissions developments 
during the proposed baseline period as accurately as possible, by taking into ac-
count the development of all relevant emissions drivers; 
b. (completeness) The implementation proposal shall include all relevant sources of 
GHG emissions; 
c. (reliability) The implementation proposal shall be based on actual data of entities or 
installations covered by the scope of the proposal; where such data is not available 
or relevant, the proposal must ensure that the supporting data for the baseline is re-
liable; 
d. (robustness) Baselines should be minimally sensitive to variation of the values of the 
most influencing parameters; sensitivity analysis shall be conducted on the more 
relevant emission drivers; 
e. (materiality) Analysis of future emission trends may disregard variations in parame-
ter values that contribute only negligible changes in the projection; 
f. (conservativeness) In case of uncertainty over accuracy of parameters, those which 
result in lower baseline emission projections shall be selected; 
g. (context) Baseline determination should include historical data prior to the baseline 
period. 
21. (Differentiation within scope) Baselines may be established in a differentiated way with-
in a given scope, if justified by the different nature of facilities or activities within the 
proposed scope of the implementation proposal. Acceptable criteria for differentiation 
include product or service differentiation within the proposed scope and differentiation 
of emission drivers across different activities within the proposed scope. In particular, 
where more than one activity or product is considered under the scope, different base-
lines may be developed for different activities. However, coherence across all baselines 
within the proposed implementation must be ensured. 
22. (Types of baselines) For each sector, category or sub-category, proponents may choose 
from the following baseline approaches: 
a. For the both implementation tracks, absolute emissions, in which baselines are es-
tablished as absolute amounts of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions for the pro-
posed scope. 
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b. For the crediting implementation track, indexed emissions, in which baselines are 
established as a function of one or more indexes. 
c. For crediting implementation track, technology penetration rates, in which base-
lines emissions are established by function of the expected development of penetra-
tion of particular technologies covered in the scope. 
H. Thresholds 
23. Thresholds shall represent significant deviations from baseline emissions, specified as an 
agreed emission reduction compared to the baseline. 
24. (Approaches to thresholds) The specification of the deviation level from baseline emis-
sions expressed by the thresholds may be based on the following approaches, or a com-
bination thereof: 
a. A default thresholds should be [20]% below baseline emissions. 
b. Mitigation potential and/or costs achievable in the absence of the Convention Mar-
ket Mechanism; 
c. Emission rates based on a reference technology: for sectors that encompass several 
competing technologies, the emission performance of a reference technology may 
be used; 
d. Emission benchmark based on historical data: Thresholds may be set by reference to 
a particular emission benchmark derived from historical data in the activities con-
sidered in the scope of the implementation proposal; 
e. Technology penetration scenario: thresholds may be set based on a defined tech-
nology penetration scenario that goes beyond the baseline scenario. 
f. Policy objectives scenario: thresholds may be set by reference to stated objectives in 
the sector or country. 
I. Monitoring and reporting 
25. (Monitoring principles) Monitoring and reporting of emissions in the trading implemen-
tation track and of emission reductions in the crediting implementation track shall ad-
here to international standards. Proposals for implementation of the Convention Market 
Mechanism shall be guided by the following principles: 
a. (Monitoring responsibility) Compliance with international standards for monitoring 
and reporting of emissions or emission reductions shall be assigned unequivocally 
to the National Implementation Authority, which shall ensure that national ar-
rangements conform to such standards; 
b. (Reporting responsibility and delegation) Likewise, responsibility for reporting, col-
lecting, verifying and storing data in relation to any implementation proposal of the 
Convention Market Mechanism lies solely with the National Implementation Au-
thority, unless notified otherwise to the Implementation Committee by the National 
Implementation Authority, in accordance with provisions under articles [y] to [x] 
(section G) above; 
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c. Proposed monitoring methodologies and monitoring reports shall be transparent, 
replicable and made publically available; 
d. Data sources used in the baseline scenarios, the baselines or implementation calcu-
lations shall be public. Data used to substantiate either baseline or implementation 
calculations cannot be deemed confidential; however, aggregated data may be pre-
sented at the lowest level of aggregation deemed necessary to safeguard commer-
cial confidentiality; where data sources are not available for key parameters used in 
baseline or implementation calculations, the most conservative default parameters 
shall be used; 
e. All relevant data pertaining to baseline and implementation calculations shall be 
made available to review by the Independent Review Teams. 
J. Participation requirements 
26. A Party not included in Annex I to the Convention may participate in the Convention 
Market Mechanism through the implementation of emission reduction policies and/or 
measures and issue, acquire or transfer CMU if: 
a. It has ratified the legal outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Plat-
form; 
b. Its implementation proposal for the implementation of the Convention Market 
Mechanism for a broad segment of the economy, in accordance with the provisions 
contained in this Annex, has been reviewed by an independent review team and 
found compliant with criteria set out in Appendix I to this Annex; 
c. It has in place a system for monitoring and reporting of emissions in the broad 
segment of the economy, in accordance with provisions contained in this Annex; 
d. It has in place either arrangements for the use of an international registry adminis-
tered by the UNFCCC secretariat or a national registry which has been reviewed by 
the International Registry Administrator and found to be compliant with the criteria 
set out in Appendix III; 
e. It has designated a National Implementation Authority (NIA) responsible for the 
domestic implementation of the Convention Market Mechanism and for the com-
pliance with its modalities and procedures and other relevant guidelines and inter-
national rules; 
f. It has submitted the latest mandated national inventory of greenhouse gases emis-
sions, in accordance with guidelines on national greenhouse gas inventories, and 
provisions on international consultation and analysis contained in Decision 1/CP.17. 
K. Use requirements 
27. CMU issued under the Convention Market Mechanism may be transferred to the nation-
al registries of Parties included in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol for use towards com-
pliance with their inscribed quantified emission limitation and reduction obligations. 
28. A Party to the Convention may use CMU towards compliance with any commitments 
under the legal outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform, if: 
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a. It has ratified the legal outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Plat-
form, or otherwise signified its willingness to be bound by its disciplines; 
b. It has completed the international assessment and review process of the latest re-
quired biennial report in accordance with the biennial reporting guidelines for de-
veloped country Parties in accordance with Decision 2/CP.17 (articles 23 to 31) or it 
has completed the international consultation and analysis process of the latest re-
quired biennial report in accordance with the biennial reporting guidelines for de-
veloping country Parties in accordance with Decision 2/CP.17 (articles 39 to 44). 
Part IV Procedures 
L. Submission of proposals 
29. A Party wishing to pursue an implementation proposal of the Convention Market Mech-
anism shall provide a proposal document which shall include all elements listed in arti-
cle 14 above. 
30. Submission of implementation proposals shall use a common template. This common 
template shall be developed by the Implementation Committee and approved by the 
Conference of the Parties. A draft common template is included in Appendix V to this 
Decision. This draft common template shall be used for the submission of implementing 
proposals prior to the approval of the common template. 
M. Review of Implementation Proposals 
31. Upon receiving an implementation proposal from a National Implementation Authority, 
the Executive Secretary shall convene an Independent Review Team for its review. 
32. Within [90] days, the Independent Review Team shall, through a review report, review 
the proposal for implementation and shall raise any questions of implementation to the 
Implementation Committee. If the Independent Review Team raises no implementation 
questions, the proposal is deemed suitable, and the administrator of the International 
Transaction Log and the Implementation Committee are notified by the Executive Secre-
tary. 
33. If the Independent Review team raises questions of implementation, these shall be for-
warded to the Implementation Committee. Upon receiving these, the Implementation 
Committee shall forward these questions, along with any other questions it may deem 
necessary, to the National Implementation Autority(ies) submitting the proposal. 
34. The National Implementation Authority(ies) shall respond in writing within [90] days 
and may have the right to hearing before the Implementation Committee. 
35. The Implementation Committee notify the Party once it is satisfied that all questions of 
implementation  have been adequately 
resolved. In addition, it shall inform the manager of the respective registry of its notifi-
cation and provide information required for issuance of units. 
36. Upon being notified, the National Implementation Authority shall proceed to imple-
mentation of the proposal and establish the start date of implementation. 
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N. Annual reports 
37. Yearly upon the start date of implementation, the National Implementation Authorities 
shall submit annual reports to the Executive Secretary who shall promptly convene an 
Independent Review Team. 
38. Within [90] days, the Independent Review Team shall review the annual report and, 
through a review report, shall raise any questions of implementation to the Implemen-
tation Committee. 
39. If the Independent Review team raises questions of implementation, these shall be for-
warded to the Implementation Committee. Upon receiving these, the Implementation 
Committee shall forward these questions, along with any other questions it may deem 
necessary, to the National Implementation Autority(ies) submitting the annual report. 
40. The National Implementation Authority(ies) shall respond in writing, within (30/60/90 
days) and may have the right to hearing before the Implementation Committee. 
41. The Implementation Committee shall notify the Party, once it is satisfied that all ques-
tions of implementation nnual report have been adequately re-
solved. In addition, it shall inform the manager of the respective registry of its notifica-
tion of the annual report. In the case of a crediting implementation track, it shall sub-
mit to the manager of the respective registry the information required to issue credits. 
O. Registries and the International Registry and Transaction Log 
42. Six months prior to issuance of units, Parties shall notify the Implementation Committee 
and the operator of the International Registry and Transaction Log of their intention to 
either use a national registry or an International Registry operated by the administrator 
of the International Transaction Log of the Kyoto Protocol 
43. Parties intending to use their national registry for issuance of units shall ensure that 
technical specifications of their national registries follow those of the international reg-
istry and ensure connectivity with the International Transaction Log. 
44. Technical specifications for data standards shall be developed by registry experts in con-
sultation with the administrator of the International Transaction Log under the Kyoto 
Protocol and shall be submitted for decision by the Conference of the Parties. 
45. Modalities for accounting of units under the Convention Market Mechanism shall follow 
closely, and be compatible with, modalities for accounting of units under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. 
P. Issuance 
46. For the crediting implementation track, issuance of CMU shall take place once a satisfac-
tory review of the proposal document and of the annual report for the relevant year has 
been undertaken, without outstanding questions of implementation. Convention Market 
Mechanism units (CMUs) shall be issued in respect of the difference between the emis-
sions stated in the annual report and the crediting threshold established in the imple-
mentation proposal for the respective year. 
Sektorale Ansätze zur THG-Emissionsminderung: Endbericht 
125 
47. For the trading implementation track, issuance of Convention Market Mechanism units 
(CMUs) shall take place once a satisfactory review of the proposal document has been 
undertaken. Upon such satisfactory review of the proposal document, CMUs shall be is-
sued in relation to one year of the relevant trading period, for the amount correspond-
ing to the trading cap in the proposal document. Issuance of CMUs for subsequent years 
shall depend on satisfactory review of the annual reports in respect of previous years. If 
the review concludes that emissions during any previous year were in excess of allow-
ances issued in respect to the trading cap to the same year, the National Implementa-
tion Authorities are required to make up for the shortfall by forwarding an equivalent 
amount of any compliance units to a cancellation account operated by the administra-
tor of the International Transaction Log or deduct the shortfall of CMUs from future is-
suance of CMUs. 
Q. Appeals 
- Provisions on how to file appeals against decisions of the independent committee; 
R. Compliance 
- Only relevant for trading implementation track 
S. Enforcement 
- Only relevant for trading implementation track 
Appendixes 
Appendix I: Criteria for Proposal Documents 
 
Appendix II: Guidelines on Data Quality 
- -like body; compatibility with 
national-level emission inventory 
- review of monitoring and reporting and provisions at chosen coverage level within 
national system for inventory 
- requirements on definition of coverage and traceability to national inventory 
 
Appendix III: Requirements for the Operation of National Registries 
 
Appendix IV: Terms of Reference for the Implementation Committee 
 
Appendix V: Draft Common Template for submission of implementation proposals  
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8 Stocktaking of and recommendations for Capacity Building Initiatives for New Market 
Mechanisms 
Work package 7, background paper 1, by Axel Michaelowa, Sonja Butzengeiger, Björn Drans-
feld (Perspectives), Martin Stadelmann (University of Zurich), 15 November 2012 
8.1 Context / Requirements for capacity building for NMM 
8.1.1 General Principles of NMM 
The new market mechanism (NMM) as defined by paragraph 83 of Decision 2/CP.17 (UNFCCC 
2012a) is to operate according to the principles laid out in paragraph 79 of the same decision, 
i.e. meet standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and verified mitigation outcomes, 
avoid double counting of efforts, and achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of greenhouse 
gas emissions. It also notes that Parties shall develop and implement such approaches in ac-
cordance with their respective national circumstances  be it individually or jointly. 
To date the design of a NMM is not clear. But translating a whatsoever NMM framework into 
practice, i.e. custom tailoring a NMM design for implementation under specific national cir-
cumstances in a certain host country will in the first place rely on domestic capacities. As these 
political, technical and institutional capacities may not exist to the extent needed, capacity 
building activities may hence serve as catalysts for enabling countries to engage under the 
NMM. 
8.1.2 Experiences with capacity building for market mechanisms in the past 
Over the past two decades vast experiences with capacity building for market mechanisms have 
been gained in the field of international climate policy: For instance, the EU Commission ran 
an intensive capacity building road show before phase I and phase II of the EU ETS, explaining 
legislation and procedures of the scheme to member state politicians and governmental staff, 
operators or verifiers  an enterprise that better enabled countries and stakeholders to cope 
with the introduction of the instrument. With respect to activities in developing countries ex-
perience with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and its precursor Activities Imple-
mented Jointly (AIJ) has shown that capacity building was crucial in generating a critical mass 
of knowledge to engage in project development. It was in particular a necessary condition for 
the takeoff of CDM in the major CDM destinations India (Babu and Michaelowa 2003, Deodhar 
et al. 2003) and China (Schröder 2012). In the early 2000´s the emerging CDM raised the atten-
tion of several bilateral and international donors, e.g. development agencies, multilateral insti-
tutions such as the World Bank or UN agencies. The World Bank´s National Strategy Studies 
programme (described in Textbox 1) for example was an important catalyst for CDM institution 
building in host countries. From 2006 on, also capacity building for CDM Programmes of Activ-
ities (PoAs) quickly expanded, reaching more than 30 activities in 2010 (Stadelmann and 
Michaelowa 2011). 
But CDM capacity building was not without its challenges, which e.g. included workshop tour-
ism, a focus on printed manuals outdating quickly, donor competition and the interest to 
source cheap emission credits as well as host country institutions becoming dependent on ca-
pacity building funds from abroad (Michaelowa 2005). Even more, Okubo and Michaelowa 
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(2011) found that capacity building is not a sufficient condition for CDM investments and that 
the substantial capacity building funds poured into Sub-Saharan Africa did not lead to project 
development in most of these countries. Furthermore, capacity building programmes often 
substantially overlapped and were not necessarily country-driven. Successful outcomes were 
mainly achieved if generic capacity building was complemented by targeted project develop-
ment support and institutional capacity building (Okubo and Michaelowa 2010, Stadelmann 
and Michaelowa 2011). 
Textbox 1: The World Bank’s National Strategy Studies Programme 
 
nal Strategy Studies (NSS) programme played a key role in initial CDM and JI capacity 
building (Michaelowa 2005). The studies under the programme aimed at estimating the CDM/JI potential of 16 
countries with the following elements: 
 Description of the CDM 
 Estimate of demand and supply on the international greenhouse gas market 
 Estimate of costs and scope of greenhouse gas abatement options in the host country 
 Institutional requirements for CDM 
 Description of a project pipeline. 
Each NSS would be financed by one industrialized country; the World Bank played a relatively limited 
role in financing, but asserted an important one when it came to content. Interestingly, smaller coun-
tries were quicker in negotiating NSS terms with the World Bank. Larger host countries were sometimes 
sceptical and the negotiations took long. A prime example is India that only started its NSS in 2003. After 
initial experiences with uncoordinated writing of the chapter on the international greenhouse gas mar-
ket, the World Bank hired Swiss consultants Gruetter to develop an easy-to-operate general equilibrium 
overall demand and prevented wasting of too many precious human resources on guessing about inter-
national markets. At the same time, in the NSS programme the World Bank also promoted its own agen-
da, particularly concerning the development of a project pipeline for its Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF). 
This role of the World Bank sometimes led to conflict with the financing country and to long delays in 
publication of the studies. Therefore, Germany made its financial contributions with the condition that it 
would retain control over the content and could decide unilaterally when a report would be fit for publi-
cation. 
Always a team of host country consultants would be in charge of writing the NSS report while consultants from 
the Annex B country financing the NSS would support them. Often, however, the Annex B consultants played a 
major role which de-facto limited the degree of capacity building. 
Usually, a NSS took 18 months to be completed but in some cases it dragged on for three years. Main reasons for 
delay were insufficient ownership of the host country, conflicts about the allocation of financial resources, lack of 
competence and slow allocation of experts by the Annex B consultancy. An instructive case is Indonesia that had 
decided to separate its NSS into an energy and a forestry part. The former was financed by Germany, the latter by 
Australia. While initially both parts were to be started in early 2000 and published jointly, it became clear quickly 
that the Australian part only progressed slowly. Eventually, the German NSS was published in September 2001 
and the Australian one more than two years later. 
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To sum up, the year-long experience has shown that capacity building can play a very helpful, 
fundamental role for putting new market mechanisms into practice. But the main lessons 
learnt are that capacity building programmes need a careful set up in order to be effective. 
Thus, capacity building shall - inter alia -: 
 be host country orientated, i.e. ensure a real transfer of resources (here mainly knowledge) 
to the host country and its respective institutions; 
 target and engage relevant stakeholders in the host country, both public and private; 
 be conducted by highly skilled technical experts; 
 involve only low bureaucracy; 
 provide a clear allocation of financial resources; 
 limit the involvement of industrialized country resources. 
 also support concrete activities to enable learning by doing 
In addition, history has shown that lacking understanding of and confidence in the future de-
sign of a mechanism can become a major barrier for host country stakeholders willing to ac-
tively engage. This is in particular true for the potential demand for credits generated under 
the NMM, which serve as the main incentive for any host country to participate. Capacity build-
ing should thus illustrate the future demand for NMM credits to the extent possible. 
8.1.3 Specific requirements as per UNFCCC decisions 
A work programme for the NMM is to be set up leading to a decision at COP 18 (paragraph 84 
of Decision 2/CP.17). Para 85 of this decision asks Parties to take their experiences, positive and 
negative, with existing approaches and mechanisms as well as lessons learned into account in 
their submissions regarding the work programme. While paragraphs 144 to 156 of the decision 
deal with capacity building, there is no specific mention of the NMM. So there is a high degree 
of freedom when it comes to capacity building activities for the NMM. In the submissions pub-
lished until mid-April (also considering submissions of 2011), the need for and importance of 
capacity building is highlighted by both developing and developed countries. Table 1 summa-
rized the positions with respect to capacity building for NMM. Most parties just note the gener-
ic need for capacity building for NMM, while some mention more specific needs, such as tech-
nical, political and legal capacity. China and the LDCs mention that the programmes may focus 
on LDCs and African countries. 

















EU Yes    
LDCs Yes Yes     
New Zealand Yes      
Norway Yes     Yes 
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China Yes Yes     
Turkey Yes  Yes Yes Yes (Yes) 
AOSIS Yes  Yes    
Papua New 
Guinea 
Yes  Yes Yes (for 
 
  
Based on parties´ submissions to the AWG LCA (UNFCCC 2011, 2012b and 2012c) 
8.2 Status quo of NMM capacity building initiatives 
New carbon market mechanisms, such as sectoral crediting, sectoral trading or even NAMA 
crediting, will require substantial knowledge, e.g. for data collection and monitoring (Schnei-
der and Cames, 2009; Aasrud et al., 2010; Fujiwara et al., 2010). Given the uncertainty on when 
and if new market mechanisms will be established, it is not surprising that capacity building 
efforts for new market mechanisms have been very limited until now. 
Most capacity has been built in the area of REDD+, as many private actors expect an integration 
of REDD+ in carbon markets in the short term. As a major international programme, the World 
rted in 2008 to build capacity in developing 
countries to harness funding through market- i-
low-carbon strategy, as well as lengthy and multistep process (pre-assessment, capacity build-
ing, design), see Chassard (2010). On the sectoral crediting / trading side, the first known capac-
ity building tool were the Sectoral Proposal Templates (SPT) developed by GtripleC/Ecofys in 
2006. 
In the last two years, several capacity building activities for new market mechanisms have 
emerged. A number of national or multilateral initiatives addressing general mitigation issues 
such as low carbon/emissions development strategies (LEDS/LCDS) include activities that sup-
port NMM capacity (for instance the International Climate Initiative of the German Govern-
ment, IKI), see also Aasrud et al. (2010). The most prominent initiatives with a clear focus on 
market mechanism capacity building are the World Bank´s Partnership for Market Readiness 
(PMR), the Mitigation Action Implementation Network (MAIN), the International Carbon Action 
Partnership (ICAP) and to some extent the Japanese Bilateral Mechanism. The four initiatives 
will be discussed below. 
8.2.1 Partnership for Market Readiness 
The World Bank led Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) is a programme unveiled at the 
Cancun Conference in 2010 that includes 16 developing countries and is currently financed 
with 93.5 million $ from twelve donors, while the total budget aimed at is 100 million $ (see 
Table 2). 





Pledges in m $ 
Chile Turkey Australia 12.5 
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China Ukraine European Commission 6.5 
Colombia Brazil Denmark 5.1 
Costa Rica India Finland 5.3 
Indonesia Jordan Germany 6.5 
Mexico Vietnam Japan 14.4 
Morocco South Africa The Netherlands 7.0 
Thailand  Peru  Norway 5.8 
   Sweden 6.0 
 
 
Switzerland 8.4  
United Kingdom 11.0  
United States 5.0  
  Total Pledges  93.5 
Source: Based on PMR (2012) 
sectors, coordination with relevant ministries and key domestic stakeholders, facilitation of data 
collection/management and establishment of reference levels, development of MRV elements, 
registries and transaction logs. It also wants to help setting goals and preparing legal and regu-
latory frameworks as well as supporting government engagement, responsibility, and institu-
tional capacity for managing technical and policy components. Finally, pilot initiatives for do-
mestic cap and trade schemes, scaled-up crediting or other new, innovative instruments are to 
be supported. The PMR is overseen by the Partnership Assembly consisting of all donors and 
recipients. Each participating country will receive at least 3 million $. 
There are three stages of the PMR process. After initial selection, which is closed since October 
2011, selected countries develop an Expression of Interest. They then get a grant of 35,000 $ to 
prepare an organizing framework for the scoping of the PMR activities, which needs to be vet-
ted by the Partnership Assembly. Once this has been done, 315,000 $ are available to develop a 
Market Readiness Proposal. 
As per October 2012, fifteen countries had reached the third phase. Turkey and Ukraine aim 
towards emission trading, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco and 
Vietnam pursue sectoral or scaled up crediting mechanisms, while Brazil, Chile and Thailand 
pursue both approaches. Finally, South Africa is interested in a carbon tax, domestic offsets and 
may be also in emission trading at a later stage. Chile, Costa Rica, China and Mexico have 
submitted their draft Market Readiness Proposals, which are now under review by experts. 
8.2.2 Mitigation Action Implementation Network (MAIN) 
The Mitigation Action Implementation Network (MAIN) is coordinated by the Center for Clean 
Air Policy (CCAP), a US-based think tank that has a long history in supporting capacity building 
for market mechanisms. CCAP is especially known for its high-level dialogue approach, while 
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its analytical capacity is more limited; it builds essentially on meta-analysis of research done in 
other institutions. MAIN, which is also supported by the World Bank and the German Ministry 
of Environment, has the target to support the design and implementation of NAMAs and Low-
Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS) in developing countries through regionally-based dia-
logues, web-  p-
proach. The most successful developing country mitigation policies implemented to date are to 
be identified and used as lessons for other countries to achieve ambitious mitigation actions. 
Sub-targets are improvement of countrie
are consistent with any LEDS or national sustainable development plans. Moreover, collabora-
tive financing is to be mobilized by providing strategies to make NAMAs attractive to possible 
funders from donor countries, including meeting expectations for monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV). MAIN is thus much broader than capacity building for NMM. 
To date, MAIN is limited to Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand 
and Vietnam) and Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Panama, Peru and Uruguay) bypassing Africa. 
k-
ers from key ministries focusing on finance, climate negotiators, finance and MRV experts, and 
industry representatives, where NAMA successes as identified by CCAP will be discussed. These 
videoconferencing, webinars and e-learning courses. 
So far, two academies were held in Latin America and one in Asia, with about 30 participants 
each. They discussed a template for supported NAMAs developed by CCAP, included role plays 
on NAMA scrutinizing by senior policymakers and assessments of the state of climate finance. 
Overall it seems that MAIN is focusing on generating NAMA proposals for subsidies from indus-
trialized countries, and that the role of market mechanisms in leveraging NAMAs is not ad-
dressed in detail. 
8.2.3 International Carbon Action Partnership 
ICAP, which was founded in 2007, is a partnership of public authorities and governments want-
ing to introduce mandatory emission trading systems with an absolute cap. Besides the EU 
member states, it includes the states of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the 
Eastern US and of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) in the US and Canada, as well as Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and the municipality of Tokyo. Japan, Korea and the Ukraine are observers. 
ICAP does capacity building for developing countries through dedicated Summer Schools, of 
which three have been held to date. They bring together for 25 to 30 carefully selected policy 
makers and other stakeholders from the non-governmental, academic and private sectors  
traditionally less than 15% of applicants - for two weeks. Alumni work will help promote active 
virtual discussions among participants beyond the duration of the course. 
Moreover, an 8-day training course on design, implementation, and administration of national 
and regional emission trading systems was held in Costa Rica in March 2012 where only about 
20% of applicants were selected. Two conferences were held in 2009 (China) and 2010 (Tokyo); 
the former focused on emissions data management. ICAP is the only one of the surveyed initia-
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tives providing hard-core technical training in a highly competitive environment. On the other 
hand, it is the most limited one regarding its scope. 
8.2.4 Japanese bilateral mechanism 
Japan has long criticized the Kyoto Mechanisms for being overly bureaucratic and thus created 
the concept of the Bilateral Offsets Crediting Mechanism (BOCM). While the detailed rules for 
the BOCM remain unclear, its preparation includes dialogues with developing countries, explo-
ration of potential projects and capacity building, with the aim to enter into bilateral arrange-
ments. To date, capacity building has mostly focused on MRV, with project feasibility studies 
limited to Japanese consultants. Bilateral MoUs have been established with Indonesia and Mon-
golia. 
It remains to be seen whether the BOCM will represent a new type of market mechanism or 
whether it will simply form a copy of the CDM with watered-down MRV standards and lower 
environmental integrity. 
8.3 First lessons from NMM capacity building initiatives 
8.3.1 Evaluation of existing initiatives 
The four initiatives differ regarding the selected target audience, the types of NMM addressed, 
the degree of host country involvement, the appropriateness of coverage, the content and the 
approach of the programmes (see Table 3). 
With respect to the target group, MAIN addresses negotiators, which is appropriate in the ini-
tial phase of the NMM. While formally the other initiatives address all groups potentially in-
volved in the NMM, PMR de facto concentrates on government officials. ICAP has the broadest 
approach, but it is unclear whether the extremely competitive selection of Academy partici-
pants favours certain groups. 
Concerning the type of mechanism, MAIN does not have a clear focus at all and probably leads 
to an increased orientation of policy decisions on NAMAs towards subsidized NAMAs. PMR 
probably has the best balance in terms of NMM types targeted. With its limitation to emissions 
trading based on mandatory caps, ICAP has a focus which is too narrow for the large majority 
of developing countries. 
Host country ownership is probably largest in PMR, where countries had to become proactive 
in the EoI phase. However, personal experience on the ground in the PMR context shows that 
this ownership can be rather shallow. Regarding coverage, duplication clearly exists between 
PMR and MAIN where the same donor (World Bank) is targeting seven countries in both initia-
tives. Appropriateness of coverage is generally relatively good, with the critical size of countries 
to engage in the NMM probably respected, as long as NAMA crediting could be implemented 
on a relatively small scale (the Dominican Republic might be the most extreme case). Content-
wise, all initiatives except ICAP have some MRV elements and the PMR is probably most en-
compassing by targeting both capacity on identification and technical design of NMM. Finally, 
all initiatives except the Japanese BOCM use interactive workshops or meetings as key capacity 
building tool, while the PMR has the most elaborated approach, based on 3 stages: expression 
of interest, organizing framework and market readiness proposal. 
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EoI = Expression of Interests 
8.3.2 Potential for improvements 
The big general challenge of the NMM is how to generate trust among emitters that the NMM 
is a stable incentive for emission reduction. This requires credible governance, as well as de-
mand for credits that can be generated from the NMM. The big shortcoming of all current ca-
pacity building initiatives is that once they are over and there is no demand for NMM credits, 
the capacity built will be lost rapidly. Experience from the CDM shows that the capacity build-
ing only triggered projects once there was demand generated. And here the limited demand 
from the Worl
multiple private entities covered by the EU ETS. In the future, this might also become a real 
threat for juvenile activities such as NAMAs or potential NMM actions. Before market-related 
demand can be created, a demand from public finance may help to test first NMM pilots that 
may enable early learning-by-doing. 
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8.4 Recommendations for the German Government 
The NMM can take many forms; international negotiations on its design have just started. Look-
ing at the experiences with capacity building for the Kyoto Mechanisms, capacity building for 
the NMM should be designed in a way that aims at: 
 Enabling an informed participation of policy makers in the negotiations about possible 
designs of the NMM, and advantages/disadvantages of approaches; 
 Allowing to effectively harness the potential for use of the NMM in the host country, i.e. 
capacity building on domestic implementation; 
 Ensuring real ownership in the host country; 
 Efficient spending of support. 
We therefore recommend having a particular focus on the following aspects when designing 
an NMM CB programme: 
Selection of relevant target groups & multi-tier approach: In the initial phase of NMM, poli-
cymakers should be targeted as they negotiate internationally. It is important for them to un-
derstand the opportunities, challenges and barriers of a NMM for their country. Besides, capaci-
ty building in phase I should focus on correct incentives for private sector mitigation activities, 
and/or proper policy instruments (in particular in case NMM targets sectors with highly dis-
persed, small emission sources). Once the design of NMM has been decided at UN level, it will 
be important to train both public institutions and the private sector in the host country how to 
implement and engage in NMM (these phases are summarised in Figure 20). 
Figure 20: Suggested phases NMM capacity building 
 
 
Phase I could be conducted in a style similar to the one successfully applied in the European 
Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI); i.e. through informal, facilitated discussions of policy makers 
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 Clear focus: Given the unclear nature of the NMM, capacity building should not address all 
possible forms of the NMM, as due to country characteristics the most appropriate form 
(sectoral crediting, sectoral trading, NAMA crediting) may differ. 
 Host country ownership: Often, capacity building grants are parachuted into host coun-
tries without a real interest on the ground. We recommend conducting a proper pre-
implementation analysis assessing in detail key interest groups for the specific NMM under 
consideration. This assessment should also include an analysis of institutional continuity 
and staff exchange rates to make sure that transferred knowledge will remain. Finally, a 
pre-assessment may also analyse whether countries are really interested in NMM (e.g. avail-
ability of a strategy, willingness to contribute in-kind or other resources). 
 Avoidance of duplication: There has been a tendency in the past to rush into the most 
attractive target countries while side-lining less attractive ones. This calls for good interna-
tional coordination. We therefore suggest inviting major donors and capacity building pro-
viders (see above) to a coordinating dialogue. 
 Evaluation: As Germany is involved in all three multilateral capacity building initiatives, it 
should also initiate a review of achievements of past efforts and an improvement of these 
initiatives in line with the discussion above. 
 Minimum capacity and appropriateness of the country for the NMM at start level : 
There are many countries which structurally are not having the necessary infrastructure for 
use of the NMM nor the critical size. The CDM has shown that LDC´s and small island states 
have faced big hurdles in participating in the mechanism, even after receiving substantial 
capacity building support (Okubo and Michaelowa 2011). A more detailed evaluation of the 
reasons should be conducted once the general nature of NMM is clear. 
 Create pilots that enable learning-by-doing: Besides the theoretical aspects discussed so 
far, we recommend creating learning-by-doing experiences. Testing NMM concepts in a 
couple of countries/sectors can create tremendous insights for all other interested Parties 
worldwide; in particular if the NMM implements a new conceptual approach that has not 
been tested by any / many countries yet. 
We therefore recommend that the German government tenders e.g. three pilot NMM activities 
where Germany buys NMM credits. Countries could e.g. be defined as eligible to bid if they 
have reached the third phase of PMR. In order to generate a credible incentive, the pilot phase 
should run for 4-5 years (e.g. from 2015 to 2020), and credit volume should be significant, i.e. 
for instance exceed 100 million tons CO2e. Other donors could contribute financially. Selection 
criteria could be appropriateness of the NMM concept in the context of the count a-
tion potential, the willingness to provide co-finance and the existence of a NMM strategy that 
involves all key stakeholder groups, thus showing ownership. Moreover, the incentives to actu-
ally trigger mitigation should be scrutinized regarding their potential effectiveness. 
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8.6 Annex 1: Party views on capacity building for NMM 
Party Views (as expressed in NMM submission) 
EU r to maximize the function of new market-based mechanisms in 
developing countries, sufficient institutional capacities need to be de-
veloped in the sectors where the mechanisms are utilized. To this end, 
developed countries should actively provide capacity building in devel-
 
LDCS Appropriate and necessary capacity building activities should be pro-
vided to countries including, inter alia, the LDCs, SIDS and vulnerable 
African countries to promote their access to these market-based mecha-
nisms, building upon lessons learnt from the CDM.  
New Zealand apacity-building to facilitate the use of the mechanism by Parties  
Norway Capacity building for market readiness and practical experience in es-
tablishing new marked based approaches is important. On-the-ground 
practical work is a very useful way to gain relevant experience. Norway 
participates actively in the market based mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and we are engaged in several multilateral initiatives which 
will provide relevant experiences for Parties to draw upon. One such 
initiative is the Nordic Partnership Initiative on Up-scaled Mitigation 
Action (NPI). (...)  
China n-
tries including, inter alia, the LDCs and African countries to promote 
their access to the possible market-  
Turkey There will be a need for financing for the formation and readiness activ-
ities for new market mechanisms in the coming years. Capacity building 
activities in developing countries will not only consume finances and 
but also time. These activities will include activities in technical, policy 
and legal areas. Thus, it will be necessary to have a work program on 
the issue as soon as possible, broadly addressing the immediate needs 
such as MRV and piloting. 
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Party Views (as expressed in NMM submission) 
AOSIS sectors might be phased in for interested countries over time, 
once the necessary eligibility criteria are satisfied. Financial and tech-
nical support could be provided to improve the quality of inventories, 
develop consideration of possible sectoral baselines and facilitate eligi-
bility for participation.  
Papua New 
Guinea 
 Capacity building is a prerequisite for the development, 
deployment and implementation of such market based 
approaches. 
45) International institutions will have to be designated to provide the 
finance and the expertise in this area, while avoiding duplication 
and reinventing rediscovering existing knowledge and 
 
48) Any new market based approaches proposed above will require 
capacity building related to: 
a. Designing new approaches and tailoring existing ones to 
meet national circumstances. 
b. Data collection. 
c.  
Based on parties  submissions to the AWG LCA (UNFCCC 2011, 2012b and 2012c) 
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9 New Market Mechanism Implementation Scenario – 
Piloting a sectoral crediting mechanism for the Peruvian residential sector 
Work package 7, background paper 1, by Björn Dransfeld (Perspectives), 1 February 2013 
new market-
under the guidance and authority of the COP, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to pro-
mote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing 
countries [...] which may assist developed countries to meet part of their mitigation targets or 
commitments under the Convention were to be 
developed through parties in the course of 2012 and various parties and observers have sub-
mitted their views and positions on the future NMM design
37
. Also, detailed modalities and 
procedures were put forward by parties. Eventually, no decision on those rules for the NMM 
was made at the Doha conference in late 2012 (COP18). The collapse of the carbon markets in 
2012 and the focus of COP18 on agreeing on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol side-lined the new market mechanism issue during the Doha negotiations. Essentially, 
rule-setting for the top-down NMM and the bottom up framework for various approaches (FVA) 
was deferred to the 2013 COP 19 in Warsaw. Parties are now once more requested to submit 
inputs on the future outfit of the NMM (and FVA). It is worth mentioning that Doha confirmed 
the FVA to be developed under UNFCCC guidance, and that the NMM should include both pro-
ject-based and sectoral approaches. 
Given the current international demand-supply balance for tradable carbon units and credits 
and the carbon market price levels, there is no high pressure for decision makers to take action 
for an immediate introduction of the NMM. But with regards to the mid-term future it appears 
likely that the NMM (as well as the FVA) may become relevant pillars of the international cli-
p-
proximately the next 1-3 years, one could use the window of opportunity to embark on testing 
the practicability of new instruments, such as the NMM. The need for piloting activities under 
the NMM is thus highlighted in many party submissions. A NMM pilot activity could explore 
the challenges and opportunities of the embryonic NMM framework and provide early lessons. 
This is in particular true with regards to involving the private sector. If private sector invest-
ments are desired to be part of the future climate policy regime (i.e. via the NMM), investment 
security and certainty about specific design issues of the NMM are essential and should be re-
flected in pilot activities. 
                                            
37
 See http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php and http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-
lca/items/4578.php. 
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As already outlined in submissions on the NMM, e.g. by the KfW
38
, piloting activities for the 
NMM face the barrier that currently i) no rules and procedures are in place and ii) no demand 
for certified mitigation under the NMM exists. Setting up NMM piloting activities in absence of 
these two components requires vehicles that replace demand and provide modalities and pro-
cedures for those vehicles. Figure 21 illustrates the actors and components under the NMM and 
the lack of demand and rules. 
Figure 21: Piloting NMM activities and currently lacking components (in red) 
 
Source: Perspectives GmbH 
In practice these lacking components for NMM piloting activities can be created in a setting 
that involves the partner country as well as actors willing to buy credits
39
. Such a joint piloting 
activity would thus most likely be set up as an agreement between two parties or amongst a 
group of parties. 
9.1 NMM Implementation Checklist 
For the time being (i.e. until the COP approves NMM modalities and procedures), the modalities 
and procedures that were developed by parties over the course of 2012 can be considered as 
relevant enough to test their applicability. Based on the submissions of the EU and Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Republic), Costa 
Republic of Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, 
Kenya, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname and 
Uganda (UNFCCC 2012a&b), we developed a NMM implementation checklist that can be used 
                                            
38
 KfW submission on the NMM, July 2012 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/ngo/249.pdf). 
39
 On the European level a window of opportunity to use credits from NMM, perhaps in combination with an in-
creased target till 2020 may be generated (e.g. under the EU ETS or Effort Sharing Decision). 
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for NMM piloting activities for demonstration of compliance with international modalities and 
procedures. 
As per the submissions, one can compile a checklist for host country requirements. After con-
solidating elements and requirements, we derive the following set of categories: 
- Host Country & Participation Requirements 
- Description of sector coverage for NMM activity  
- Measures to be applied under NMM activity 
- Institutional Arrangements 
- MRV Arrangements  
- Baseline Determination 
- Projection of Emission Reductions and Thresholds/Targets 
- Co-benefits & required support 
A template for the checklist is provided in Annex I. For illustrative reasons the checklist is ap-
plied to the Peruvian residential sector below. 
9.2 The Peruvian residential sector 
In 2009, energy consumption in the Peruvian residential sector, commercial and public 
was 175,655 TJ with a share of 29.0% of total primary consumption. Compared to the 
previous year the energy consumption increased by 5.7% (MINEM 2010, p. 9, 22). Alt-
hough total CO2 emissions increased steadily during the last years - corresponding to 
the increase in energy consumption  the CO2 emission from the residential and com-
mercial sector was steady since 2004, reaching about 1.8 million tCO2/a (MINEM 2010, 
p. 31). The main source of emissions from the residential sector is the use of energy 
related to the combustion of fossil fuel and non-renewable biomass as well as electricity 
consumption from the grid in residential houses. The main energy sources are electrici-
ty, liquefied natural gas (LPG) and biomass (firewood). In the residential sector the en-
ergy demand is driven by the energy need of the inhabitants of the houses. Generally 
the main energy needs are heating, warm water supply, cooking, air conditioning and 
electric appliance. Thus, firewood is still prominent in the energy consumption mix of 
the residential and commercial sector, being used mainly for cooking with an efficien-
cy reaching 10%. The demand for electricity and LPG have increased their participation 
in this sector at 26.8% and 16.9% respectively, while consumption of kerosene has de-
creased dramatically in the years 2004 to 2009 due to higher Selective Consumption 
Tax (ISC) (MINEM, 2010, page 22; Lazo and Rojas 2009, p.57). The final energy con-
sumption depends on the other hand on the penetration rate of the services and appli-
ance. For example, in urban areas the majority of houses use liquefied natural gas (LPG) 
for cooking purposes (63%), whereas in rural areas traditional cook stoves are predomi-
nately combusting fire wood (90%). Thus potential mitigation measures also have to be 
considered regarding the different services and appliances used in urban and rural ar-
eas and could consist of efficient cooking (LPG/ improved cookstoves), solar water heat-
ers, energy efficient lighting, thermal insulation, efficient heating/ ventilation, PV on-
site generation, etc. So far, there are no current national technical guidelines for the 
design and construction of buildings or urban development to improve energy effi-
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ciency and reduce environmental impact through reduced energy consumption (MVCS 
2012). 
Based on a business as usual (reference) scenario developed by Lazo and Rojas (2009) 
the energy demand of the Peruvian residential sector will increase until 2030 (approx. 
30 - 40 % compared to 2009). The energy mix in the urban as well as in the rural sector 
is expected to be steady, consisting of fossil fuels, traditional fuels, i.e. fire-
wood/manure, and electricity in urban areas, respectively mainly traditional fuel in ru-
ral areas. As a result also the GHG emissions from the sector are expected to increase 
over the coming years under a business as usual scenario. It has been assumed that by 
introducing energy efficiency measures (depending on the respective measures) for 
houses in urban areas a reduction of at least 15% of fossil fuel consumption can be 
reached; for rural areas 30-60% (considering improved cook stoves). In both urban and 
rural areas, it has been assumed that 20-30% less electricity demand can be reached 
(Lazo and Rojas 2009). 
9.3 Implementation Scenario for the Peruvian Housing Sector 
Subsequently, the NMM checklist is applied for the Peruvian residential sector for illus-
trative reasons.
40
 Peru is considered as an attractive candidate for climate policy market 
instruments, as it has gained numerous experiences under the CDM, and is progressive-
ly engaging in the UNFCCC negotiations and for instance pursuing market opportuni-
ties under the World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR). 
9.3.1 Host Country & Participation Requirements 
Item Comment 
Is the introduction of NMM 
measures consistent with Na-
tional Policies?  
i-
cal agenda and could complement on-going initiatives. According to 
Article 9 of Law No. 28611, General Environmental Law, the purpose 
of the National Environmental Policy is to improve the quality of life 
of people, ensuring healthy ecosystems, viable and functional in the 
long run and sustainable development of the country, through pre-
vention, protection and recovery of the environment and its compo-
nents, the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources in a 
responsible and consistent way (MINAM 2009). 
NMM measures would support and follow the general policy guid-
ance for mitigation and adaption on climate change according to 
I-
                                            
40
 The assessment was done to illustrate the application of the checklist, based on information available online. A 
more detailed analysis would be required to deepen the understanding of certain parameters/aspects. 
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Item Comment 
NAM 2009, p. 23): 
a) Encourage the implementation of measures to mitigate 
and adapt to climate change with a preventive approach, consider-
ing the characteristics of the various regions of the country, with 
emphasis on the situation and spontaneous action adaptation of 
peasant communities and indigenous peoples. 
b) Establish monitoring systems, early warning and timely re-
sponse to natural disasters associated with climate change, giving 
priority to the most vulnerable populations. 
c) Encourage the development of forestry projects, solid waste 
management, sanitation/refurbishment, use of renewable energy 
and others to contribute to the mitigation of climate change. 
d) Conduct the processes of adaptation and mitigation to cli-
mate change spreading their consequences, and to train the various 
social actors to organize. 
e) Promote the use of adequate and appropriate technologies 
for adaptation to climate change and mitigation of greenhouse 
gases and air pollution. 
Besides this, a national strategy for climate change is in place.  
Is the host country ready to buy 
additional, comparable emission 
reduction units on the global 
carbon market in case actual 
emissions have exceeded the 
target for the relevant year? 
Theoretically yes: Peru has been actively engaged in the CDM (i.e. 
Interaction with the International transaction log, ITL) and is also 
currently exploring market opportunities under the World Bank 
PMR. 
Although, no provisions have been made as of now for buying cred-
its under the NMM.  
Findings In general, no provisions exist that would prevent the implementa-
tion of NMM activities. Thus, NMM measures can be introduced in 
Peru.  
9.3.2 Measures to be applied under NMM activity 
Item Comment 
Shall the NMM activity choose a 
crediting or a trading route? 
For the residential sector crediting appears more suitable. To be fur-
ther explored.  
Specify the measures to be ap-
plied in the sector under the 
NMM 
Under the NMM piloting activity, primary energy consumption 
benchmarks based on a whole house measurement could be intro-
duced. The construction of houses according to the benchmark level 
would be incentivized by a scaled-up financial promotion system. 
The programme would promote energy efficiency measures and 
renewable energies for new residential houses in urban and rural 
areas. 
 Urban areas: efficient cooking (LPG), solar water heaters, tank-
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Item Comment 
less gas boilers, energy efficient lightning, thermal insulation 
(e.g. of walls/roofs and improved windows), efficient heat-
ing/ventilation, efficient air conditioning, etc. 
 Rural areas: efficient cooking (improved cook stoves), solar wa-
ter heaters, PV on-site generation, energy efficient lighting, 
thermal insulation (e.g. of walls/roofs and improved windows), 
efficient heating/ ventilation, etc. 
The NMM pilot envisages providing financial incentives to the target 
groups of house-buyers/owners and construction compa-
nies/developers to implement the energy efficiency and renewable 
energy measures. The financial incentive framework under the pilot 
shall ensure that the better the level of energy efficiency achieved, 
the more favourable the financial support conditions are and that 
the house-buyers/owners will receive a subsidy to the loan granted 
by a financial institution (e.g. reduced interest or lower reimburse-
ment installments, or redemption grant), if they purchases a house 
built in accordance with whole-house energy efficiency standards 
under the pilot in order to cover a part of the additional investment 
costs (incremental costs). Additionally, construction companies (de-
provided they 
commit themselves to build a house according to the whole-house 
energy efficiency standards under the pilot. The compliance have to 
be proven when the house is finished (MRV). 
Description of ongoing activities 
with GHG benefits in the con-
cerned sector. 
So far, there are no current national technical guidelines for the 
design and construction of buildings or urban development to im-
prove energy efficiency and reduce environmental impact through 
reduced energy consumption. Some NAMAs are planned for the 
building sector, though.  
Findings No current national technical guidelines for the design and construc-
tion of buildings or urban development to improve energy efficiency 
and reduce environmental impact through reduced energy con-
sumption exist, hence the NMM measure would in general endeavor 
new mitigation impacts.  
9.3.3 Description of sector coverage for NMM activity 
Item Comment 
Is the same definition of the 
sectors, categories or sub-
categories to be covered by the 
broad segment of the economy 
used as in other host countries? 
If not: 
 Is the deviation properly justi-
The second national communication does not provide a definition of 
the residential sector. Would need to be further explored.  




 Is the definition subject but 
not technology specific? 
Is the definition including all 
covered installations/activities of 
the sector? 
Is an analysis of potential risks 
of carbon leakage including 
potential volumes available? 
If yes, does it describe measures 
to prevent or limit those effects? 
Not applicable 
Is an analysis of double counting 
including potential volumes 
available? 
If yes, does it describe measures 
to prevent or limit those effects? 
There is no analysis of double counting including potential volumes 
available. But the possibility of double counting was considered for 
example for a cook stove PoA, and therefore the implementation of 
a NAMA database managed by the NAMA Unit is recommended. 
This could potentially also be expanded to other instruments such as 
NMM measures and hence provide value for a NMM pilot.  
Findings There are no existing national regulations with regards to GHG 
emission reductions in the residential sector. An exact definition of 
the residential sector would need to be provided, in order to provide 
clarity on the exact scope of a potential NMM measure. This applies 
also to double counting. Interestingly, various NAMA initiatives are 
put forward for the housing sector, hence one needs to account for 
overlap of NMM and NAMAs.  
9.3.4 Institutional Arrangements 
Item Comment 
Is a Designated National Author-
ity for NMM implementation 
(and compliance with modalities 
and procedures for the NMM, 
other relevant guidelines and 
international rules) appointed 
and in place? 
 
Alternative: Which Entity could 
serve as the NMM DNA (e.g. 
CDM DNA)? 
The CDM DNA is in place and with the Ministry of the Environment 
(MINAM). 
An alternative coordinating entity is the Ministry of Housing, Con-
struction and Sanitation (Ministerio de vivienda, Construcción y 
Saneamiento - MVCS) and its Office of Environment (Oficina del Me-
dio Ambiente (OMA)) 
The pilot could be coordinated by the Office of Environment (Oficina 
del Medio Ambiente (OMA)). The Office of Environment is the adviso-
ry body to coordinate specialized housing and administrative pur-
poses at the level of the deputy ministry for Construction and Sanita-
tion under the MVCS. 
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Item Comment 
It aims to incorporate the environmental dimension in the process of 
generation of policies, programs, projects and technologies to guide 
the activities of the sector towards sustainable development. It also 
consolidates and strengthens the environmental management in the 
MVCS by incorporating it into the institutional dynamics especially 
in the process of policy formulation, sector planning and strategies. 
It shall guide the activities of housing, construction and sanitation to 
sustainable development and non-assignment planning, protection 
and recovery of the urban-rural and rural resources linked to sectoral 
activities. 
Alternatively, a Climate Change Unit in the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance is to be set up. It will focus on economic instruments and 
production of information/knowledge.  
Are stakeholder dialogues insti-
tutionalized? 
There is no specific dialogue institutionalized, but the institutional 
set-up and implementation of the pilot should start a dialogue with 
the following proponents: 
 Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM): technical support 
and monitoring; development and proposing energy policy 
 Peruvian Chamber of Construction(CAPECO): construction of 
houses and implementation of measures 
 Ministry of Environment (MINAM): technical support and 
monitoring; verification and certification of emission reduc-
tion and potential carbon credits 
 Servicio Nacional Capacitación para la Industria de la Con-
strucción (SENCICO): public institution of Housing, Construc-
tion and Sanitation under the MVCS; research and capacity 
building under the programme 
 Peru Green Building Council (PGBC): technical support and 
promotion; research and capacity building; private organiza-
tion who wants to lead the transformation of construction 
activities, and urban development towards a more sustaina-
ble reality 
 Ricardo Palma University, Lima: technical support and pro-
motion; research and capacity building; training of profes-
sionals 
Findings No designated NMM authority is in place, but Peru has a broad 
range of experienced public and public/private entities in the field of 
climate change / building sector, which could serve as the respective 
counterpart for the NMM measure. Exact capacity building needs 
have to be further assessed. Potential overlap of work / synergies 
with the NAMA unit (see 4.6) needs to be considered. 
9.3.5 MRV Arrangements 
Item Comment 
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Item Comment 
Is a national registry or ar-
rangements for use of an inter-
national registry administered 
by the UNFCCC Secretariat in 
place? 
A database to record and manage all relevant baseline and monitor-
ing information for NAMAs will be developed and managed by a 
NAMA unit (see above and 4.6). This could be utilized for the NMM 
pilot measures as well. Monitoring reports will be prepared periodi-
cally which will aggregate all required monitoring information of 
the sampling group, i.e. monitoring records, in order to allow a third 
party verification. 
Is adequate monitoring and 
reporting of emissions of the 
sector in place? 
 
No, hence it recommended establishing a MRV system for the NMM 
pilot which should be based on direct GHG emissions by monitoring 
the energy use of the building. 
It should apply energy performance benchmarks based on a whole 
house energy performance that still has to be defined and intro-
duced. The monitoring boundary should be each houses and build-
ing unit, respectively. 
The NAMA database (see above) will periodically prepare monitoring 
reports based on the monitoring records and according to the meth-
odology, e.g. once every second year. The monitoring reports will 
aggregate all required monitoring information of the sampling 
group, i.e. monitoring records, in order to allow a third party verifi-
cation. For the case of embarking on NMM activities (or pilots), this 
database could be used. 
Is there a clear allocation of 
responsibilities for MRV & han-
dling of data? 
(could also be moved up to insti-
tutional arrangements above)  
The NAMA unit would be responsible for NAMA MRV systems, in-
cluding the installation of metering systems, if required and hiring 
of the survey team, if applicable. Certain tasks and responsibilities 
for the management and operation of NAMAs could also optionally 
be outsourced on a commercial basis by the NAMA Unit. The overall 
responsibility for the MRV system, though, will stay with the NAMA 
Unit. This could be expanded to NMM activities, such as the pilot. 
Are provisions for transparency 




Are provisions on data, sources, 
quality, use of factors including 
default factors and conserva-
tiveness established? 
 
The monitoring should apply energy performance benchmarks 
based on a whole house energy performance that has to be defined 
and introduced. Besides it shall be based on appropriate elements 
of CDM methodologies, or other standards (VCS, UNEP) for the 
building sector. 
Is the independent verification 
of actual emissions being exer-
cised or planned? 
Under the CDM, yes. To be further explored.  
Findings No dedicated MRV system (resp. its procedures) exists for the meas-
ure envisaged under the NMM. However, concepts for MRV of NA-
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Item Comment 
MAs in the residential sector are currently being elaborated. Again, a 
close collaboration with the NAMA unit is required to avoid overlaps. 
9.3.6 Baseline Determination 
Item Comment 
Does every sector, category or 
sub-category included in the 
broad segment of the economy 
in the host country have a sepa-
rate baseline? 
A Peruvian NAMA Unit will be responsible for the development of a 
database to record and manage all relevant baseline and monitoring 
information for NAMAs. The database will allow the NAMA Unit to 
calculate the corresponding baseline and NAMA emissions, as well as 
avoiding potential double counting of emission reduction under the 
NAMA and carbon projects (e.g. cook stove PoA). For the case of em-
barking on NMM activities (or pilots), this database could be used. 
The NMM pilot could separate the residential housing sector in rural 
and urban housing and set up different baselines for those sub-
sectors.  
Does the baseline include all 
relevant sources of GHG emis-
sions in the sector? 
 
The baselines would include the following sources of GHG emissions 
(all emissions from fuel combustion in households): 
 Solar thermal 
 Fossil fuels 
 Electricity 
 Traditional fuels 
Does the baseline use the same 
methods and criteria for calcu-
lating baselines as in the same 
sector in different countries (e.g. 
IPCC approaches)? 
 
Baselines for the residential sector are limited value. A business as 
usual (reference) scenario was developed by Lazo and Rojas back in 
2009, hence one would need to update the baseline information.  
Does the baseline period start no 
earlier than 01. January 2013? 
N.A. 
Does the baseline use the most 
conservative baseline scenario? 
N.A. 
Is the baseline data the most 
reliable data available, including 
actual sector data, and publicly 
available? 
N.A. 
Do the baselines take into ac-
count: 
 policies and measures includ-
N.A. 
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Item Comment 
ing those at an advanced stage 
of development 
 CDM projects 
 technological developments 
 population, 
 economic growth 
 other socio-economic factors? 
Are revisions every 5 years in-
cluded in the proposal of the 
baseline period? 
N.A. 
If baseline period other than [5] 
years is proposed: is it sufficient-
ly justified (e.g. due to unsuita-
bility in the broad segment of 
the economy or consistency with 
mitigation pledges) 
N.A. 
Are the baselines guided by the 
following principles: 
 Accuracy, 







Findings Baseline scenarios are to be updated /have to be further or complete-
ly new developed for the residential sector in order to comply with 
the above requirements. The NAMA unit in this context is envisaging 
baseline studies.  
9.3.7 Projection of Emission Reductions and Thresholds/Targets 
Item Comment 
What are the expected emission 
reductions? 
It has been assumed that by introducing energy efficiency measures 
(depending on the respective measures) for houses in urban areas a 
reduction of at least 15% of fossil fuel consumption can be reached; 
for rural areas 30-60% (considering improved cook stoves). In both 
urban and rural areas, it has been assumed that 20-30% less electrici-
ty demand can be reached (Lazo and Rojas 2009). 
 
Is the threshold set according to 
(one/more) the following crite-
ria? 
Not defined yet. 
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Item Comment 
 In the range of 10-30% below 
baseline 
 Consider ghg mitigation po-
tential, overall capability, fi-
nancing received or expected 
and greenhouse gas mitigation 
pledges 
 Applying objective criteria 
(performance benchmarks, 
where feasible); 
 Following detailed rules on 
establishment of thresholds 
adopted by the COP 
Is the crediting/trading period 
consistent with the period cov-
ered by the developing country 
pledge for appropriate own ac-
tion pre and post 2020 
 
Not defined yet. 
Does the stringency of the cred-
iting threshold or sector target 
reflect respective capabilities in 
the sector and in the country? 
Not defined yet. 
Are thresholds consistent with 
broader agreed mitigation ob-
jectives of the host country? 
Not defined yet. 
Findings Only vague information exists on planned emission reductions for 
the residential sector. A crediting threshold definition requires better 
projections. 
9.3.8 Co-benefits & Required Support 
Item Comment 
Is the implementation of the 
NMM contributing to sustaina-
ble development within the 
country? /  
The NMM pilot would result in benefits other than GHG emissions 
reductions. These co-benefits will most likely include sustainable 
development benefits such as benefits to the economy (e.g. increase 
in number of jobs and reduced use of energy/natural resources), 
environment (e.g. reduction of air pollution) and population (e.g. 
improved quality of life). 
Environmental impacts: 
 Limiting local/regional air pollution 
 Reduce the irresponsible consumption of natural resources, 
 Limiting inadequate growth of cities, poor construction, applica-
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Item Comment 
tion of building materials and inappropriate designs, etc. 
Are processes to ensure contri-




Does the NMM contribute to 




Socio-economic impacts of the NMM pilot: 
 Contribution to rural electrification; 
 Improved welfare and poverty alleviation; 
 Improvement health and quality of life 
 Reduction in fuel costs (energy expenditure); 
 Less time for women to spend collecting wood; 
 Reduced burden on limited natural resources (energy security); 
 Reaching a minimum comfort for housing 
Does the NMM activity provide 
incentives for the private sector 
to engage and participate? 
 
Construction companies (developers) shall receive a subsi p-
c-
cording to the whole-house energy efficiency standards under the 
NMM. The compliance have to be proven when the house is finished 
(MRV). 
Furthermore the envisaged training and capacity building for devel-
opers and construction companies as well the provision of infor-
mation to house owners and buyers is planned. Additionally, 
through the pilot projects and marketing and advertisement activi-
ties the activity will help to raise awareness for energy efficiency. 
In addition, the pilot can support regional manufactures and com-
panies with access to knowledge and capacity. 
However, the incentives for private actors will depend on the na-
tional layout the government applies for the NMM. 
Is external capacity required for 
preparing / implementing the 
NMM activity? 
In order to achieve the desired level of penetration with regard to 
the energy mix in the residential sector, however, additional funds 
are needed beyond what the Peruvian government can provide. Car-
bon finance, international donors and private finance would be nec-
essary to expand the scope and impact of the sustainable housing 
initiative. The NMM pilot to be developed would provide an instru-
ment to attract and leverage additional international funding 
through the carbon market to support sustainable development in 
the residential sector in Peru. 
Findings The activity could be expected to have positive effects and to con-
tribute to sustainable development in the country. Support in the 
form of finance, technical aid and capacity building would be re-
quired (to be defined in detail).  
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9.4 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The UNFCCC aims to build the rules and procedures of a NMM in the coming years. NMM pilot 
activities are desirable to inform the UNFCCC rulemaking as well as to convince partner coun-
tries that the NMM is an attractive carbon market mechanism. As already outlined in submis-
sions on the NMM, piloting activities for the NMM face the barrier that currently i) no rules and 
procedures are in place and ii) no demand for any certified mitigation exists. 
In this context it is recommended for the German Government to engage in a NMM piloting 
activity with selected partner countries (and possibly jointly financed with other industrialized 
countries), such as for the residential sector in Peru. 
The NMM implementation checklist developed above can serve as a template for gathering 
information in a formalized fashion (for instance as a NMM Pilote Information Note). 
In this context, the checklist based assessment for the Peruvian residential sector above makes 
clear that an introduction of the described NMM activity is generally feasible. Peru fulfills the 
generic participation requirements and has been actively engaged in pushing market instru-
ments in the field of climate change, both on the national and international level. The institu-
tional framework allows for a relatively professional dealing with an NMM activity. Currently 
no major national initiatives target the sector in the sense the NMM activity would do. On the 
other hand there is strong political commitment towards fighting climate change and also the 
residential sector has been identified as a potential contributor to reducing GHG emissions in 
Peru. In this context a couple of NAMA initiatives have been put forward, hence it is important 
to understand those NAMAs and their scope and to ensure that no overlap exists. MRV ar-
rangements and baseline definition for the sector are juvenile, and so is the projection for 
emission reductions. Robust calculations for baselines and projections, and robust design for 
the MRV system are to be developed. While it is apparent that the NMM activity would result in 
positive co-benefits, the country requires support to successfully implement it. This comprises 
finance, technical aid and capacity building, of which all need to be further defined. 
The short assessment for Peru above makes clear that the current provisions put forward in 
country submissions are relatively easy to meet, if the host country is generally positive towards 
market mechanisms. But the assessment also shows that a certain degree of international re-
quirements for baselines and MRV will require host countries to provide data, run complex 
studies and set up robust schemes. This can become a major challenge for NMM activities. 
Pilote activities could explore and experience these challenges in more detail. As the NMM is a 
market mechanism, the private sector (as demand source) should be involved in a NMM pilot-
ing activity. An important barrier to private engagement is that NMM credits cannot be used 
for compliance purposes (and a rather low demand for additional credits). In the context of a 
NMM pilot activity the German Government could contribute to overcoming the existing barri-
ers, simulate the demand and for instance guarantee the purchase of a certain amount of cred-
its at a certain price to establish an incentive for private sector participation. 
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Bioclimáticas en el Perú; Electronic document, provided by e-mail on 10.08.2012 
UNFCCC 2012a: Views on the new market-based mechanism. Submissions from Parties, Addendum, 
Agenda item 3(b)(v), Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 
Fifteenth session, part two, http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/ 
6911.php?priref=600007174#beg 
UNFCCC 2012b: Views on the new market-based mechanism. Submissions from Parties, Addendum, 
Agenda item 3(b)(v), Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 
Fifteenth session, Bonn, 15-24 May 2012, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/awglca15/eng/ 
misc06.pdf 
9.6 Annex I 
The subsequent NMM implementation checklist for NMM piloting activities for demonstration 
of compliance with international modalities and procedures, was developed based on the sub-
missions of the EU and Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Republic), 
Costa Rica, Co
Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Suriname and Uganda (UNFCCC 2012 a& B). The specific origins for individual 
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9.6.1 Host Country & Participation Requirements 
Item Comment Reference 
Is the introduction of NMM 
measures consistent with 
National Policies?  
 Para 36, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 42, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 16, Page 9, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 37 Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
Is the host country ready to 
buy additional, comparable 
emission reduction units on 
the global carbon market in 
case actual emissions have 
exceeded the target for the 
relevant year? 
Indicators? CER trade? Para 52, Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
9.6.2 Measures to be applied under NMM activity 
Item Comment Reference 
Shall the NMM activity 
choose a crediting or a trad-
ing route? 
 Para 15, Page 9, 
EU, February submission 
Specify the measures to be 
applied in the sector under 
the NMM 
  
Description of ongoing activities 
with GHG benefits in the con-
cerned sector. 
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9.6.3 Description of sector coverage for NMM activitiy 
Item Comment Reference 
Is the same definition of the 
sectors, categories or sub-
categories to be covered by 
the broad segment of the 
economy used as in other 
host countries? 
If not: 
 Is the deviation 
properly justified? 
 Is the definition sub-
ject but not technology 
specific? 
Is the definition including all 
covered installa-
tions/activities of the sector? 
 Para 25, Page 10, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 8.1, Page 11, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
26 Page 10, 
EU, February submission 
Is an analysis of potential 
risks of carbon leakage in-
cluding potential volumes 
available? 
If yes, does it describe 
measures to prevent or limit 
those effects? 
 Para 54, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 4.2, Page 7, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 27, 
Page 10, 
EU, February submission 
Is an analysis of double 
counting including potential 
volumes available? 
If yes, does it describe 
measures to prevent or limit 
those effects? 
  
9.6.4 Institutional Arrangements 
Item Comment Reference 
Is a Designated National Au-
thority for NMM implemen-
tation (and compliance with 
modalities and procedures 
for the NMM, other relevant 
guidelines and international 
rules) appointed and in 
place? 
  Paragraph 3.2, Page 6 and 
Para 3.4e page 7, EU Novem-
ber 2012 submission and 
Para 24, Page 10, 
EU, February submission 
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Item Comment Reference 
Alternative: Which Entity 
could serve as the NMM DNA 
(e.g. CDM DNA)? 
Are stakeholder dialogues 
institutionalized? 
  
9.6.5 MRV Arrangements 
Item Comment Reference 
Is a national registry or ar-
rangements for use of an 
international registry admin-
istered by the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat in place? 
 Para 3.4d, Page 7, EU No-
vember submission 
Is adequate monitoring and 
reporting of emissions of the 
sector in place? 
 Para 11.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
3.4c, Page 7, EU November 
submission 
Is there a clear allocation of 
responsibilities for MRV & 
handling of data? 
(could also be moved up to 
institutional arrangements 
above) 
 Para 11.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
3.4c, Page 7, EU November 
submission 
Are provisions for transpar-
ency of monitoring and re-
porting existent? 
 Para 11.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
3.4c, Page 7, EU November 
submission 
Are provisions on data, 
sources, quality, use of factors 
including default factors and 
conservativeness established? 
 Para 11.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
3.4c, Page 7, EU November 
submission 
Is the independent verifica-
tion of actual emissions be-
ing exercised or planned? 
 Para 11.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
3.4c, Page 7, EU November 
submission 
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9.6.6 Baseline Determination 
Item Comment Reference 
Does every sector, category 
or sub-category included in 
the broad segment of the 
economy in the host country 
have a separate baseline? 
 Para 29, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission 
Does the baseline include all 
relevant sources of GHG 
emissions in the sector? 
 Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
31, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 9.4 Page 13, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 9.1, 
Page 12, EU November sub-
mission 
Does the baseline use the 
same methods and criteria 
for calculating baselines as in 
the same sector in different 
countries (e.g. IPCC ap-
proaches)? 
 Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
31, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 9.4 Page 13, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 9.1, 
Page 12, EU November sub-
mission 
Does the baseline period start 
no earlier than 01. January 
2013? 
 Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
31, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 9.4 Page 13, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 9.1, 
Page 12, EU November sub-
mission 
Does the baseline use the 
most conservative baseline 
scenario? 
 Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
31, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 9.4 Page 13, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 9.1, 
Page 12, EU November sub-
mission 
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Item Comment Reference 
Is the baseline data the most 
reliable data available, in-
cluding actual sector data? 
publicly available? 
 Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
9.1, Page 12, EU November 
submission 
Do the baselines take into 
account: 
 policies and measures in-
cluding those at an ad-
vanced stage of develop-
ment 
 CDM projects 
 technological developments 
 population, 
 economic growth 
other socio-economic factors? 
 Para 30, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 9.1, Page 12, EU No-
vember submission 
Are revisions every 5 years 
included in the proposal of 
the baseline period? 
 Para 9.3a Page 13, EU No-
vember submission 
If baseline period other than 
[5] years is proposed: is it 
sufficiently justified (e.g. due 
to unsuitability in the broad 
segment of the economy or 
consistency with mitigation 
pledges) 
 Para 9.3b Page 13, EU No-
vember submission 
Are the baselines guided by 
the following principles: 
 Accuracy, 






 Para 32, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 28, Page 10, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 33, Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
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9.6.7 Projection of Emission Reductions and Thresholds/Targets 
Item Comment Reference 
Is the threshold set according 
to (one/more) the following 
criteria? 
 In the range of 10-30% be-
low baseline 
 Consider GHG mitigation 
potential, overall capability, 
financing received or ex-
pected and greenhouse gas 
mitigation pledges 
 Applying objective criteria 
(performance benchmarks, 
where feasible); 
 Following detailed rules on 
establishment of thresholds 
adopted by the COP 
 Para 9.2 Page 12, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 34, 
Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
Is the crediting/trading peri-
od consistent with the period 
covered by the developing 
country pledge for appropri-
ate own action pre and post 
2020 
 Para 36, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 42, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 16, Page 9, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 37 Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
Does the stringency of the 
crediting threshold or sector 
target reflect respective ca-
pabilities in the sector and in 
the country? 
 Para 36, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 42, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 16, Page 9, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 37 Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
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Item Comment Reference 
Is the threshold set according 
to (one/more) the following 
criteria? 
 In the range of 10-30% be-
low baseline 
 Consider GHG mitigation 
potential, overall capability, 
financing received or ex-
pected and greenhouse gas 
mitigation pledges 
 Applying objective criteria 
(performance benchmarks, 
where feasible); 
 Following detailed rules on 
establishment of thresholds 
adopted by the COP 
 Para 9.2 Page 12, EU Novem-
ber submission and Para 34, 
Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
Are thresholds consistent 
with broader agreed mitiga-
tion objectives of the host 
country? 
 Para 36, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 42, Page 11, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 16, Page 9, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 37 Page 11, 
EU, February submission 
9.6.8 Environmental Impacts & Co-benefits 
Item Comment Reference 
Is the implementation of the 
NMM contributing to sus-
tainable development within 
the country? /  
 Para 12.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
12.2 Page 14, EU November 
submission 
Are processes to ensure con-
tribution of market mecha-
nisms to sustainable devel-
opment existing? 
 Para 12.1 Page 14, EU No-
vember submission and Para 
12.2 Page 14, EU November 
submission 
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Item Comment Reference 
Does the NMM contribute to 
domestic capacity building 
and economic development? 
 Para 13 Page 8, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 17, Page 5, 
submission 
Does the NMM activity pro-
vide incentives for the private 
sector to engage and partici-
pate? 
 Para 13 Page 8, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 17, Page 5, 
submission 
Is external capacity required 
for preparing / implementing 
the NMM activity? 
 Para 13 Page 8, 
EU, February submission and 
Para 17, Page 5, 
submission 
 
